American Revolution
17 June 1775
Americans: Israel Putnam, William Prescott ~5,550 with 6 guns
British: Maj.Gen.Sir William Howe ~3,100 with 201 guns (including 166 on ships and 25 in the Copp's Hill fort)
Weather: Day bright, sunny, and hot. Almost no wind.
Sunrise: 04:10 Sunset: 19:25 Moon: 78% Waning Gibbous, rises at 22:06 High Tide: ~13:00
(calculated from NOAA Improved Sunrise/Sunset Calculator Site)
Misnamed Bunker Hill, this battle was actually fought a few hundred yards southeast of that bump, on a lower bump called Breed's Hill, directly overlooking the village of Charlestown and just about 1,000 yards (or within cannon range) of Boston and the warships in the Charles River, And given all the SNAFUs on both sides of this early battle of the American Revolution, it seems apt that this battle be named for the wrong place.
It will be the theme of this article that, not only was this battle named for the wrong place, it was an example of all the things that can go wrong in war: underestimating your enemy, loose lips, stupid tactical decisions, bad (or no) reconnaissance, blame gaming, sloppy command-and-control, cowardice, crummy logistical support. But there are also examples of exceptional leadership and courage.
The battle that should never have happened
In the weeks following the opening shots of the Revolution at Lexington and Concord on 19 April, the Americans had bottled the British up in Boston, which was essentially an island linked to the mainland by only a narrow neck of land to the south. The American General Artemis Ward had amassed some 15,000 minutemen around the town, building redoubts all around the city. General Thomas Gage, the Royal Governor of the Massachusetts Colony, had no control over anything outside the town of Boston.
Contemporary map showing the siege fortifications the Patriots had thrown up around Boston, as well as the relative positions of Charlestown and Cambridge.
Hearing of the temerity of the colonists' rebellion against their king, the Tory Prime Minister, Lord North, dispatched three more generals to help Gage, Sir William Howe, Sir Henry Clinton, and John Burgoyne. Neither the king nor Lord North had confidence in Gage, who they thought a colonial bumpkin. North
wanted generals with experience in the Seven Years War (a "real" war
against professional armies in Europe) to take charge and quash the upstart
"peasants" (Burgoyne's epithet for Americans). And lots of people suspected Gage's wife Margaret of being a Patriot spy. Gage, for his part, didn't appreciate the help. He thought he had things under control. And he thought (probably rightly) that he understood the Americans' grievances better than the King or the Tories in Parliament.
But the three generals arriving in late May on the frigate HMS Cerberus didn't think Gage had things under control. For one thing, though his troops had, upon their retreat from Lexington in April, erected fortifications on Bunker Hill, guarding the Charlestown peninsula and protecting Boston itself from bombardment from the north, in early May Gage abandoned Charlestown, essentially leaving the town and its commanding hills to the rebels. At the same time he ordered the town evacuated by the residents, reassuring them that he would preserve their property provided they didn't help the insurrection. All three of the new generals thought this move was dumb.
By the middle of June, Gage's force had been reinforced from England from 4,000 to 5,700 troops. On 11 June he called a war council with his three new generals to devise a strategy to free Boston from the rebel siege. General Clinton, considered the most forward-thinking strategist of the generals, proposed a two-pronged attack on the Americans. The first would storm across the Boston Neck to the south, seize the fortifications and move around to capture Cambridge. The second prong would be an amphibious assault across the Charles River to the Charlestown peninsula and then move on Cambridge from the east, catching the insurrectionists in a surprise pincer move. Everybody at this council concurred and thought this plan should be executed as soon as possible before the Rebels got any stronger. D-Day was scheduled for Sunday, the 18th, while all the pious Puritan rebels would be in church. Heh, heh, heh. That'll get 'em!
 | |
| Joseph Warren by John Singleton Copley in 1765, making him about 24 here. |
Warren wasted no time in rowing back over the Charles and getting the news to army headquarters in Cambridge. General Ward called in General Israel Putnam and ordered him to march as many men as he could muster and start building fortifications on Bunker Hill, the highest point on the Charlestown peninsula.
So, on the evening of Friday the 16th, Putnam, seconded by Col. William Prescott, marched across the Charlestown Neck with about 1,200 men, all equipped with excavation tools, to start building a fort as fast as possible.
Wait! Was it this hill? Or that one down there?
About an hour-and-a-half before sunset, Prescott had mustered his 1,200 (or so, numbers in this article are very approximate, so bear with me) and, with slung muskets; wagonloads of picks, shovels, and gabions; and six field pieces, started to march east over the narrow Charlestown Neck toward Bunker Hill. It was a little over a two mile march from Cambridge and by the time they got to the hill, it would've been after dark (sun set at 19:25). There was a waning gibbous moon rising at 22:06, so I'm not sure how much light they would've had. Some of the narratives I read said that it was a pitch black night with no moon, but I used the U.S.Naval Observatories Calculator to determine moon phase and moonrise, so by the time they got to Bunker Hill (sometime after 22:00 according to all the references I used) they would've had moonlight for the rest of the night, at least. I'm assuming nobody was carrying torches or lanterns so as not to alert the Redcoats in Boston and the ships in the river.
When they got to Bunker Hill proper, there was apparently some discussion between Prescott, Putnam, and their chief of engineers and artillery, Richard Gridley, about whether they should build the fort there on top of Bunker Hill (about 110 feet, or 34 meters. high and northwest of Charlestown town) or move farther southeast and do it on top of Breed's Hill (about 62 feet or 19 meters elevation), directly above the town and within cannon range of Boston. Of
course, they would've come across the fortifications that the
British had built on Bunker Hill two months before, right after their
retreat from Lexington. So they would've had that clue, and a head start
on completing those emplacements to face the right way (southeast). General Ward and the Committee of Safety had specifically told Putnam to build the fort on Bunker Hill. Later, in his own after-action reports, Prescott claimed that he had specific orders from his immediate commander, Putnam, to "march to Breed's Hill in Charlestown." Putnam also claimed he told Prescott to be more aggressive and move to Breed's Hill so that Gage could not ignore the provocation. All of this rationalization was undoubtedly after the fact. I wonder if, it being dark, and there weren't signs labeling Bunker and Breed's Hills; it was essentially just one long ridge line anyway, they probably just kept on marching until they got to the end of that ridge, which we now know as Breed's Hill.
 |
| Building the fort. Something I loved doing with my friends when I was a kid, too. |
Apparently at some point, and under the bright moon, a watch on the HMS Lively, anchored just off Charlestown, thought he saw and heard a lot of commotion up on the high ground above the village. He alerted the OOD (Officer of the Deck, in modern Navy terminology) who rang General Quarters (or whatever they called it in the Royal Navy back then) and by dawn, as it became apparent that there was a lot of enemy activity on the hill above the town, the captain of the Lively ordered "Shoot!" The warship began to bombard the nearly completed redoubt with its nine-pounders... At first, because the hill was high and the ramparts even higher, the shots just buried deep into the dirt harmlessly. Prescott reassured his men that they were safe and strode back and forth on top of the ramparts to prove it. But one lucky shot managed to ricochet up the slope and decapitate some extremely unlucky guy (one Asa Pollard) working in front of the breastwork. Pretty horrifying.
This first casualty of the battle stunned everyone still digging. Prescott allowed the poor man to have a memorial service and his headless body wrapped up and carried back to Cambridge. Unfortunately, too many men escorted him. During the course of the battle, in fact, desertion from the Patriots was to prove a problem.
As the sun came up, Prescott realized that the fortifications weren't nearly wide enough. To the north of the breastwork extending from the redoubt, there was another 300 yards of open ground up to the Mystic river. He needed more men to quickly build more walls up to the beach and defend his left flank. He sent an aide, John Brooks, over to borrow a horse from the artillery unit and ride back to Cambridge requesting reinforcements. Unfortunately, when the aide asked John Callender, the nearest artillery captain, if he could borrow one of his horses, the captain refused, saying he needed every horse in case he needed to withdraw the guns. So a little after 09:00 Brooks started walking the whole three miles back to headquarters in Cambridge to request the reinforcements, which were immediately ordered forward by Ward, but not until 10:00.
 |
| John Stark by Chandler Potter |
Gen. John Stark (not that John Stark from Game of Thrones) and Thomas Knowlton brought over 1,250 New Hampshire and Connecticut men as fast as possible to Breed's Hill and immediately began building makeshift fortifications from the north end of Prescott's breastwork up to the beach on the Mystic, including a rock wall that extended into the tidal zone. To plug a void between this new wall and the breastwork on the hill, Knowlton had also thrown up three flèches (V-shaped mounds) and positioned two guns of Traverton's battery to cover that flank. By early afternoon, the Americans had plugged that gap and were ready for the British response to their brazen challenge. Which was not yet ready.
The British Response
Henry Clinton, in his memoirs, said that he was the first to be aware of what the rebels were doing over on Breed's Hill. He claims he couldn't sleep that night and in taking a post-midnight walk along the docks in Boston, he heard all the clanging and clunking going on across the water and knew those were the unmistakable sounds of picks and shovels making a fort. He rushed to wake up Gage at Province
House and the Governor-General called an early morning counsel with the other three generals. Clinton proposed an immediate attack across the Charles and Howe and Burgoyne agreed. But Gage wanted to wait and see what the dawn's early light would reveal. Besides the tide was low and it would be too difficult to land troops in the shallows around the Charlestown peninsula. And maybe, he proposed, all the noise was just a feint to distract them away from their defense of the Boston Neck to the south.
 |
| Contemporary view of Boston's north side, with the fortifications at Copp's Hill in the mid-distance. |
The British plan was to start moving troops over to the eastern tip of the Charlestown peninsula at high tide, beginning around 13:00, massing on the high ground there (known as Morton's or Moulton's Hill) and when ready, commence an all out assault on the "peasant rabble" (as Burgoyne slandered them) up on Breed's Hill. All of the generals were sure that once the colonials saw the serried masses of red-coated professionals marching up the hill, they'd skedaddle without firing a shot. (Just like they did at Concord two months before...oh, wait!)
William Howe, being the senior general of the three, took charge of the operation. That morning they all could see that the Americans' left flank was completely open and Howe thought they could be swept off the hill completely by attacking that exposed sector. But it was still low tide and boats couldn't get the regiments to the shore until high tide around 13:00. So Prescott had all morning and into the mid-afternoon to complete his fortifications and seal off the left flank.
Howe felt he needed at least 3,000 troops to do the job, but there weren't enough boats in Boston to ferry that many over at once. So even after the troops were loaded onto the boats on the Long Wharf on the other side of the city, only about half of the force could be transported at a time. It wouldn't be until 15:00 that the whole force was assembled on the eastern side of Charlestown.
By this time, though, Prescott and Stark had managed to pretty much close off the whole American front from the top of Breed's Hill up to the beach on the Mystic (see the map below). The colonials were ready behind their fortifications.
Howe saw this too. By the time he had all four regiments and ten cannon lined up on top of Morton's Hill, the provincials had managed to extend their wall down to the northern beach. But he saw that the beach route was still the most opportune for turning the enemy flank. He would personally lead the column of light infantry companies (about 400 men) up that beach to attack there while the rest of the force, led by his second-in-command Col. Sir Robert Pigot, would stage a pinning demonstration against the redoubt and breastworks in the center. Meanwhile, on the left flank, below the swampy ground under Morton's Hill, Maj.John Pitcairn, of Lexington infame, would lead another pinning attack with the 47th Regiment and four companies of his Marines on the south side of the American redoubt.
The Redcoat First Attack
Just before this opening attack began, who should show up on the American side but Joseph Warren, the President of the Massachusetts Congress and the same intrepid soul who had made that dangerous spy mission into Boston two night before to alert the Americans about the British plans. It was thanks to his intelligence tip that there was a fort on top of Breed's Hill to begin with. Arriving at the redoubt, he went up to Prescott and offered his services. Since Warren had been made a major general and was the Chief Executive of Massachusetts, Prescott offered to turn over command. But Warren declined that role and said his commission by the Continental Congress hadn't arrived yet and he was just there to pick up a musket and join in the ranks of fighting men as a private soldier. You gotta love this guy. He had no ego and only a sense of duty. And was brave as you can be.
By 15:00 all of Howe's Redcoats were over the Charles and in position on Morton's Hill. After a brief opening bombardment by the ten guns he brought with him, he commenced his attack. He would personally lead the light companies in narrow column up the beach to the extreme left of the rebel position while Lt.Col. Pigot would lead the combined Grenadiers under James Abercrombie and the four regiments of regulars in standard, three-rank lines toward the American center breastwork. Pitcairn was to lead the 47th Foot and Marines toward the redoubt itself. It was supposed to be all over in ten minutes (the distance being just 680 yards, or 8.5 minutes at normal marching pace). Just in time for tea!
What's this doing here?
But, on the British side, nobody had thought to reconnoiter the ground beforehand. This was not a smooth parade ground the troops had to march over. There was tall grass, many ditches and clay pits, swampy ground, and several walls and fences, which all hindered the troops and broke up their linear formation. As Pigot's main attack marched up the 680 yards slope, they were in complete disorder. many having stopped, against orders, to shoot up at the colonials on the top of the hill. And once these groups started firing, it became difficult to get them formed up to start the charge again.
On the northern flank, Howe was leading his combined battalion of light infantry up the narrow beach. They were in tight column, just four men wide. Their left was shielded from any shots from the breastworks by a steep bank down to the sand. But as they neared their target, they saw that even the beach had a recently constructed wall of rock and rails, reaching down into the water. Nothing was firing at them until they got to within a stone's throw of that wall, and they crossed an innocuous looking stick poking out of the sand.
John Stark, who was in close command of his New Hampshire militia, had ordered his men to hold their fire until ordered. He supposedly told them that "don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes" line, but that was apocryphal, mostly for legendary purposes and written by the same guy, Parson Mason Weems, who came up with the bullshit Washington and the cherry tree story. It was more likely that Stark said "don't fire until you see the whites of their gaiters" (the white coverings at the bottoms of their red pants), which would've made more tactical sense but was not nearly a poetic as " whites of their eyes". Even more likely Stark had, as was common practice back then, a wooden stake pounded in the sand 100 feet in front of the position, giving the men a range marker. At that close range their fresh rifle fire would've had the most devastating effect. And the reminder to fire low (at the gaiters) was common sense given the musket's tendency to pull up on ignition, so the bullet would come out of the long muzzle high.
Also the tension the withholding of fire built in the attacking force would've made them very nervous, amplifying the shock when it finally came. And they probably didn't fire until Stark ordered them to anyway.
That's
when all hell broke loose. As soon as the lead British company, the 23rd Welsh Fusiliers, came up to that innocent little stick, the men behind the wall let loose
controlled volley after volley into the front ranks of the Redcoats. One
red line after another collapsed. Even though Howe himself was
supposedly leading the charge, he was miraculously spared...unless, by
"leading" he was somewhat back in the ranks, which I suspect was the
case. And because the British column was hemmed in on by the steep bank on one side and the water on the other, they weren't able to deploy to return fire. They just became a conveyor belt of slaughter.
At any rate, this did the trick. Suffering as many as 93 casualties in rank after rank, or almost a quarter of their entire strength, the British light infantry gave up their attack and stampeded all the way back to their boats on the eastern point of the peninsula. This end run had not been a good idea.Whose idea was it anyway?
Wa-a-a-a-a-a-a-it for it...
 |
| William Prescott in his signature "wa-a-a-a-a-it for it..." pose photo by Jefferson Gray |
Meanwhile, Pigot's and Pitcairn's main attack by the main force wasn't faring any better. Though Howe's orders to them were to merely create a diversion, waiting until the he himself had achieved his master stroke along the beach, the two lost control of their men. Companies began to arrive in dribs and drabs, climbing over fences, stumbling through bogs, tall grass, and ditches, and, as I mentioned, stopping against orders to fire.
All this time, the Patriot army was holding its own fire...ominously. Since they couldn't be seen behind their ramparts from below, the Redcoats may have assumed that they had run off in fear of the professional soldiers and their bayonets, as predicted. The six American guns did not fire either. Their excuse was they didn't have the right caliber ammunition (which, to be fair, might've been true).
Prescott himself was standing heroically on top of one of the ramparts, holding his hand in that "wa-a-a-a-a-a-it for it" gesture. Like Stark, his men had also hammered ranging stakes into the ground 100 feet ahead of them. These Minutemen were disciplined, at least in fire. Most didn't have bayonets. And they did tend to call it a day when they ran out of ammunition. But they could hold their fire. And they knew how to lay their pieces down on the breastworks and knew how to aim steadily accurately. They were professional hunters, after all. Many of them, too, were veterans of the French & Indian War (the North American chapter of the Seven Years War a decade before). They weren't the unruly "peasants" that Burgoyne had slandered them. In fact, most of them had more actual combat experience than the impressed Redcoats marching up toward them.
The Americans had also been told to aim for the British officers, the ones with bright scarlet coats and gorgets on their chests. This was what they had been encouraged to do during the Lexington & Concord fiasco in April. To British eyes this was most uncivilized, at least to the British officers; gentlemen didn't target other gentlemen. The British rank and file, in their dull red coats, probably didn't see the problem. However, it wasn't British practice in this era for their officers to literally lead from the front anyway. Rather, they pushed from the rear, making sure nobody ran. So whether the American marksmen could easily see the officers at first is doubtful.
The Massachusetts militia waiting for the signal to fire from Prescott (the one in blue in the center). Painting by Don Troiani. Visit his site for more examples of his exquisite historical paintings.
At the last minute, and the given signal from Prescott, the men behind the parapets all opened fire on the Redcoats in a gigantic, rolling volley. Hundreds dropped at once. None got close enough to climb down the ditch and over the ramparts to close with the Americans. And soon the whole force began to retreat back to Morton's hill, leaving the slope covered in dead and wounded.
On the southern end of the British attack, the 47th Foot and the Marines under Maj. Pitcairn had attempted a flanking maneuver around the redoubt. On the way, they found themselves pestered from the left by three companies of American snipers in the houses of Charlestown, and driven back by these and then the devastating musketry from the redoubt itself.
A Shameful Incident
On the American side there were virtually no casualties yet. However, the two batteries of John Callender and Sam Gridley (Richard's younger son) had had enough excitement. Though they hadn't fired a shot, as the British got closer, Callender waived his hat and ordered his men to limber up and retreat to save the guns. As they started running back over Bunker Hill, Putnam intercepted them on the way and asking where they thought they were going, Callender made the excuse that they had run out of ammunition and were on their way back to get more. Putnam called bullsh**t and, inspecting the ammo boxes, found they had plenty and ordered the guns back. The gunners made as if to turn around and then, when Putnam wasn't looking, they all abandoned the cannons and ran back across the Charlestown Neck. Callender was later court martialed for cowardice and cashiered. The young Gridley (because of his dad) was also court martialed but acquitted. Trevett's battery of two six pounders, though, stayed with Knowlton and fought out the rest of the battle stoically. And Putnam, finding the guns abandoned, had all the powder in the boxes taken forward to the redoubt to be distributed to the men running low on ammunition. At least that's what he testified later. Prescott said they never got such an Amazon delivery.
Howe tries again.
Howe
realized his original plan wasn't going to work. He started to rally his men for another college try. This time he wouldn't bother with the beach route, though. He'd lead the attack from Morton's Hill straight up and at the breastworks--no diversionary nonsense this time. Now that they had "reconnoitered in force" and knew the lay of the land in front of them, they'd have a better chance. Yeah. That'll do it.
While he was in the process of reorganizing his shaken regiments, Howe sent word over to Gage in Boston of the harassment they were getting from the sneaky little bastards hiding in the houses on the north side of Charlestown. The Governor-General had warned the residents of that town the month before not to harbor any insurgents or he'd burned the whole place down. The month before, as the siege drew around Boston, those residents had long since prudently packed up and moved off the peninsula, leaving the place pretty much empty. And Gage, keeping his promise, had left their town intact until now. But Prescott had dispatched three companies of snipers (about 300 men) to use the houses as cover from which to shoot at the flank of the Redcoats marching up toward the main redoubt.
Infuriated by this, Gage sent word to Vice-Admiral Graves on the Somerset to fire-bomb the town. Graves had his ship start sending rounds of incendiary shells into the houses. He also dispatched a landing party to douse the houses with pitch and set fire to them directly. In about an hour, almost the whole town was in flames. This had the desired effect of driving the snipers out of the houses, but they only dug in again up in ditches and behind walls, even closer to the southside of the redoubt, and closer to the attacking Redcoats.
 | |
| Bostonians watching the battle and burning of Charlestown. I'm just a little disturbed by parents who would put their children in such a precarious position on the roof, though. Painting by Howard Pyle. |
After he and his surviving officers had rallied and reformed his troops, Howe led another charge up the hill. This time he didn't bother with the end run up the beach. Instead, he led his regiments again in linear formation straight up the hill, toward the breastworks and redoubt.What was left of the combined grenadier and light companies led the attack, the foot regiments, 5th, 38th, 43rd, and 52nd following up in linear echelon. To the left, below the swamp, Pitcairn led the 47th and Marines toward the southern end of the redoubt.
But the outcome wasn't much different on this attack. Even though the fences, walls, grass, and obstructions weren't a surprise this time, they still posed a hindrance to the order of the wide formations. And companies still disobeyed orders not to fire, but stopped to waste more ammunition up toward the ramparts. This time, too, they had to step over the hundreds of bodies of their dead and wounded comrades from the previous aborted attack. This couldn't have helped morale. Also, the left-hand wing of the attack, by the 47th and Marines, was still being harassed by the sharpshooters on their left, who, though they'd been driven out of the houses of Charlestown by the growing fire, had still found cover behind walls and ditches from which to torment Pitcairn's men.
Howard Pyle's painting of the second assault up Breed's Hill, the Redcoats advancing in long, three-rank lines. Those would be grenadiers in the foreground. Pyle accurately has them wearing their backpacks, even though it was a hot June afternoon. And he has the town burning in the distance. Hundreds of dead and wounded men litter the ground in front of them. This is the only inaccurate part of this otherwise excellent depiction: most of the casualties from the first attack would've fallen within 100 feet of the parapet.
 |
As with the first attack, Prescott's and Stark's men held their fire until the last minute, until they could see the "whites of the enemy's gaiters" (or as the apocryphal cliche goes, "eyes"). They also had an added incentive to hold their fire because they apparently went into battle that morning with an average of only 15 rounds per man. The officers scrounged for what powder and ball they could. Some used bits of nails and other debris to load their muskets with. Prescott sent back more urgent pleas for more ammunition and for reinforcements, in vain. Even though he could clearly see troops milling around on Bunker Hill behind them, none came down to help. There were even troops that could be seen standing idly on the far side of the Charlestown Neck, but they didn't move either. What was the deal?
One thing hindering these potential reinforcements was that the British sloops-of-war HMS Falcon and HMS Symmetry (love that name) were bombarding the narrow neck, which in places was only about thirty feet wide, making it extremely hazardous for a traffic jam of soldiers to get over. This is one advantage the British still had over the Patriots; their ships and their combined 166 guns, though only half could be pointed at any time, and they couldn't be elevated enough to get over the ramparts on top of Breed's Hill. But they did pose a psychological threat. But, Stark and Knowlton managed to get their regiments over the Neck under the same gauntlet. So the ones milling about this now didn't have that excuse.
Not surprisingly, though, the outcome of this second attack on the hill was the same as the first. The British suffered massive casualties again as they were met with close range, disciplined volleys. And they never got over the ditch fronting the redoubt and breastworks. Again, almost no Americans were killed in this round. And the Redcoats beat another retreat to Morton's Hill and the landing zones.
Howe, not one to be discouraged, thought he finally figured out this problem. They'd been going about it all wrong. Instead of going up the hill in wide, tight lines, three ranks deep, which took too long. They should do it in narrow columns, four men across. That way, they could run up the hill and pour over the ramparts as fast as possible, bayonets fixed. That way, they'd reduce the time the enemy had to reload and fire again. In front of these flying columns, he'd deploy the grenadiers and what was left of the light infantry in a loose skirmish line to draw the fire of the rebels and keep their heads down. THAT'S IT!
This time, Howe also gave permission for his men to drop their cumbersome backpacks. Carrying all that useless, extra weight, and dressed, as they were, in their wool dress uniforms, they were getting pretty hot and tired on this June afternoon, after all the previous exertion.Nor could the heat from the growing conflagration next to them in Charlestown have helped. They should've had that brilliant idea at the beginning. Clearly, the British officer corps was not imbued with competence...just good connections. Most of them didn't get their commissions through merit.
Howe also sent six of his six-pounder guns forward to the northern end of the colonials' line so as to flank the central breastwork and enfilade the troops behind it. These were to prove valuable close support this time. There was a story in some of the narratives that these six-pounders were sent over to the peninsula with the wrong caliber ammunition (twelve pounder instead of six), but either that was quickly rectified or was just misinformation (like, coincidentally, the same bogus excuse that Callender had used prematurely withdraw his guns from the American side).
But Howe's problem was about to solve itself anyway because the colonials were
practically out of ammunition. They knew they weren't going to be able
to repel another attack. More men, out of bullets and powder, started
falling back. Of course, there was no way that Howe would know this. So
Prescott was determined to make as strong a show of force as possible in
the hope that the Brits would just give up, like before.
After the British had rested a bit and fell in to their new formations, they commenced their third attack. This time, as they drew near the ramparts, expecting another awful fusillade, very few shots were fired. Either most of the rebels had fled or they were out of ammo...both assumptions proved to be true. By the time of this third assault, around 18:00, it has been estimated that only about 150 men remained in the redoubt itself, while half along the flanking breastworks had withdrawn.
This time, while the colonials did manage a few shots, the Redcoats were able to roll over the ditch, up the ramparts and into the fort.
The British, in a pretty pissed-off frame of mind at having been so ravaged from the previous assaults, and having to step over the bodies of hundreds of their friends, poured into the redoubt stabbing and shooting. Whether individual Yankees were surrendering or not; the Redcoats were in no mood for mercy. On the American's side, few of them had bayonets themselves and most could only club back with rifle butts. A few of the officers had swords and did what they could with those. But they were not as prepared for hand-to-hand combat as the regulars.
Many Americans got out of the redoubt and from the breastwork while they could. It was described by the English officers as an ordered retreat, not a rout. Many colonists gave as good as they got. One, Salem Poor, a Black freedman, was credited with shooting down both Lt. Col. Abercrombie, the commander of the Grenadiers, and Maj. John Pitcairn leading the the Marines and of Lexington fame. This has been disputed by some historians and other memorists, some who claim that both Abercrombie and Pitcairn had been brought down by friendly fire from behind.
 |
| Salem Poor shooting Lt.Col. Abercrombie at Breed's Hill |
George Washington, on taking command of the Continental Army, issued an order prohibiting further recruiting of Black soldiers, he being a slaveholder from Virginia himself (an order he later rescinded, to his credit). Salem Poor, himself, stayed in and served throughout the rest of the war, in several battles.
Scene from the diorama at the Bunker Hill Museum.
Sorry. I got sidetracked. Where was I?
Oh, yes...the British finally overran the Breed's Hill fortifications. But the Americans weren't exactly fleeing in terror. Many fought back while their brothers retreated in order. This reminds me of the heroism of those few Union soldiers (including my great-great grandfather) on top of Snodgrass Hill at Chickamauga in 1863 who held off the entire Confederate army until they ran out of ammunition, while the rest of their comrades retreated.
It must have surprised the British that the Americans weren't routed, as many
expected they'd be. But rather they seemed to fall back in order to the
next fence, and then the next until they reached Bunker Hill. The
victors did not pursue them. But it was during this phase of the battle that General Joseph Warren, who, you'll remember, had come to fight as a private soldier and not a general, was shot and then bayoneted to death. He had been one of the most popular leaders of the Patriot Cause, and elected the President of the Massachusetts Congress. Prescott, Stark, Knowlton, Putnam, had all managed to come out of the fight unscathed, but the loss of this hero was truly tragic. He was only 34.
Below: John Trumbull's controversial 1786 painting of "The Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker Hill" There is a lot of detail depicted here, and some of it wrong. In the center left Warren is shown in white, lying mortally wounded while the British Maj. John Small attempts to restrain the grenadier from bayoneting him (Small, a personal friend of Trumbull's, asked him to add him in the center of the painting in a noble pose making a gesture of mercy). Maj. Small is straddling the mortally wounded Lt.Col. Abercrombie, recently shot by the Black freeman Salem Poor (on the far right behind the white American officer). Above Warren, to the left, is Thomas Knowlton holding the musket. Behind Small to the right is mortally wounded Maj. Pitcairn, who had apparently been accidentally shot from behind by friendly fire, though Salem Poor was also given credit for this as well, Prescott is in this picture too,behind Knowlton about to smack the grenadier with a musket butt. Finally there's Israel Putnam, in light blue to the extreme left, who, though he was nowhere near the battle, was put in the painting later at the pleading of his friends. Did I miss anybody?
The British, having driven out the rebels from their positions, called off the pursuit. By 18th century rules, Howe considered that he had won the battle, having won the ground and achieved the stated objectives of the operation.
But it was a pyrrhic victory.
The British had lost 1,064 killed and wounded (of which 226 killed outright), including 81 officers, or a third of their attacking force. Remember their entire expeditionary force in Boston prior to this battle was about 5,700. They couldn't afford many more of these victories. As Gen. Nathanael Greene said, "I wish we could sell them another hill at the same price."
And though the British had 838 wounded, many of these died in subsequent days (like Lt.Col. Abercrombie) due to the primitive state of medicine at the time. Also so many of those wounded had leg and lower body wounds, which resulted in ghastly infections and amputations, meaning, even if they had survived, the wounded would not be able to return to active duty. They were permanently hors de combat. The British doctors speculated that the Americans purposefully shot at the legs of the men to sadistically incapacitate them, but the reality was the those minutemen were practiced shots, who knew to aim low in order not to miss the target (since the discharge of the musket would make the barrel jerk upward before the bullet left the muzzle). It was one reason why their musketry was so deadly at Breed's Hill and the previous battles of Concord and Lexington.
On the American side, though they had given up the position, they had suffered only a fraction of the casualties; 450 (115 killed outright) out of about 5,500, or around just 8%. And nearly all of these happened in the fight inside the redoubt after the retreat. Moreover, they had lost just one gun (well, most had been withdrawn, as you'll recall, before the battle started) and kept their army intact. Besides, they weren't supposed to defend Breed's Hill anyway. It was the wrong hill. How embarrassing!
Nevertheless, there were recriminations on the American side. Prescott was mad as hell at Putnam for not supporting him, even though he had sent three increasingly desperate messages back for help. And he has furious at the thousands of minutemen he could see shuffling around on Bunker Hill and behind the Neck, refusing to come to the aid of their compatriots.When he walked up to Putnam astride his white stallion, Prescott challenged him, "Why did you not support me, General, with your men?"
Putnam complained, "I could not drive the dogs up."
"Well, if you could not drive them up, you might have led them up." Oooooo! Burn!
Samuel Gerrish, who had been in command of the 25th Massachusetts Regiment up on Bunker Hill and refused orders to march down to Breed's Hill to help in the fight there, was also cashiered for cowardice. As was John Callender, commander of the gun battery who had fled before a shot was fired, mentioned previously. The excuse of the regiments milling about on the other side of the Neck for not coming to the aid of Prescott was that the British ships were bombarding that narrow causeway. There was something to that, of course. But then the men who did manage to make it to the front (like Stark's and Knowlton's) also endured that gauntlet.
The biggest fault, though, lay with Putnam, the so-called commanding general, who failed to not just send reinforcements when they were called for, but even failed to send ammunition. It was their running out bullets that compelled Prescott's defenders to fall back. Had they had more, I dare say that they could've stopped the third attack as well, possibly quashing the entire British effort that day.
Of course, this dispute lasted for years. There were Putnamists and Prescottists. Mostly it was political. As with that famous painting by Trumbull above, in which he was pressured by Putnamists to paint him into the left of it later, there were those who could've sworn they saw Putnam in the thick of the fighting that day, in several places at the same time. There is an interesting essay about this dispute by Harry Schenawolf in the Revolutionary War Journal site in which his thesis is that it was a political fight that went on until long after the war was over. America in its early years needed heroes. Putnam fit that bill. Prescott and a lot of the men on the ground at Breed's Hill, would've disagreed...vehemently.
What happened next?
After this battle, which shouldn't have happened anyway, Gage never attempted to lift the siege of Boston. He hunkered down, having his garrison of reinforcements grow ultimately to 11,000, while the Americans tightened their earthworks all around the peninsula and increased their army to over 16,000 sealing it in. Henry Knox, in a legendary expedition called the Noble Train of Artillery, managed to drag 59 guns from Fort Ticonderoga in western New York some 300 miles during the dead of winter to Boston to surround the city. It became, to the British, like the siege of Dien Bien Phu was to the French in Vietnam in 1954. Or the siege of Vicksburg to the Confederacy in 1863.
Governor-General Gage was relieved of overall command of Boston by Lord North and recalled to England in October. The King didn't want Gage punished but the Tories in Parliament vilified him for Lexington & Concord, for the debacle of Breed's Hill, for the siege of Boston, and for what they perceived as his mismanagement of the rebellion in Massachusetts. He retained his official title of governor of the colony but returned to England and never returned to his beloved America. Howe was promoted to replace him as Commander-in-Chief in North America.
But by March of the next year, 1776, it became clear that the British could no longer retain control of Boston and evacuated the city of the remaining 9,000 troops and some 1,220 women and children, dependents of Loyalist Bostonians.
But the war had just begun.
Armchair General Section
This is perhaps one of the most confusing battles of the American Revolution. Everything seemed to go wrong, on both sides. And there didn't seem to be any consensus about what actually happened. There couldn't even be agreement on where it was fought (Bunker Hill or Breed's Hill), who was in charge, whose fault what was.
The British Mistakes
On the British side, I would argue that Gage shouldn't have evacuated the Charlestown peninsula in the first place. Why he did is beyond me. British engineers had already started building fortifications on Bunker Hill in May, which would've covered the approaches to Charleston and Boston from the north. But Gage cancelled their completion and ordered the evacuation of all troops back into Boston, as well as forcing the evacuation of all the civilians from Charlestown. This left the whole peninsula open to the Patriots to build earthworks in June and thereby threaten Boston from artillery range.
For Howe, his first mistake was in failing to act earlier and land troops on the northwestern side of the peninsula from the Mystic River as soon as Prescott had marched his men over to Breed's Hill. Gen. Clinton had also advised this during their counsel of war.. This would have bottled the 1,200 colonials up. Howe's and Gage's worry was that that landing force would itself be trapped between those 1,200 and the American army in Cambridge. But as the British had naval superiority, they would've been able to prevent any relief from the Cambridge side by bombarding the Neck. Meanwhile, Howe could've landed his main force at the eastern point as he ultimately did, and crush the Yankees between the two commands, forcing their surrender.
Howe's second mistake was, after he eventually got his assault force of 3,100 all over to the eastern side of the peninsula, was in not reconnoitering the ground they had to attack over. This, as I pointed out above, was not a smooth parade ground, but a rough terrain criss-crossed with fences and walls, ditches, pits, and bogs. The result was to completely break up his attack formations and cause the men to top to fire at long range. Compounding this lack of reconnaissance was his choice to have all the regiments attack in wide lines, unscreened by skirmishers (which would've performed the necessary survey of the ground as they went).
Then, while it sounded brilliant, his initial attack in a narrow column up the Mystic beach was also plagued by lack of scouting. Though Howe says he personally led this flying column, he and they were all completely surprised by the unexpected wall blocking the beach at the western end, and the withering fire coming from it. Since they couldn't deploy to return fire on that narrow beach, penned it by the steep cliff to their left and the water to their right, they were ducks in a chute.
Overall, Howe's main mistake was overconfidence, and in underestimating the resolve and discipline of the American defenders. He, like Burgoyne, assumed they were just "peasant" rabble and would be easily chased away when faced with tight formations of professional troops. He seemed surprised that they didn't just run away when they saw the serried ranks in red ascending the hill.
The American Mistakes
Strategically, before Washington took command of this nascent Continental Army, the Americans under Gen. Artemis Ward, were pretty disorganized. Their concept of a chain of command was loose, to say the least. After his intelligence warning from Warren about the British plans to break out of Boston in two days, Ward had assigned Putnam, a Major General to take command of sufficient forces to seize the Charlestown peninsula and fortify Bunker Hill. But Putnam himself, delegated this responsibility to Col. Prescott, being satisfied to sit back and pose heroically on his white stallion, several hundred yards back on Bunker Hill. Prescott, accepting overall command, took it upon himself to go start fortifying Breed's Hill, looming directly over Charlestown and within artillery range of Boston itself.
While the Americans under Prescott did a very competent job in building the fort and emplacements in the dark and the short time they had to do it, they realized, after the sun came up, that their flanks were very exposed. Putnam, in the meantime, after the redoubt was built, called for Prescott to send back all the wagonloads of digging equipment so, he said, his men could complete the fortification of Bunker Hill (which they never even started). Prescott, getting no help at all from the only group that had horses (Callender's artillery battery) to borrow one and send back to Cambridge for help, nevertheless managed to send a walking messenger back and, by the early afternoon, got invaluable help from the New Hampshire regiments of Stark, Reed and the Connecticut regiment under Knowlton, who quickly threw up makeshift breastworks closing off Patriots' flank.
The most colossal mistake the Americans made...or rather Putnam made...was to fail to reinforce their line at Breed's Hill and to make sure they were more than supplied with enough ammunition. While this can be tested in a wargame (see below), my belief, based on the performance of the colonial troops during the first two attacks, is that they would've been able to stop as many assaults as Howe could throw at them had they had enough bullets. They were mostly immune from any fire in their fortified positions at the top of the hill and they had been mowing down any charges that got within a hundred feet of their ramparts. So Putnam ignoring Prescott's three desperate pleas for reinforcements or even more ammunition was criminal. And, yeah, I'm biased.
Wargaming Breed's Hill
Given all the mistakes that both sides made, a wargame should be an illuminating exercise.
Regardless of the game design or engine you use, certain factors need to be adjusted:
Combat Efficiency & Morale
Even though the "minutemen" weren't "professional" soldiers, give them roughly equal combat efficiency ratings to the British regulars. Many had previous combat experience from the French & Indian War. They were also skilled hunters and knew how to take care of and aim their muskets. And they had fire discipline, showing they could hold their fire until the absolute last minute, listening to their officers. The British soldiers, though professionals, showed that their fire control went to hell on the way up the hill, many stopping to shoot ineffectively up hill beyond musket range. So perhaps lower their combat efficiency (or discipline ratings if that is in your game engine).
In terms of morale, the Americans probably had higher enthusiasm for their casuse than the Redcoat rank & file, who, face it, were mostly kids pressed into service and with little or no combat experience.
Ground
The ground in front of Breed's Hill was steep and rough. The grass was high, concealing many ditches, fences, walls, pits, bogs and other obstructions. So it would've not been conducive to tight, linear formations.
Moreover, the slope of the hill and the nature of the fortifications would've inhibited any artillery or musket fire coming from below. Even the big guns from the ships could not elevate sufficiently to get over the ramparts of the redoubt or the breastwork to the north.
Fatigue and the Weather
Since it was a warm ,sunny day, and the British regulars were toting their backpacks on top of their woolen coats, take this into consideration if your wargame rules have allowance for fatigue and heat. This would not have had the same effect on the colonials since they A) were not moving and B) tended to fight in shirtsleeves. They did have a water barrel that was randomly hit by naval gunfire at the outset, which may have had an effect on their fatigue later in the afternoon--which you can make a factor in your game, if you want.
Scenarios to Test
The main interest in wargaming to me has always been to test the effect of various scenarios on the historical outcome. Here are some:
1. Ammo Resupply
This is an obvious one. Since the Americans had to retreat during the third and final attack, one test would be would they have had to if they'd been adequately resupplied (or supplied sufficiently) with ammunition?
2. Reinforcement
Would Prescott, Stark, etc. have been able to repel the third attack had they been reinforced by the 1,200 troops behind them on Bunker Hill and at the Neck?
3. American Artillery
Would it have made a difference if the few American guns (at least the four under Callender and Gridley Jr.) not been withdrawn prior to the first attack, giving the colonial side more firepower?
4. British Naval Gunfire Support
I had always wondered why, with their superiority in warships, Howe and Vice-Admiral Graves didn't just have a few of those ships go up into the Mystic river and enfilade the hell out of the American left flank there, especially in support of the first end-run attack by the Light Companies up the beach. Apparently, at the time, there was some trepidation about the navigability of the Mystic, but during the high tide that the main attacks took place? Anyway, I think this would be an interesting scenario to test.
5. Henry Clinton's Idea of Landing Behind Bunker Hill
The third British general had this idea of a double-envelopment, landing troops behind Bunker Hill, cutting it off from the Neck, combined with Howe's attack up Breed's Hill from the eastern shore. The fear was that this ran the risk of cutting off the western wing of that attack if American troops hit them from the mainland, across the Neck. But you could see that, since those colonial troops seemed reluctant to get involved in the main fight on Breed's Hill, would they have had the cojones to attack an isolated British landing force across a narrow isthmus? It would be an interesting proposition for a game variant.
6. Fortifying Bunker Hill Instead of Breed's Hill
Since there seemed to be ongoing controversy for years about Putnam's original orders from Artemis Ward about which hill to fortify, make this a scenario. See if the Americans' expanding the abandoned British fortifications on Bunker Hill, instead of going over to Breed's Hill, would've made a difference. Bunker Hill was higher. It was out of range of the guns at Copp's Hill in Boston. It was less of a direct threat to Boston and the docks there. And it was not as easily outflanked. Also, the name of the battle wouldn't have been a misnomer.
Orders of Battle
The following OOB lists were compiled primarily from the Wikipedia site of the battle and Military History, Battle of Bunker Hill
Command,
besides listing the name of each command, this cell is also color-coded
for the primary
uniform coat color of the British regiment (red...duh!). For the American troops, this color
coding is mostly speculative since so many had essentially civilian
coats, i.e. brown or grey. Though New Hampshire militia were known for their white coats.
Facing
is color-coded in the facings of the British regiment (e.g. cuffs, lapels,
etc.). American militia did not have facings, since they were dressed in civilian mufti. This column also designates the military organization (company, battalion, brigade, etc.) of the unit.
Flags displays miniatures of the flags carried into battle by the British regiments (both King's Colour and Regimental Colour). I could not find in my meager references any reliable representations of any flags carried by the American militia.
Strength The strength values on this OOB are very, very approximate. Add another "very" to the approximate strength of the American side since there was quite a bit of desertion from the front lines before and during the battle, and some of the militia hanging back on Bunker Hill to the rear never got to the front.
References
Breen, T.H., American Insurgents: American Patriots: The Revolution of the People, 2010, Hill & Wang, ISBN 978-0-8090-7588-1
Calvin, John R., The Minute Men, The First Fight: Myths and Realities of the American Revolution, 1989, Potomac Books, ISBN-13 978-1-59797-070-9m
Hibbert, Christopher, Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes, 1990, W.W.Norton, ISBN 0-393-02895-X
Philbrick, Nathaniel, Bunker Hill: A City, A Siege, A Revolution, 2013,Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-14-312532-7
Stephens, Michael, Patriot Battles: How the War of Independence Was Fought, 2007, Harper Collins, ISBN 978-0-06-073261-5
Online
Order of Battle for Bunker Hill https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Order_of_Battle_for_the_Battle_of_Bunker_Hill
Wikipedia article on Bunker Hill https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bunker_Hill
Wikipedia article about Salem Poor, the killer of Maj. Pitcairn, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salem_Poor
Kronoskaf: British Army during the Seven Years War, which was close enough for organization, uniform, and flag details to the opening of the American "troubles" https://www.kronoskaf.com/syw/index.php?title=British_Army#Regiments_of_Foot
Zabecki, David, "From Cowardice to Courage" HistoryNet article on the performance of American artillery at Breed's Hill, https://www.historynet.com/from-cowardice-to-courage/
Schenawolf Harry, "American Legend General Israel Putnam: Coward or Hero and His Disappearing Act at the Battle of Bunker Hill" https://revolutionarywarjournal.com/american-legend-general-israel-putnam-his-disappearing-act-at-the-battle-of-bunker-hill-june-17-1775/
Little, Becky, "Slavery Persisted in New England until the 19th Century" https://www.history.com/news/slavery-new-england-rhode-island
