War of the First Coalition
5 August 1796
French: Napoleon Bonaparte, 26,414 (22,764 infantry, 2,466 cavalry, 32 guns)
Austrians: Dagobert Sigmund von Würmser 14,623, rising to 27,964 by midday, (24,555 infantry, 2,571 cavalry, 64 guns)
Weather: Hot. Dry.
Dawn Twilight: 04:33 Sunrise: 05:07 Sunset: 19:39 Twilight Ends: 20:12 Moonrise: 07:25 new moon (i.e. a black night)
(calculated from U.S.Naval Observatory site)
The Sucker Punch
Castiglione has been known by most military historians as the embryonic, quintessential Napoleonic battle. It has been analyzed as the prototype that Bonaparte used for his ultimate winning formula for many of his future big battles— well Austerlitz in 1805, anyway, Friedland in 1807, and Bautzen in 1813. I call it the "Sucker Punch".
Basically, the idea was this: Feign a retreat, getting your enemy to lunge at you in pursuit. Then, when he is disorganized, turn around to pin him and hit him from the side or the rear. Of course, Bonaparte didn't invent this strategy. It had been used by generals as far back as Alexander.
That's all I wanted to say. End of article.
Map of the positions and movements at dawn on 5 August. I had originally made this hi-res map with a lot more forests represented, and greener land, using Bernhard Voykowitsch's excellent and detailed maps and Google Maps Satellite View as reference. But Voykowitsch points out in his book that the battlefield was a lot more barren than it is today,, mostly because of thousands of feral goats who'd strip the countryside bare back then. Like locusts. Locust goats. Gogusts.
Map protected by Digimarc embedded copyright, © Jeffery P. Berry Trust. Note that a hi-res version of this file (1 px = 1 yd) is for sale for personal use (with or without troop markers. Go to the Maps page of this site for details.
Hah! Sucker! As if I'd ever do a short post. Now, off to the battle!
But first, a little background.
I know...BORING! But I need to put this battle into context. And you need this, trust me.
Castiglione came about after a whole bunch of similar battles that Bonaparte had been fighting with various Austrian armies since the spring of 1796 when he first took command of the Army of Italy for the new French Republic. The 26-year-old Corsican had just married the ex-mistress of his political sponsor, Paul Barras, Josephine Beauharnais (a dried-up old lady of 32). Barras, President of the Republic's recently formed Directory, had apparently thought a charming wedding present was to award command of France's l'Armée d'Italie to the boy general. Josephine (played patiently by Vanessa Kirby in that recent, awful, disappointing movie, Napoleon) soon joined him on their honeymoon in Milan, mid-campaign. Bonaparte was a hopeless romantic, and in love. But he was able to focus.
The army he had been given had been languishing from neglect since the war had begun in 1792. The revolutionary government in Paris had long thought Italy was a secondary front. Compared to Belgium and the German frontier, Paris didn't think Italy was worth it to actually...oh...you know...pay the soldiers in its army down there. Or feed them. Or arm them. Most were shoeless. Barely had pants (hence the epithet sans culottes, evidently). And many didn't even have muskets or ammunition. It was felt that their revolutionary zeal, their élan, should be enough to bowl the decadent Austrians over. One idea had been to just arm them with old-fashioned pikes.
Bonaparte had other ideas. To him, the vulnerable underbelly of France's most powerful enemy on the Continent, Austria, was up over the Alps through Italy. And if he could take these starving, pantsless soldiers and drive that enemy out of Italy and then invade Austria from the south, he could write his own ticket...politically, anyway.
Napoleon was indefatigable. He had a self-confidence that was infectious, élan indeed. And he could give inspiring pep talks to the dispirited troops. Evidently this optimism and charisma also touched the older and more experienced (not to mention, taller) generals of the Army of Italy —Massena, Augereau, Sérurier, Despinois, Sauret, Kilmaine —who got up and proceeded to bitch-slap the Piedmontese and Austrians in one battle after another, from west to east across the Lombard plain. King Victor Amadeus III of Sardinia (actually Piedmont, also Savoy, though I don't know why they called him King of Sardinia), realizing his Austrian "allies" were fickle and costing his country more than the French, sued for a separate peace, taking the Piedmontese out of the war and allowing Bonaparte to secure his lines of communication to France and the coast. He was also able to focus on the primary enemy, Austria.
Bonaparte pushed one Austrian army after another farther east. At the same time, instead of waiting for sustenance for his men from France, he instituted a policy of liberating the locals —at least of their food, shoes, and clothing. Coming down off the barren Apennine mountains and the coastal range, into the fertile Lombard plain, the Army of Italy refound its strength. And started to kick butt.
The young general also made forays into the Papal states in the south and extorted Pope Pius VI for millions of lire (ducats, semoleons, or whatever the currency they used) and a lot of muskets and heavy artillery. He got the cities in Tuscany (like Florence, Lucca, Pisa, and Livorno), which had been domineered by the Pope, to opt for neutrality and kick the British Royal Navy out of the port of Livorno, securing his maritime access to Nice and the French Mediterranean ports. He was doing what no other French general had been able to do since the Revolution started.
The Army of Italy loved their young, new leader. So did the Directory. He was so successful in pushing back the Austrians, under General Beaulieu, all the way back to the border of the Republic of Venice, that they started to actually send his army reinforcements and supplies from France. It looked to everyone, after four years of stalemate in this war, that victory might actually come. The Republic evidently had finally found its hero.
By the beginning of June, Bonaparte had driven Beaulieu clear out of Italy and back up into the Tyrol. Napoleon was set to rest his army and commence to march up the shores of Lake Garda and through the Alps, invading Austria proper and forcing its capitulation. Except for one, tiny little detail.
Mantua, Damn it!
The Austrians still held onto the city of Mantua, near the confluence of the Mincio and the Po Rivers...and with a pretty sizable force, over 13,000 men. As long as Mantua was in his rear, Bonaparte's lines of communication to Milan and France were threatened. So he had to take it before he launched his final project of marching up to Austria. Fortunately, from his raiding expedition south to the Papal states, he now had quite a few heavy siege guns. So with his expert engineers and artillery, he began his investment of the city on 4 June. But besides the large garrison and formidable defenses, Mantua posed one other problem. It was situated on an island in the middle of the Mincio, which spread out around it like a large lake. There were only four long causeways into the city, two from the left bank and two from the right. He had his men try twice to storm the these bridges, but they were thrown back. So he had to settle in for a long siege.
British map of Mantua from 1800. You can see how the Mincio River widens into a lake here, making the city essentially an island. Clearly not an easy place to take.
Meanwhile, the Hofkriegsrat (War Council) in Vienna, couldn't just let Italy go. Beaulieu and his army, who had fled all the way back into the Tyrol, were in no shape to try to take it back. So Vienna decided to take one of their most experienced and inspiring generals, FML Dagobert Sigmund von Würmser (I do love that adorable name!), and much of their army in Bavaria and send them south to relieve Mantua, take back Lombardy, and eject Bonaparte once and for all. This new expedition took nearly two months to organize. But by the end of July, Würmser and some 47,000 men had moved down through the Alpine passes in three columns to attack the French.
Bonaparte, meanwhile, had spread out his operations from Brescia to Verona, and from Rivoli up near the Alpine pass down to Mantua, an area roughly 37 x 64 miles (60 x 103 km, or 296 x 512 furlongs, or 622,000 hectares) guarding the main passes up to Austria (see Strategic Situation map below). His army had dwindled to about 34,000, even with reinforcements from France, but not including the troops besieging Mantua. He also had to deal with local riots from the Italians who, it turns out, hadn't been so keen on their liberation by the Republican san-culottes (liberation mostly of their money and food). From their point of view, they were forced to trade one foreign occupier (Austria) with another (France), as they had had to endure for centuries. And, at least the Austrians had been as rapacious as the Revolutionary French.
So with Bonaparte spread out and reduced to about 34,000, Würmser had a numerical advantage with his close to 47,000. An advantage he squandered by coming down in three widely dispersed columns. FML Peter Vitus von Quosdanovich, with his 18,000, was wending his way through the passes on the west side of Lake Garda, with the target of Brescia. Quosdanovich's goal was to cut off Bonaparte's lines of communication to Milan.
Würmser himself, with the largest column of 24,000 was coming down Lake Garda on the eastern shore, though Rivoli, to come at the French from that direction in a pincer move, which, when you see how the subject battle of this post turns out, is kind of ironic.
His third column, under FML Meszaros, about 5,000 men, was approaching from much farther east, through Vicenza, with the goal of relieving the garrison at Mantua.
At first, things were going pretty well for the Austrians. By 31 July Quosdanovich drove in Sauret's division from up at Salo on the western shore of the lake, making it as far as Gavardo, just 16 miles (26 km) from Brescia. He sent some cavalry over to Brescia to seize that town, which Bonaparte abandoned as his headquarters and move down to Castiglione. Meanwhile Würmser drove south and east, pushing Massena, Augereau, Kilmaine, and the rest back across the Mincio. Meszarros relieved Vincenza on the Adige and began to head down to Mantua to relieve them.
Bonaparte had to abandon his siege of Mantua...at least temporarily. He ordered Sérurier, who had been in charge of that siege, to break off, spike what big guns he could, and make his way east to Marcaria. He also sent orders to the rest of his army to consolidate around Castiglione to take care of Quosdanovich first. This they did in a sharp battle on 3 August around at the town of Lonato, just to the north of Castiglione.
On 1 August, Würmser, after having pushed the French west of the Mincio toward Castiglione, got distracted and moved south to Mantua himself. His orders from the Hofkriegsrat had been first to relieve Mantua, then to drive Bonaparte out of Italy. Since it seemed like all the French were fleeing westward, he concluded that they were retreating pell-mell back to Milan. And he wanted to resupply the Mantua garrison, haul in the French siege guns, and dismantle their works. In this he wasted three vital days.
By 3 August, Würmser had finally moved his army back up to the vicinity of Solferino, near Castiglione. He was disturbed that he hadn't heard from Quosdanovich, and, for some reason, was unaware that that general had been sharply checked at Castiglione, Lonato, and Gavardo and was in the process of taking his 18,000 men back up the western side of Lake Garda back to the Tyrol
Then everything changed.
Bonaparte, far from having retreated back to Milan, had condensed his position between Würmser and Quosdanovich. He had dealt with the threat to his own lines of communication from the latter by coming at him from three directions, (Despinois had retaken Brescia), and forcing him to pull back his whole column way back up north. Now he could turn and deal directly with Würmser and the main Austrian army, which was lining up in front of Solferino, just to the east of Castiglione. On the afternoon of the 3rd, he sent meticulous orders down to Sérurier at Mantua (actually, Sérurier was sick that morning and had turned his command over to Fiorella) to break off from the remaining works to the southwest of Mantua and arrive at Guidizollo, to the left rear of Würmser's line at exactly 06:30 on the 5th. Timing was critical, he emphasized. No sooner. No later. Zero-six-thirty. (I like to imagine him talking in Frank Oz's Yoda voice)
In setting up his battle plan, Bonaparte was meticulous with everyone. One advantage the French Army had at this stage over the Austrians was superior organization and staff work. While the Austrians were organized roughly as a loose collection of regiments, run like small family businesses, and had a rather amateurish field staff system, the French had divisions and brigade structures, with supporting staff. This allowed their commander to shift divisions and brigades from task to task and within subordinate commands smoothly, and without ruffling aristocratic feathers. If anything, this was Bonaparte's real advantage, more than his strategic genius.
This was going to be good.
For his part, Würmser felt confident the evening of the 4th. Though he had still not heard from Quosdanovich and the western column for three days, and was unaware that he had retreated back up to the north, he felt he was in a strong posture. He had accomplished his first goal, relieving Mantua and now he held a strong position to the west of Solferino, hinged on its iconic tower (La Rocca). He had some 28,000 men and twice the artillery of Bonaparte. He had begun earthworks to position those guns on the northern and southwestern flanks of his position, so the French, who were massing about a mile to the west, in the direction of the village of Grole, could be enfiladed if they tried to attack. He had some intelligence that a small French force (Sérurier’s division) had left Mantua and seemed to be moving north toward Gioto. He had sent off an order to Maszaros, who had gone down to Borgoforte to guard the crossing of the Po, to move his 5,000 cavalry up to engage them before they got to Goito. To Würmser's northeast rear, the only threat to his lines of communication were the still untaken fortress at Peschiera, at the southeast tip of Lake Garda. But the small French garrison there was locked in by a reserve force of some 11,000 men under Bajalich, Vukassevich, and Weidenfeld, thus securing his own line of retreat should things go badly.
Which they would.
The First Punch
At 05:00, just before sunrise, Bonaparte gave the order for the feigned attack to begin. He specifically didn't want all of Augereau's and Massena's divisions to charge; just a token demibrigade (what the Republican Army called a "regiment" at this time) from each, coming out of the pre-dawn gloom — just enough to fool the enemy. So from Augereaus's sector, the 4e Demibrigade, supported by the 22e Chasseurs-a-Chevals, about 2,300 men, formed up in columns of attack and charged, using the tower on top of La Rocca as their aim point. The rest of Augereau's battalions were lying down in line about a mile to the west of the Austrian line, reducing their exposure to the massed battery of guns in the northern, Second Redoubt. Farther to the north, Massena's division started their own half-hearted demonstration with only one battalion of the 11e Demibrigade, while the rest held back. (See detailed battle map at the top of this post). There was a lot of yelling and singing of "Ça ira! Ça ira!" by the few Frenchmen in these two forlorn hopes. But after a few musket volleys and artillery blasts from the Austrians, they dutifully scurried to the rear to take shelter behind their prone support.
This apparently did the trick. Both Shubirz and Spiegel's troops or the right and center both ran forward to chase the French, thinking they had won the battle. But Würmser and his division commander on that wing, FM Davidovich, knew better and galloped up to order the men back.
At the same time, on the far left of the Austrian line, anchored on the First Redoubt, the French General Beaumont led his cavalry (1,263 troopers), three battalions of grenadiers (some 800 men), and twelve guns under Marmont down to flank that sector. The Austrian battery there (about 16 guns) was behind half-constructed fieldworks on top of what was euphemistically called "Monte" Medolano. It was hardly a "monte" at all; barely a rise in the surrounding flat plain. And it was only protected by a regiment of Erdody Hussars, a squadron of uhlans (884 troopers total), and the gunners themselves. Soon Marmont's horse artillery had unlimbered and were firing at the ill protected Austrian guns in enfilade. Shots were also bouncing over the small farm at Monte Medolano and hitting the white-coated infantry of the Alvintzy and Gemmingen regiments in the flank. These began to turn right and retreat back toward Solferino, completely exposing the left flank of the whole army.
After about half-an-hour of this fire, Verdier's three battalions of grenadiers charged and overran the Austrian battery, capturing all the guns, and turning them around to fire up the backsides of the retreating white-coats. Meanwhile, Beaumont's 1,200 cavalry (1e & 7e Hussards, 5e Dragons, and 10e Chasseurs) moved eastward to take the Austrian line from the south.
At 06:30 Bonaparte judged the time was right to start the main, pinning assault—the sucker part of the punch. Word reached him that Fiorella had showed up on time to the southeast and was commencing his own attack up from Guidizollo toward Cavriana, into the left rear of Würmser's line. A half-hour early, but, still: Excellent! So Bonaparte, Augereau, and Massena all called the men to their feet and personally led the whole army forward, rushing toward that tower on La Rocca, bayonets lowered.
Battle of Castiglione engraving by Carle Vernet, 1840. You can see the distinctive Rocca tower in the center distance, near Solferino. The mountains in this picture are a bit more steep than in reality, but we can chalk that up to artistic license. And Vernet is showing the French advancing in line, though most of the narratives and contemporary tactical doctrine for the Republican infantry then had them advancing in battalion columns of attack (two companies abreast and four companies deep, or 12 ranks). "What difference does that make?" I can hear some of you saying, "It's just art!". But it makes a difference to wargamers and military historians, trust me.
Below is my interpretive map of Phase 2 of Bonaparte's battle plan, based on my synthesis of Voykowitsch's, Chandler's, and Esposito's narratives, as well as Berthier's original map. The French battalions are represented in the actual dimensions of columns of attack. The Austrians received them in line, which gave them superior firepower. Also the French have overrun both the First and Second Redoubts (at Monte Medolano and west of Solferino) and captured all the guns there. Map protected by Digimarc embedded copyright, © Jeffery P. Berry Trust. As I noted before, a hi-res, 1 yd/px, of this map is available for sale for personal use, with or without troop markers. Go up to the Maps page of this site for details.
But Dagobert's mom didn't raise no sucker.
Meanwhile, General Fiorella (that division's second-in-command, because Sérurier was sick) had led a grueling 19 mile (31 km), night-long march all the way up from Marcaria (see campaign map above) and arrived, as ordered, at Guidizollo, precisely at 06:00. They were just south of the battlefield and behind Würmser's position at Solferino. As I mentioned above, three days before, Würmser had sent Meszaros specific orders to shadow Sérurier to prevent him from reaching the battlefield, but Meszaros had been a day late and a dollar short. About 06:00, admittedly a half-hour earlier than Bonaparte had intended, Fiorella started his attack with seven battalions, two dragoon squadrons, and eleven guns (3,651 men) up toward Cavriana to hit the Austrian line in the left rear.
Nobody panicked on the Austrian side, though,. True, things were definitely not going as hoped, but the troops and their leaders maintained their discipline. Few broke. Even those regiments on the extreme southwest flank hit by Marmont's enfilading artillery managed to form right and march back toward Solferino in some order. As soon as Würmser got intelligence of Fiorelli's appearance down by Guidizollo, and of the taking of the First Redoubt at Monte Medolano, he had GM Mittrovsky quickly move his second line south to Cavriana and form up 90° to meet the new threat from that direction (see battle map above). Likewise, the Hungarian hussars (Erdody and Erzherzog Josef) met the French cavalry and assault on the Austrian left. In the center Würmser, along with Davidovich's, Sebettendorf's, Spiegel's, Liptay's, and Gummer's help, personally stabilized the troops, even leading them from the front in counter-charges. Liptay himself was badly wounded in a counter-attack. Würmser, the 72-year-old Commander-in-Chief, was rallying his regiments from the front like his youngest lieutenant! He was no wilting flower. Everybody did their professional best.
But after an hour or more of this resistance, and with the arrival of the rest of Despinois' division from Castiglione to put pressure on the Austrian center at Pozzo Catena (see map above), Würmser realized he was losing the battle and ordered a controlled retreat back through Solferino to the east. Telescoping inward and then marching eastward, one battalion at a time funneled through the streets of the town and then marched toward Borghetto, the nearest crossing over the river, 8 miles (13 km) away.
In so doing, Würmser and his subordinates were able to avoid the destruction of his army. He was greatly aided later in the morning by the timely appearance of Oberst Franz Weidenfeld, followed by GM Bajalich and their combined 6,000 fresh troops from Peschiera. These were able to intercept the pursuing French and stop them short. Weidenfeld was later honored by the Kaiser for his heroic action in saving the Austrian army at Castiglione. This reminds me of a similar action my own great-great-grandfather took part in at Snodgrass Hill in 1863, arriving just in time with his brigade to hold back the victorious Confederates hordes from pursuing the retreating Union Army, which had just lost the Battle of Chickamauga. Both Weidenfeld and Gen.George Thomas were like Hodor in Game of Thrones.
Victor-Jean Adam's 1835 salon painting of the battle, depicting Bonaparte leading from the rear (apparently, if we can have any faith in eyewitnesses or his own reports to the Directory, Bonaparte led from the front, as he had at Lodi and later that same year at Arcola.) The hills are less steep in this painting than in the 1840 Vernet engraving above, and more bare, as Bernhard Voykowitsch describes the landscape in his thorough book on the battle.
Bonaparte was both pleased and frustrated. It wasn't a complete victory. In his official dispatch to Paris he reported that the enemy lost some 3,000 killed and captured, and around two dozen guns. But they got away, more or less intact, as had Quosdanovich the day before with his 16-18,000. Also,Würmser wasn't done yet. And the young French genius realized that he had another long campaign ahead of him.
The French, for their part, reported losses of 415 killed, wounded, and missing. The most serious casualties were in the 18e Legere (60 KWM) which had been checked by Weidenfeld in the pursuit after the battle, and 228 from the 4e Demibrigade, which had been the sole participant in Augereau's initial banzai charge at the beginning of the battle. Otherwise the French losses were relatively minor. By the rules of traditional, 18th century warfare, the French had taken the field and suffered the fewest casualties. But both sides saw it differently, though.
To Würmser he had accomplished his primary goal; relief of Mantua. He had managed to drive the investing French back, destroy their earthworks, capture their siege guns, resupply and reinforce the garrison. Mantua was secure..at least for now. And while he didn't drive Bonaparte back west, out of Italy, he felt he had checked him. He also saved most of his army. Reaching the bridge over the Mincio at Borghetto, he managed to get all of his troops across without further loss and then had the bridge destroyed. He decided to march back up the eastern shore of Lake Garda, back to the Tyrol (where Quosdanovich had gone) to regroup, refit, and resupply. He'd continue his campaign in the fall.
Bonaparte, meanwhile, had restarted his siege of Mantua, which would continue until February of the next year. He had several more battles to fight, including a second assault from Würmser in September.
So Castiglione could hardly be considered a decisive battle. Was it, though, the embryonic Napoleonic battle plan? The thing that defined his military genius?
Armchair General Section
I know that Castigilione has long been considered by military historians as the prototype of Napoleon's tactical system, one that he was supposed to have applied repeatedly throughout his career. Namely, get the enemy to think you are scared and ready to retreat, then, when he's committed to attacking you on one wing, hit him from an unexpected direction. He did do this again at Austerlitz in 1805. And at Bautzen in 1813.
But at Eylau in 1806, Napoleon had attempted a sucker punch attack on the Russians by pinning their center and having Davout's corp launch a flank attack, as at Castiglione. But this ended up not working either. The Russians, like Würmser , realigned their front to meet Davout's attack. The result was just a mass slaughter on both sides, without a decisive result.
He then did another attempt at a pinning attack at Friedland the next year. It started well, feigning weakness on the western bank of the Alte River and getting the Russian Bennigsen to rush his army across into a cul-de-cac. But this "feigning weakness" strategy was just happenstance. It wasn't part of Napoleon's plan in that battle, even if he took advantage of it as he brought his main army eastward quickly and had Ney make his flank attack. In the end, though, Friedland was not an elegant, Napoleonic battle, but another abattoir, mostly characterized by brutal frontal assaults.
In fact, virtually all of of Napoleon's other big battles were also just straight-ahead, knock-down, drag-out affairs, without this artful misdirection or clever maneuvering designed to fool the enemy. At Borodino, for instance, Marshal Davout had even pressed for him to do a Castiglione on a grand scale; pinning the Russians in the north and center and sweeping around them from the south. But Napoleon (who was, apparently sick that day) rejected that strategy in favor of just a costly, straight-ahead attack into the strongest part of the Russian center, costing an estimated 75,000 casualties!
Ironically, Napoleon himself fell victim to his own Castiglione at Waterloo, when, thinking he had Wellington on the run (he had withdrawn behind the ridge), got pinned by the British while Blucher and the Prussians hit him from the southeast at the end of the day, causing his final defeat. In fact, this sucker punch worked so much better on Napoleon himself than on Würmser nineteen years before. Würmser saved his army and came back to fight again in a month. Napoleon got packed off to St. Helena.
I do love poetic justice.
Wargaming Castliglione
As a stand-alone battle, Castiglione was actually a near run thing, which, I should think, would make for an interesting wargame. Two of the special considerations should be:
1. French predilection for column attacks. The French sans culottes soldiers, preferring aggressive, bayonet charges, were not so well trained at this stage of the wars to attack in line. Linear attacks, while good for musketry, took too long under enemy fire, and became disorganized too easily, given the state of the Republican Army's training in 1796. But column attacks were faster moving, and easier to keep together. They were, essentially, mobs. They were also more vulnerable to enemy guns and musketry.
2. Austrian preference for the line. The Austrians, on the other hand, being a traditional Age of Enlightenment army, preferred thin lines and massed volleys. They were well trained in this. They could move in live more securely than the French, could change formation (from line to column and back, for instance), and they were less vulnerable to enemy cannon fire.
Scenarios to experiment with
1. Fiorella does not arrive in time. See what happens if Fiorella does not show up on the south side of the battlefield at 06:00. Would this change the balance of the battle? Roll a dice (or some other chance generator) each turn to see if Fiorella arrives.
2. Bonaparte orders an all-out attack at dawn. Instead of a tentative, teasing attack with a couple of demibrigades, see what happens if the French side launches an all-out attack up toward Solferino from the get go. This might have pinned Wurmser's line sooner so that when Fiorella struck he might not have been able to redeploy his second line to meet him.
3. Weidenfeld and Bajalich show up earlier in the morning. Together these two had 6,000 troops marching down from Peschiera. See if that would've made a difference had they started arriving on the north side of Solferino (the Austrian right) against Massena. Like with the arrival of Fiorella for the French, use a die roll or some randomization generator.
4. Quosdanovich doesn't retreat all the way back to the Tyrol. Instead, he moves only as far as, say Sabbia or Salo, (see Strategic Map above), which would put the Austrian players in a position to threaten the French lines of communication, possibly even doing a reverse sucker punch on Bonaparte himself.
5. Würmser doesn't extend his line down to Monte Medolano. Instead, the Austrian player can set up his line so that it bends back toward San Cassiano and Cavriana from the beginning. This would protect from a flank attack from Fiorella (which Würmser evidently already suspected), and it would give the Austrian player some fortified cascini and villages to anchor on. I confess that I play-tested this scenario myself with remarkable success for the Austrian side.
An After-note (written a month after this original post)
I myself wargamed this particular battle to test some of the propaganda and historical claims. First there was the assumption that Bonaparte turned a numerical disadvantage around by distracting Würmser while he brought up his strength and outmaneuvered him. But, at the start of the battle, and until the late morning, Bonaparte already greatly outnumbered Würmser by nearly 2:1. He didn't need to distract, delay, or throw him off while building up this own force.With Fiorella's early arrival at 06:00, he had the numerical and positional advantage over the Austrian from the get-go. My wargames reflected this each time.
The other thing I noted in my tests; while Bonaparte had an initial manpower advantage, Würmser had a 2:1 superiority in artillery, in both tubes and calibers (according to Voykowwitsch's OOBs). The Austrian batteries deployed in the center (at the 2nd Redoubt) decimated the French attacks in Augereau's sector, costing many units up to 50% casualties and sending them retreating in disorder. The French did have the advantage on the southwest wing for a time (with Marmont's battery, the grenadiers, and Beaumont's cavalry attacking Monte Medolano), but in the first two games I was able to easily swing back the Austrian wing to meet them and hold them off (Würmser had the advantage of interior lines and could quickly reinforce any threatened sector, like Meade did at Gettysburg).
In the second game, I had Bonaparte begin his all-out attack at dawn, instead of making probing attacks to distract Würmser. These ended in the same way, with mass casualties on the French side and the Austrians making a more-or-less ordered withdrawal eastward.
In my third game, I began with Würmser deploying his army more tightly around Solferino (extending southeast toward Cavriana instead of toward Monte Medolano--Scenario 5 above). He undoubtedly had been made aware of Fiorella's approach from that direction during the night. This scenario resulted in a catastrophic defeat for Bonaparte.
PS: This is one popular battlefield.
This particular battle wasn't the first or the last fought on this exact field. Besides the one the day before, on 3 August, a battle had been fought at this very site in 1706 during the War of the Spanish Succession, also between the French and the German Imperialists. Then, later, in 1859, during the Second Italian War of Independence, Il Risorgimento, a much bigger battle was again fought on this very battlefield, called the Battle of Solferino, then, again between the French, under another Napoleon, and the Austrians. One can imagine the French and Austrians saying each century, "Same place?"
Messonier's "Battle of Solferino 1859" painted in 1863, with Napoleon III observing the battle from the same position (at least in this painting) as his great uncle in the Adam painting above. You can see La Rocca tower above Solferino over in the right distance.
Views of the Battlefield today
The following were taken from Google Maps, the first four from the top of La Rocca, that landmark tower above Solferino.The land today is much greener than it probably was in August of 1796.
View south looking down at Solferino town. from La Rocca. The Austrian line extends down on the right of this picture. Photograph Mattia Ravarelli from Google Maps
Below, looking east from La Rocca, toward Borghetto, in the direction of the Austrian retreat. Photograph Giovanni Merini from Google Maps
Below, looking north toward Lake Garda and the Alps. Again, probably lusher than it was in the summer of 1796 but you can see how relatively flat it was. Photograph Christian Kollner from Google Maps
Orders of Battle
The following OOB lists were compiled primarily from Bernard Voykowitsch's detailed study Castiglione 1796, These are the troops that were either at the battle on the 5th or within supporting distance.
Command, besides listing the name of each command, this cell is also color-coded for the primary uniform coat color of the regiment.
Facing is color-coded in the facings of the regiment (e.g. cuffs, lapels, etc.). It also designates the command level (Division, Brigade, Regiment, Battalion, etc.) and type (Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery).
Flags displays miniatures of the flags carried into battle by the units. Where I could not find a specific reference for a flag or pennants, I would leave this blank. Note that with French infantry regiments (demibrigades) during this period, the 1st and 3rd battalions would carry a unique tricolor, while the 2nd battalion carried a universal standard for the Directory period.
Strength The strength reported by each unit on its roster on 5 Aug, as listed in Voykowwitsch's study.
Guns are the number of artillery tubes assigned to each command. Calibers of the ordnance listed on the far right.
References
Asprey, Robert, "The Rise of Napoleon Bonaparte", Basic Books, 2000, ISBN 0-465-04879-X
Chandler, David, "The Campaigns of Napoleon", MacMillan, 1966, ISBN 0025236601
Chandler, David, "Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars", MacMillan, 1979, ISBN 0-02-523670-9
Elting,
John & Esposito, Vincent, "A Military History and Atlas of the
Napoleonic Wars", Greenhill Books, 1999, ISBN 1-85367-346-3
Forty, Simon & Swift, Michael, "Historical Maps of the Napoleonic Wars", PRC, 2003, ISBN 1-85648-733-4
Haythornthwaite, Philip, "Austrian Army of the Napoleonic Wars (1): Infantry", Osprey 176, 1986, ISBN 0-85045-689-4
Haythornthwaite, Philip, "Austrian Army of the Napoleonic Wars (2): Cavalry", Osprey 181, 1986, ISBN 0-85045-726-2
Giessmann,
John, "Instrument of Victory: General Bonaparte's Army of Italy in the
1796-97 Campaign" Napoleon Magazine #9, Sept 1997
Letrun,
Ludovic, "French Infantry Flags: From 1786 to the End of the First
Empire", Histoire & Collections, 2009, ISBN 978-2-35250-112-1
McLynn, Frank, "Napoleon: A Biography", Arcade, 1997, ISBN 1-55970-631-7
Nafziger, George, "Imperial Bayonets" , Greenhill Books, 1995, ISBN 1-85367-250-5
Smith, Digby, "Napoleonic Wars Data Book", Greenhill Books, 1998, ISBN 1-85367-276-9
Voykowitsch, Bernhard, "Castiglione 1796", Helmet, Feldzug #1, 1998, ISBN 3-901923-00-4
Other reading:
Boycott-Brown, Martin, "The Road to Rivoli: Napoleon's First Campaign", 2001, Cassell, ISBN: 9780304362097
Online:
This site at Napoleon & Empire has some very interesting aerial panoramas and other landscape shots of the battlefield. https://www.napoleon-empire.net/en/battles/castiglione.php
