War of the Fifth Coalition
19 April 1809
French under Marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout, exactly 21,479 with 20 guns
Austrians under Archduke Charles & FML Hohenzollern approx. 32,000 with 88 guns
Weather: Chilly, cloudy, following several days of rain and snow. Roads muddy from all the rain.. Thunderstorm starting about 19:00.
Location: 48.88°N 12.01°E or search for Teugn, Germany on Google Maps
First Light: 04:41 Sunrise: 05:14 Sunset: 19:09 End of Twilight: 19:43
Moon Phase: First Quarter Moonrise: 07:58 Moonset: 22:35 not that you could even see the moon.
(calculated for the location and date from U.S. Naval Observatory )
This was one of the very first battles of the Fifth Coalition of the French Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars, which had been going on more or less continuously since the First Coalition seventeen years earlier. And since this particular "Coalition" ended pretty much the same way for the Austrians that One through Three had (they sat out Four), you can't help but think of that psychological diagnosis of a person who does the same thing over and over again with the same lack of result: They're crazy.
But this particular battle (unlike several of the ones on my site) really is an "obscure" one. I wonder how many Napoleonic nerds have even heard of Teugn-Hausen (I know, I know, there are dozens of you--but out of 8.2 billion hominids on the planet, and out of the million plus who have visited my blog). Though, had it gone the way Archduke Charles had conceived, it could've had a significant strategic effect on the war. But, in the end (spoiler alert) it didn't. So there's no particular reason it should be anything but obscure. Which is one reason it intrigued me.
It's also a battle that some military historians have classified as one of the earliest examples of a modern battle. For one, it was an encounter battle, in which each side ran into the other unexpectedly and the fighting unfolded from there on. It was also one dominated by open-order, skirmishing combat in wooded terrain, very much like fighting in WWII or Vietnam or even Ukraine today. So in that sense it had the character of a modern battle (minus the air support...oh, and no drones).
For some reason, the battle was known to the French as Thann, though that town (over a mile south of Hausen) was not involved in the battle in any way. Maybe it was because it was easier to pronounce than Teugn (honestly, I'm not sure how to pronounce that.)
But why was there a Fifth Coalition War? Scroll away... ↓
Situation at Teugn-Hausen about 11:00.. Larger version is posted farther down, right after the narrative of the battle-proper starts. I made this map using a combination Google satellite view and
contemporary maps for reference. Note that the precise dimensions of
woods as well as the actual size of the villages are conjectural,
assuming that the woods are in the same locations they were 216 years
ago. I've rendered the villages smaller since the population of Germany then was one quarter what
it is today, but they're still based on their current street plan. The dimensions of the troop formations are in scale with
the actual areas they would have occupied.
Why on earth?
So why was there a War of the Fifth Coalition in the first place? Especially since the Habsburgs hadn't done well at all in the first three (as I mentioned, they sat out the Fourth Coalition, involving just Britain, Prussia, and Russia).
It seemed to Austrian Emperor Francis I, whose nation had been repeatedly humiliated by the French since 1792, and had suffered its worst chastening yet from the 1805 war (3rd Coalition, ending at Austerlitz), that now was a good time to strike back at Napoleon and get back much of what it had lost, including the extra "I" from his name (he was forced to abdicate as Holy Roman Emperor as Francis II in 1806 to become merely Francis I of Austria). Napoleon was himself distracted by what was turning out to be the "tar pits" of the ill-conceived war in Spain (from 1808) and the French were just spread too thin from the Peninsula to Poland. So to the "war party" in Vienna it seemed opportune to hit the Corsican while he was tied up down in the Iberian Peninsula.
Also the British, who also were busy fighting the French in Portugal and Spain and blockading pretty much the whole Continent (especially after that other decisive victory in 1805, the naval one at Trafalgar), were pressing the Austrians to rejoin the fight and had been funding the rearmament of the Austrian army all along. Russia, who had signed the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 and was supposed to be an ally of France since then, was really not living up to that pledge and had given a wink-nod to the Austrians to go ahead.The Russians would stay out of it. So would that other humiliated power in Europe, Prussia. But evidently Francis felt it was time to reclaim his lost honor, his lost "I"...and his empire.
For a longer explanation of this war and the political and economic background to it, might I suggest you revisit my earlier post on Aspern-Essling 1809
A Reformed Austrian Army
After the fiasco of the Third Coalition in 1805, Archduke Charles (Francis' brother) had been methodically building up and reforming the Austrian army to be a better match for the new French methods of warfare. Discarding many of the quaint linear tactics as well as the organization the Imperial Army had used for most of the previous century, Charles had sought to implement ones that seemed to respond to the columnar formations of the French, as well as to its more open combat, skirmishing character. Taking into account the nature of the new generation of Austrian soldiers, he had them drilled in closed column formations, with less emphasis on deployment into vulnerable lines and open squares. Aggressive tactics were taught, like charging in massed columns, and not stopping to fire as they had done throughout the previous century. Skirmishers were to be deployed from the third rank of each platoon, meaning up to one-third of the infantry could be employed in these independent, open order screens, foreshadowing modern combat of the 20th century. (See the graphics illustrating the new combat formations near the bottom of this post.)
Charles also began to reorganize the Imperial Army along the newer French lines. For the first time, the army was divided into standard Armeekorps, imitating the successful corps structure of Napoleon's forces. Each Austrian Korps was to have three divisions, each division two brigades, each brigade two or three regiments of infantry, each regiment three battalions, and each of those six companies, each of those two platoons (or zugen) of about 70-90 men each (or about 1,080 men per battalion). In addition, like the French corps, each Armeekorps would have its own integrated artillery and light cavalry components (see the Order of Battle section below for an example).
It all looked so good on paper. But paper was the problem, sort of. The French corps system worked because the French had, by 1805, an efficient and experienced command structure. French generals and marshals were adept at operating their corps thanks to experienced, veteran staffs, with thorough paperwork (I myself have worked on a military staff, albeit a Navy staff).
The Austrians didn't have that yet. In fact, Charles' subordinate commanders were highly suspicious of all this new-fangledosity and didn't have the professional staffs that the French had long trained. Officers got their commissions through their aristocratic connections, not by their merit or expertise. And they were all fine with the way they had always done things for the past hundred years; like gentlemen. The average age of Charles' senior commanders, in fact, was 63, all but a few of them a whole generation older than this youngster.
Archduke Charles and his family by Johann Ender around 1832
Rather than post the usual, clichéd, hero-on-a-prancing-white-pony painting, I liked this sweet family portrait with his cute kids. Reminds me of "The Sound of Music". That's his wife Henrietta's bust on the left, who had died of scarlet fever a couple of years before this was painted 😢 Wouldn't you love to hear them all sing Edelweiss?
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Charles, though--one of the few Austrian commanders who had actually achieved success during the long war so far--was favored by his older brother. Not so much by the old men of the Hofkriegsrat, the Imperial War Council, however. Nevertheless, after the 1805 disaster, he was given overall command of the entire Austrian forces, with the impressive title Generalissimus. This came with the caveat that he took the sage "advice" from the more veteran officers. The ones who had lost so many wars before. He took personal command of the main, home army around Vienna, organized in eight of the newly formed Armeekorps of some 188,000 men with 524 guns.
However, in spite of all the hard work he had done in his military reforms, by 1809 the Charles was not enthusiastic about going to war again so soon. In the three years he had had to remake the army, he didn't think it was yet ready to face the French again. He fruitlessly argued against this year to go to war again. But Francis and the war party thought otherwise.
But if he couldn't persuade his brother or the Hofkriegsrat to not go to war that year, Charles' original plan was at least to delay the start of it until May or June, when the weather had improved and the roads would not suck (literally). He reasoned that it also gave time for the secret negotiations with Prussia and Russia to bring them into the Coalition (what number were we at again?).
As my dad used to say, there are two reasons for everything, the "good" reason, and the "real" reason. The "real" reason was that Charles didn't want to restart the war was that he wasn't very confident of the tool he had been tasked to hone for the past three years, the Army. He was, to be sure, more encouraged by the new enthusiasm of the rank and file, and the new, modern, "French" tactical doctrine (for which he himself had written a manual). But he was not at all confident in his aristocratic commanders and their amateur staffs, or their understanding of how to employ the new Armeekorps. It wasn't just a matter of imitating the French organization, it was knowing how to use it. And, as we'll see, it was the leadership at the Korps level that would hinder Charles' otherwise good plans.
The Archduke was also thinking geo-politically. He lobbied that if there was to be a war anyway, to make his main attack along the left bank of the Danube, through northern Bavaria toward Württemberg, Franconia, and the other German states of Napoleon's brand new "Confederation of the Rhine" (Rheinbund). He sensed from all his connections there that there was widespread discontent among the Germans about their "forced" alliance with the new Napoleonic Empire, and the economic stress that the forced participation in Napoleon's Continental System was causing, essentially cutting off all trade beyond Europe (thanks to the British blockade). He argued that an attack on this area would generate a revolt against the arrogant French, who treated the populations of their so-called new allies as they had enemy states, with disdain, rapacious taxation, or just outright plundering. Charles anticipated the Austrian attack would be greeted as a liberation by his fellow Germans instead of an invasion. Just like certain powers today have anticipated their invasion of neighboring countries would be greeted as liberation (not naming any names). Some lessons are never learned.
But the Hofkriegsrat disagreed. Their own intelligence sources persuaded them that Charles overestimated the German states' nostalgia for the old Holy Roman Empire and there wouldn't be a general uprising against the French as he thought. They also felt that the ex-electoral states like Bavaria, Wurttemburg, Saxony, Prussia, and all the little principalities were still too cowed by the French to rebel against them. Also, Bavaria itself had long been a bitter rival of Austrian hegemony during the Holy Roman Empire. So the Hofkriegsrat did not sense that Germany was ripe for rebellion. Charles, of course, would eventually be right about the mass German backlash on the French, but he was five years early.
The Hofkriegsrat were also worried that having the Danube between Charles' main force on the north bank and his brother Archduke John's army in Italy (Charles had nine brotheres, including the emperor!) exposed Vienna to a blitzkrieg-like thrust from Napoleon along the more open right bank of the river, as had happened in 1805. So they nixed Charles original plan (even though he was, technically, Generalissimus) and "persuaded" him to move the bulk of his army south of the Danube for his Bavarian invasion...oh, and to move it as quickly as possible, bitteschön.
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| Queen Louise of Prussia by Elisabeth Vigée-Lebrun in 1801 |
It was now or never. Besides, by late March it was looking like there would be no help this time from either the Prussians or the Russians, in spite of all the negotiations and persuasion from the British. Due to pressure from his wife, Queen Louise (who was far more influential in European politics than her husband), Prussia's King Frederick William III and Russia's Czar Alexander had signaled to their erstwhile ally, Austria, that they while they wouldn't side with Napoleon this time, Austria would be on her own in the coming war. This was in spite of the "secret" agreement in the Erfurt Convention of 1808 (following the more public Treaty of Tilsit the previous year) that Russia would aid France in any future war.
So, with no help from their erstwhile allies, the "war party" in Vienna leaned on Charles and the Emperor Francis to start the war now, while Napoleon was still in Paris, distracted by the mess in Spain, and more subversive domestic plots by his so-called French friends. It was now or never.
Tora! Tora! Tora!
On April 9th Charles obeyed Francis' and the Hofkriegsrat's orders to start the war and invade Bavaria, crossing the Inn River on the south side of the Danube. As I described, the new plan was to sweep up from the southeast and take the French and Bavarians from that flank. His intelligence had also revealed that Marshal Berthier, the interim commander of the French forces in Napoleon's absence, had positioned Davout's III Corps far to the northeast, around the city of Regensburg (historically known as Ratisbon, the original Celtic name for that town for the past several thousand years, since before the Romans, thank you). This exposed, eastern deployment of Davout's corps offered a tempting target to isolate and destroy before it moved to join up with the rest of the Army of Germany (L'Armée d'Allemagne as Napoleon had named this new Franco-German force).
Napoleon, now back in Paris from Spain, and not yet aware that the Austrians had made a surprise invasion that same day, had sent a telegraph message to Berthier to have Davout concentrate around Ratisbon in anticipation of an Austrian attack from the north side of the Danube sometime after the 15th, and not move from that position"...under all circumstances." (that's the fatal phrase)
By "telegraph", I don't, of course, mean an electronic signal, but a system of signal towers between Paris and Donauwörth (Berthier's headquarters, about 500 miles, or 800km) that relayed flashing lights in code, rather like Navy ships do to this day. In good weather, a message could be sent that far away in a few minutes.
But this wasn't good weather. There was rain, snow, and fog across Central Europe (don't know what it was like in Paris then). The message didn't get to Berthier for nearly a week. In the next few days word got back to Napoleon via conventional horse messenger (since the telegraph was down) that the war had started, and that Charles had invaded Bavaria up the south bank of the Danube. Realizing he couldn't send another telegram in the rain, the Emperor wrote out a paper message and sent a courier with an urgent amendment to his original orders, ordering Berthier to have Davout evacuate Ratisbon on the left bank of the Danube and beat feet back west to Donauwörth, about 90 miles west, to join with the rest of the army. He also ordered Berthier to get himself down to Augsburg (south of Ingolstadt) to personally concentrate Oudinot's and Messena's corps there.
Unfortunately, Berthier didn't get the hand-written, backup transcript of the first, telegraphed order until after the second horse-delivered one, and was confused by their contradictions (did they not have DTG--Date/Time Group--on messages back then?). Was he supposed to withdraw Davout or order him to stay "in all circumstances" like the telegraphed message ordered? These conflicting messages were received by Berthier on the 16th, when Charles had already reached Landshut. To cover his own butt, he sent a response to Napoleon...
“In this position of affairs, I greatly desire the arrival of your Majesty, in order to avoid the orders and countermands which circumstances as well as the directives and instructions of your Majesty necessarily entail." --Berthier
Such are the consequences of contradictory orders...and, I might add, lacking DTG comms discipline, which was one of the first things I learned in my stint in the U.S.Navy! Sheeze Louise!
As he began his invasion, Charles sent orders to his 1st and 2nd Korps under Bellegarde and Kollowrat (around 56,000 and 130 guns) come at Davout in Ratisbon from the north side of the Danube, through Bohemia, with the object of seizing the crossing at that town. Meanwhile he himself took the bulk of his army (about 132,000 and 394 guns, consisting of 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 1st Res and 2nd Res Korps) to invade Bavaria on the southern bank of the Danube. This reassured the powers-that-be in Vienna that the capitol would be safe. Ri-i-i-i-ght. (Again, see my post on Aspern-Esling 1809)
For his part, Napoleon, still in Paris at the beginning of April, believed that the most likely scenario was that the Austrians would formally declare war sometime after the 15th, then courteously and diplomatically withdraw their ambassador in a civilized ritual. He also anticipated the Austrians would invade Bavaria from Bohemia, north of the Danube, most likely through Nuremberg or Ratisbon. He thought he had plenty of time. And he didn't want to provoke the Austrians by moving to that theater prematurely himself. Besides, at the same time, the "real" reason he had hurried back to Paris from Spain was the revelation of a plot by his former foreign minister Talleyrand, his security chief, Joseph Fouché, and even his own sister, Caroline, and her husband, Murat, recently made Queen and King of Naples, to overthrow him (ungrateful much?), so he was still dealing with that (amazingly, he didn't fire, execute, or even arrest any of them, but merely dismissed Talleyrand, temporarily, until 1812).
Unfortunately Charles had been right about the unreadiness of his "reformed" army and also the condition of the roads this early in the year. Where, in dry weather, it should've taken less than a week to reach Ratisbon on the Danube from their start point at the Inn River, it took that long to merely reach Landshut on the Isar River just 72 miles (116 km) by the 16th, and 40 miles (64 km) short of their goal. Not only were the roads muddy, they were clogged with Bavarian civilians, fleeing the "liberating" Austrians. Had the invaders been French, they would've quickly pushed aside this civilian rabble. But the Austrians were more civilized (and these were fellow Germans, after all). And Charles, mindful of his belief in the disaffection of the Bavarians toward their French overlords, had ordered that the civilian population was to be treated with respect.
Also, while the French were masters of moving fast and light, scouring supplies off the countryside as they went, the Austrian army was still bogged down with baggage; supply wagons, mobile ovens, carriages for the aristocratic officers and their households, etc. As I mentioned before, too, the old Austrian commanders were not yet used to maneuvering the new Armeekorps. The staffs hadn't been trained in the fine art of communicating with subordinate commands. Orders would be written from the top but they were unsure who was supposed to get them down the chain.
On 17 April, having finally seized the crossing of the Isar at Landshut and within two days' march of the Danube (33 miles, 54km), Charles came into the lucky possession of an intercepted message from Lefebvre (VII Corps) to Davout acknowledging Napoleon's order for his III Corps to leave Ratisbon and join the army at Ingolstadt (changed from Donauwörth) and of Lefebvre's orders to cover Davout's withdrawal at the Abens River.
Charles now clearly saw his opportunity to rush up to intercept Davout's isolated corps in the flank as it withdrew. This fortuitous bit of intelligence for Charles reminded me of the famous "Special Order 191" that had fallen into Gen. McClellan's hands prior to the Battle of Antietam durng the American Civil War 53 years later (you've got to read my post on that battle), alerting him to how isolated Robert E. Lee's various corps were, a stroke of luck that would likewise be wasted. (Oops! Sorry for the spoiler.)
Charles issued his own orders to rush up to the northeast to catch Davout's divisions spread out in marching order and in the flank. It was a sound plan. And if it worked, it could've destroyed most of Davout's corps (60,525), the best and largest formation in the French army. It would've been a dose of Napoleon's own medicine. Payback for the humiliation of 1805. Unfortunately, Charles' commanders were not as nimble as Napoleon's. So there was the inevitable delay of the subordinates executing Charles' orders. The weather had improved these past couple of days, so they could no longer blame the roads. It was just slowness of the army.
This delay proved decisive.
Backing up a few days; on 13 April, as soon as he got word of Charles' invasion of Bavaria, Napoleon packed his toothbrush and left Paris at 04:00 and was in Donauwörth at 05:00 on the 17th, 500 miles away and 90 miles west of Ratisbon, taking over command of the Army of Germany from Berthier (much to the latter's relief, see his own message to Napoleon above).
On arriving at the front, the Emperor was pissed to see that Davout was still in Ratisbon (the result of the confusing communications I already mentioned) and Berthier was down at Augsburg micromanaging the concentration of Oudinot's corps, which, apparently, Napoleon had forgotten that he ordered him to do. The Emperor took over, dispatching a countermanding order for Davout to immediately pull out of Ratisbon and move west to Ingolstadt (see campaign map below). The marshal, himself having received contradictory orders to move-not-move during the previous week, didn't hesitate; he acted at once. There was a reason Napoleon considered him one of his best commanders. And Davout was undoubtedly relieved, too, that his old boss was back in charge. As was Berthier.
In the predawn hours of the 19th, as soon as he got Napoleon's direct order, Davout began to methodically pull in his divisions and move them southwest, up the right bank of the Danube, toward Ingolstadt. He moved the divisions in echelon, each covering the one behind it, starting with Morand's, then Gudin's, then St. Hilaire's, and finally Friant's, whose was last to cross the Danube at Ratisbon. He ordered just one regiment, the 65e Ligne (2,085 men), to fortify the crossing over the river at Ratisbon and hold up the Austrians (Kollowrat''s II Korps, 28,168) coming from the north. The 65e probably thought, "Gee! Lucky us!"
Maneuvers on the 16th to 19th of April. Charles is trying to execute his plan to catch Davout's isolated III Corps as it withdraws up the Danube from Ratisbon to join up with the rest of Napoleon's army, massing at Neustadt. A nice plan, but carried out by inbred nitwits. Red framed area in the center is where my Battle of Teugn-Hausen map is (above). Little clashes also happened around the area on the 19th (at Kirchdorf, Dünzling, Pfaffenhofen, and at the Danube crossing at Ratisbon itself), which I've marked.
Charles issued orders for his V Korps, under Archduke Ludwig (another of Charles' seven little brothers), and a cavalry division under Kienmayer to march up from Landshut through Pfeffenhausen in the direction of the Abens River, following Delroy's Bavarians as they retreated from Landshut. Charles ordered his III Korps under Hohenzollern to hurry up toward Teugn near the Danube and block the route from Ratisbon to Ingolstadt. He had Rosenburg's IV Korps and the II Reservekorps cavalry to head toward Ratisbon to catch Davout's troops while they marched down through the eastern route through the village of Dünzling. He had entrusted Hiller with his VI Korps to march on Au to intercept any French coming toward his left flank. Finally Charles himself moved with Johannes Liechtenstein's I Reservekorps up to Grub to support both Ludwig and Hohenzollern.
Napoleon, for his part, was operating on only sketchy intelligence as to Charles' positions and intentions. He figured, if it was him, he'd try to go for Davout's isolated corps at Ratisbon. He therefore ordered Lefebvre and his 27,000 strong Bavarian VII Corps to hold the line at the Abens River near Neustadt, guarding the route Davout needed to move west and link up with the rest of the army.
Vandamme's Württemburger VIII Corps (about 11,000) and Nansouty's cavalry division (5,300) were nearing Neustadt from the west. Napoleon had also ordered Massena and Oudinot to hustle over from Augsburg and then hit Charles' western flank at Moosburg, threatening his line of communications through Landshut. But those two were inexplicably moving slowly on the 18th and Oudinot's leading elements hadn't yet reached the Ilm River at Pfaffenhofen, where a token Austrian force under Scheibler was guarding the bridge. (Just look at the map above. None of this will be on the test.)
The Emperor was biting his nails.
Charles was jubilant. With his new intelligence of Davout's isolation, he was confident that he had won the first battle before it even started.
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But, then there was the questionable competence of his subordinates. These--Hohenzollern, Ludwig, Rosenburg, Hiller, J. Liechtenstein--all continued to move slowly, as if they were on a sightseeing vacation. Hohenzollern, with his III Armeekorps, eventually reached the town of Hausen, just south of Teugn, late in the morning of the 19th. He sent his advance guard under Vukassovich and his division, under Lusignan with Kayser's single brigade, through Hausen and up toward Teugn. They encountered some French foragers in Hausen, driving them out. They continued up over a ridge to the north of Hausen (appropriately named the Hausenerberg), through a narrow gap in the thick woods there, then down into a little valley and up another ridge, called the Buchberg (is that where the local Schulkinder hiked up to read their buchs? With Julie Andrews?).
From this ridge, Lusignans and Vukassovich (about 8,000 men and 16 guns) saw, to their shock, a whole lot of French troops marching west below them through the village of Teugn on the road toward Saal. The two generals took it upon themselves to attack and start bombarding the enemy while they were strung out in marching columns. Lusignan sent an urgent report back to Hohenzollern about what he had found and asked for reinforcements. But Hohenzollern had halted the rest of his force south of Hausen, waiting to see what else would develop (see 11:00 battle map, reprised below, but bigger). He also sent a query over to Charles, who had stopped at the little village of Grub just 2.4 miles southeast, with most of the I Reservekorps (12,000 grenadiers and cavalry under Johannes Liechtenstein). He didn't, at first, send any reinforcements up to Lusignan.
Hearing this news of first contact, the excitement apparently got to Charles. Reportedly, he started having one of his epileptic seizures about the time he got Hohenzollern's note. He tended to get these when under pressure, and he was under a ton of it this particular morning. Besides the gunfire wafting down from the northwest from Teugn, there was also rumbling gunfire to the northeast from the direction of Dünzling., about 4.5 miles away (7.2km). So he was a little distracted. And he probably had no sleep the night before. Which is never a good thing when you're managing any chronic health vulnerability like epilepsy. Your read about it a lot among famous historical figures. Even Napoleon was rumored to have epilepsy, though formal diagnoses of that condition didn't happen until later in the 19th century. As I noted in my last post, on Oudenarde, Marlborough himself was prone to getting migraines under pressure and started that battle with severe migraine attack.
But Charles, maybe incapacitated by his seizure, did nothing at this time. And I don't know if anybody on his staff took it upon themselves to answer Hohenzollern's request for instructions. (If any of my readers have information about this, I'd be welcome to hear.)
The actual battle begins.
It was about 11:00. As I noted above, as soon as Vukassovich's and Lusignan's troops got to the top of the ridge line overlooking Teugn and saw the marching columns of French on the road below them, they unlimbered their guns and started opening fire. What they saw were the last of Gudin's division's battalions and St.Hilaire's division starting to march west through the town. Morand's division and the rest of Gudin's had already passed that way and were two miles to the west at the choke point of Saal on the Danube, on their way toward Neustadt.
St. Hilaire had his marching columns quickly deploy and start attacking up the Buchberg slope. His lead regiments were the 10e Légère and the 3e Ligne (4,538 men of Lorencez's brigade). While the 10e Légère were already in the field and were more or less positioned to deploy into column of attack, the 3e Ligne , just emerging from the streets of Teugn and exhausted from marching all night (though, to be fair, so were the 10e Légère) just swarmed up the hill in a loose Banzai charge. The grenzers and jagers of Vukassovich's advance guard and the infantry of Lusignan's Colloredo and Schröder regiments, as well as their 16 supporting guns, swept the slopes as the French pounded upward. The French gave as good as they got, but they didn't yet have artillery for support (it being bogged down on the muddy roads behind them). The Austrians had better position, particularly the Peterwarden Grenzers in the tongue of woods near the hamlet of Roith and the right battalion of Schröder (see map below) who were able to enfilade the French as they pounded up the slope. The 10e Légère. was also attacked in the flank by Lusignan's single squadron of #3 Ferdinand Hussars. So after several minutes of skirmishing and sustaining Austrian artillery fire, the French fell back to Teugn.
View from the foot of the Buchberg slope from Teugn, where St. Hilaire's troops would've first seen the Austrians. The eastern clump of woods from which the Austrians flanked the French is to the left. from Google Street View
Here's a blow up of the map at about 11:00 to make it all clear as mud... ↓
Situation at Teugn-Hausen about 11:00.
Davout, in the thick of the fighting, helped St. Hilaire rally and reform the 3e Ligne and the 10e Légère. These regiments weren't beaten, they just needed to reform for another attack. He also intercepted a trailing regiment from Gudin's division, the 7ème Légère and some voltigeur companies some of Friant's division bringing up the rear of his corps and redirected them to attack the right of Lusignan's line on the Buchberg.
Meanwhile, the remaining regiment of Lorencez's brigade, the 57e Ligne was filing through Teugn. It was icknamed "le Terrible" for its ferocious reputation (though, I don't know if this was maybe a sarcastic nickname, like "Stonewall" Jackson's snide nickname from
General Bee at 1st Bull Run in 1861). St. Hilaire deployed its three
battalions to join the fight in attacking the Buchberg. He also had the newly arrived
brigade of Destabenrath (78e and 105e Ligne,
4,385 men) to form up on the hill to the west of Teugn to support
Lorencez's counterattack. Davout, now managing the lineup for the second attack up the Buchberg, had the 57e form up in column of attack alongside the rallied 3e Ligne and 10e Légère. He left this attack to the brigade commander, Lorencez. After this was ready to go just before noon, Davout galloped the two miles over to Saal to order Morand's and Gudin's divisions to circle back and attack the Austrians' left rear below Hausen. He wasn't yet sure who was down there, but unlike Hohenzollern's hesitation on the other side, he was going to commit his whole corps to annihilating the Austrians. That was who he was.
Louis-Nicolas Davout
III Corps Commander
On their side, Lusignan and Vukassovich,who seemed to have kicked over a nest of hornets below them (and also the increasing masses of French infantry, to clarify that tired metaphor for any A.I. summarizing this), kept sending back urgent pleas for reinforcements to Hohenzollern.
For his part, Hohenzollern wasn't sure what the hell was going on. He, like Charles down in Grub, was also hearing rumbles of fighting to the northeast, from the direction of Dünzling. He was also wary of his vulnerable western flank from the direction of Saal. He wasn't getting much in the way of intelligence from his light cavalry (Erz. Ferdinand Hussars #3) or from Charles. Unlike his opposite number, Davout, it was also telling, too, that he doesn't seem to have gone up past Hausen himself onto the Buchberg to check out the action up there first hand; it was only a couple miles. The whole battle, though only a few thousand yards away, was masked by the two ridges and their covering woods.
As he apparently understood his role as an Armeekorps commander, he was supposed to stay behind and await word from the front, even though "word from the front" was, "Send help!" To be fair, though, he may have thought his primary responsibility was to preserve the integrity of his command, and not get drawn into a trap. He had survived all those traps Napoleon had sprung on his fellow commanders in the disastrous 1805 Ulm campaign. He wasn't a sucker.
By noon St. Hilaire had rallied his division after the initial repulse and Friant had begun to arrive in force from Ratisbon. These all (about 13,000 by now) started to overwhelm Lusignan's isolated brigade and Vukassovich's advance guard (about 7,600), who fought doggedly back, but were forced to slowly retreat back to the second hill, the Hausenerberg.
About 12:00 St. Hilaire launched his second attack, now fully reinforced with the 57ème, the rallied 3ème, and 10ème Légère, and supported by Destabenrath's brigade. On the east, Davout had funneled Petit's light infantry as well as those voltigeurs from the 108ème and 33ème regiments through the Emeranholz to attack the right flank of Kayser's infantry. These, in turn were supported by the arrival of Friant's division of Barbanègre's 48ème Ligne. On the western flank, St.Hilaire had had a battalion of his 3ème Ligne to loop around, under cover of woods, and jump on the exposed left wing of Vukassovich's grenzers and battery near the hamlet of Roith. These latter so surprised the battery there that the crews just abandoned the guns, and several grenzer were captured. Vukassovich himself and his second-in-command, Moritz Leichtenstein (this was a prolific family!), were wounded in this flank attack and carried back to Hausen.
Fighting as hard as they were, Lusignan's nd Vukassovich's forcess were getting worn down by the relentless French, whose numbers were growing as more and more of St. Hilaire's and then Friant's divisions came up (now about 15,000). By noon the Austrians (only about 7,600) pulled back to the second ridge, the Hausenerberg and the gap between the Ammerholz and Emeranholz woods (okay, "woods" is redundant, but this is for English speakers), which they knew would be easier to defend than the more exposed Buchberg.
The firefight went on for a couple more hours, both sides taking horrendous casualties. Lusignan himself was severely wounded and had to be taken back through Hausen. The single squadron of Austrian Ferdinand #3 Hussars made a flanking attack on the 57ème skirmish line and threw them back a bit, but they, in turn were driven back by supporting musketry from the 57ème's closed line. On the Austrian left, the 3,200 men of the 10ème Légère and the flanking battalion of the 3ème Ligne finally pushed the 1,500 of the Peterwarden Grenzers and Karl Legion Jagers back through the Ammerholz, clear down and out of the woods, where, bleeding, low on ammunition, and exhausted, they retreated all the way below Hausen. On their right, Kayser's brigade (Colloredo #53 and Schroder #7) held its own, counter-attacking, falling back, repelling charges, and counter-attacking again.
But eventually, heeding Lusignan's repeated pleas for reinforcements, Hohenzollern finally dispatched Alois Liechtenstein's brigade of five battalions of St. Julien's division (Manfredini #12 and Würzburg #23, 4,400 supported by eight guns) up through Hausen to relieve Kayser, whose men were completely spent and out of ammunition. These fresh troops pitched in with a will, bringing additional artillery firepower against the French, who still hadn't any of their own.
Alois Liechtenstein grabbed the flag of the Würzburg Regiment and personally led the bayonet charge of his brigade into the woods against the French 72ème and 105ème and temporarily drove them back. Alois himself, like Lusignan before him, was badly wounded for his fearless leadership. But he and his men gave Kayzer's exhausted troops cover to withdraw through Hausen to join Vukassovich's grenzers. That's what soldiers do for each other.
By about 13:00 the French had increased their forces in the battle to 21,479 (well, if you deduct the already wounded and killed). Their artillery (20 guns) had finally started arriving down the muddy road from Ratisbon to Teugn about 14:00 and these they moved up to support their infantry. Davout had pulled back Lorencez's brigade, who had suffered severe casualties themselves and were almost out of ammunition, relieving them with Destabenrath's and Barbanègre's brigades. Friant's remaining troops began arriving to support these (Grandeau's and Gilly's brigades, ~5,300), positioning them just to the east of Teugn (see 15:00 map below).
The Austrians by this time were badly outnumbered, with A.Liechtenstein's 5,000 remainng, and most of Kayser's and Vukassovich's brigades now withdrawn.
Finally, after sympathetically greeting the wounded Lusignan and Vukassovich, hearing Kayser's reports, and seeing the bloody condition of the survivors of their troops, Hohenzollern took it upon himself to move what remained of his command, Bieber's brigade (Kaunitz #20 and Württemberg #38, about 4,800 in five reduced battalions) up to join the fight and help Liechtenstein. He thought, this time, he'd lead them himself. He also had the Korps' main "position" artillery under Col. Smola (22 guns) move up to the slopes on the north side of Hausen to support the fight from there. While Hohenzollern's remaining troops were outnumbered by Davout's by now (~21,000 to ~9,000) he did have artillery superiority in 38 tubes vs the French 14 (six of which were still back in Teugn). These helped hold off the French from attacking out of the shelter of the woods on the Hausenerberg.
View from the east of Hausen up toward the Hausenerberg. Google Street View
Hohenzollern and Bieber now led their reinforcements up into the fight, moving to the right of Liechenstein's men to attack the French in the eastern woods (Emeranholz) along the road. Hohenzollern himself led the Württembergers against the French in the wood. But, unfortunately, Davout had managed to have a horse battery of a couple of guns dragged through those choked woods and unlimbered on the flank of the Austrians. These were supported by Barbanègre's 48ème (2,228) who were able to take the attacking whitecoats and their supporting battery in enfilade (for you non-military nerds, that's "in the side"...not good).
By 15:00 the battle started to wind down. The two forces had been fighting each other for over four hours of close combat. In the high humidity (it had been threatening rain all day) visibility in and around the woods must've been pretty close to zero with all the smoke. Both sides were exhausted. Even though, by this time, the Austrians were outnumbered, they were still giving as good as they got. They did have artillery superiority, but their gunners probably couldn't see their targets, so they were probably just firing blindly in the direction of the woods. Also both sides were running low on ammunition.
Not wanting to waste any more of his command in a battle that was in stalemate, Hohenzollern ordered a measured withdrawal back behind the shelter of the batteries in front of Hausen. You wouldn't call this a rout. Or even a retreat. In the words of Marine Gen. O.P. Smith in the Korean War, "Retreat hell! We're just advancing in another direction!"
For their part, the French, also exhausted and low on ammunition themselves, didn't pursue the Austrians. In all the smoke, they may not have been aware that the enemy had, in fact, pulled back. In fact, Davout had them slowly withdraw back themselves up to the Buchberg to dig in and make camp.
So, while Teugn-Hausen is listed in most of the sources I used as a French victory, it seemed like it was really a tactical draw. Both sides, as if by mutual consent, just stopped trying to kill each other at the same time. Oh, if only rational heads could prevail like that in our own age!
All during the past few hours, Hohenzollern had been sending his own polite little notes to Charles, just a couple of miles down at Grub, asking for reinforcement. But he was getting no reply. I 'm not sure if this was because the archduke was still in his seizure, or if Charles was himself not clear what was going on around him. And, with my limited access to original records, even in this online age, I was not able to see what correspondence there was between them.
There was also still fighting to the northwest, near Dünzling (off map), between Rosenburg's IV Korps and Montbrun's light cavalry and a few of Friant's battalions. This would be in a stalemate until sunset. But maybe Charles, with his flawed staff and subcommanders, wasn't sure. It may have been that Charles, had he been conscious again, didn't want to commit any of his reserves (12,000) until he was sure where, exactly, the French were and where they were going.
A little after 16:00, though, when the fighting north of Hausen had long petered out, Charles did start marching four of his battalions of grenadiers (of the twelve) up to Hausen. These got there about 17:00, tried a half-hearted attack on the Emeranholz, but backed off pretty quickly after a few rounds from the French guns.
Meanwhile, Morand, over west of Saal on the way to meet up with Lefebvre at Abensburg, had been ordered by Davout to turn around and attack Hohenzollern below Hausen . But his first elements (17ème Ligne) didn't start coming out of the woods west of Hausen, near Buch, until around sunset. The battery that Hohenzollern had placed there fired a few rounds and the French prudently backed into the woods. That's when, conveniently, it started to rain again. Whew! That was close!
Louise Aimée Julie Davout
I thought it only fair to have a portait
of Davout's adorable family, too.
Though, unlike Charles', Davout's wife
didn't predecease him. Two of his eight
kids did, thoug
Some of the narratives I've read about this battle say the battle stopped after a thunderstorm broke. While it had been raining (and sometimes snowing) all that week until this day, and had been threatening all day of the 19th, it wasn't until about sunset (19:09 according to the U.S.Naval Observatory) that the storm finally broke and drenched everything. So it wasn't the rain that stopped the fighting; everybody seemed to have been fought out a few hours before. Apparently there wasn't any more serious fighting after about 15:00. In the next few hours before sunset, everybody was just trying to erect or find shelter before the storm broke.
And it's not fun to camp in the rain and cold. I've tried it. Don't recommend it.
Tactical Draw, Strategic Defeat
As I said, the Battle of Teugn-Hausen, in fact, turned out to be a draw by itself. At least a tactical one. Both sides suffered comparable casualties. The Austrians lost between 3,465 (Caballo) and 3,862 (Digby Smith) KWA. The French lost between 2,352 (Caballo) and ~4,000 (Smith). So the Austrians gave as good as they got. In terms of the archaic rule of 18th century victory, neither side could claim the battlefield since both sides withdrew from it more or less simultaneously.
But the strategic outcome was definitely not a draw.
Charles' original plan to pull a fast one on Napoleon by trapping his biggest corps (Davout's III) against the Danube and annihilating it had failed. Davout was able to secure his withdrawal of all of his troops, link up with Lefebvre's Bavarians at the Abens River the next day, and allow Napoleon to regain the initiative.
Other confusing situations made Charles hesitate. Rosenburg's IV Korps had run up against an unknown number of French forces to the northeast of Teugn, at Dünzling, and, rather than being able to concentrate and deliver a decisive blow to Davout's retreating divisions in concert with Hohenzollern, his 25,000 were distracted the whole day by 5,000 of Montbrun's light cavalry and some of Friant's infantry (4,700). This action wasn't so much a battle as a long afternoon of each side taking potshots at each other.
Then there were miscues and setbacks at other clashes to the west. Elements of Ludwig's V Korps were blocked by Lefebvre at the Abens River, and, other than long range artillery fire, Ludwig made no serious effort to engage. A detached brigade from III Korps (Thierry's) had run into more Bavarians near Abensburg and been thrown back. Hiller's VI Korps, tasked with guarding the far left of the army at Paffenhofen on the Ilm River had not made it past Au, almost 10 miles from that crossing (though he did send over a small detachment under Scheibler), and had failed to keep Oudinot and Massena back (just look at the campaign map, hate to keep making you scroll). Coming down from the north, Kollowrat's II Korps' of 28,000 hadn't been able to secure the crossing over the Danube into Ratisbon until that evening, capturing the heroic 65e Ligne only after they had off the whole coprs by themselves, and allowing the rest of Davout's corps to escape.* And nobody seemed to know where the hell Bellegarde's 27,000 man I Korps' were.
Mostly, Charles was hampered by lack of reliable intelligence and slow subordinates. So his whole original plan was a flop. He'd lost the initiative.
Napoleon, for his part, now had the ball. With the convergence of most of his corps (Oudinot's Davout's, Lefebvre's, Vandamme's, Massena's) and the arrival of his trusty Marshal Lannes and Bessieres to take control of a provisional corps of cavalry and infantry, the Emperor rode over to Neustadt and started his own offensive, putting Charles on the back foot. Charles proceeded to lose a whole sequence of battles during the following three days; Abensburg, Landshut, Eggmühl, forcing him to eventually cross back over the Danube from Ratisbon and retreat along the north bank, losing Vienna in three weeks, as the Hofkriegsrat and Francis had feared. It was 1805 all over again.
And like 1805, he would be in Vienna within three weeks, on 13 May, ready to start the next phase of the war; crossing the Danube and attacking what remained of Charles' army at Aspern-Essling on the 21 May.
*As an aside, I want to shout out to the heroic sacrifice of the 65e Ligne Davout had left to hold back an entire Austrian Korps at Ratisbon on the 19th. They were fighting against 14:1 odds this whole day. This reminds me of the heroic rearguard action of my great-great-grandfather's regiment (the 89th Ohio) and their vastly outnumbered brigade holding back the whole Confederate army at Snodgrass Hill at the end of Chickamauga in 1863 so the rest of Rosecrans' Army could make its escape up to Chattanooga. I wrote an homage to this self-sacrifice in my post on Chickamauga six years ago. I am still so proud of my ancestor's bravery in that battle for freedom for all Americans.
Armchair General Section
As I've done with other battles, I've made my own judgments about this one. While most historians like to tout the genius of Napoleon and his generals, studying this small battle, and the campaign around it, I've come to the conclusion that both sides, French and Austrians, made potentially fatal mistakes.
On Napoleon's side there was, as I've mentioned, the cascade of miscommunication and trying to micromanage the operations remotely from Paris. He really had no idea what was going on 500 miles away. It reminded me of how the U.S. was trying to micromanage operations in Vietnam from Washington in the 1960's and '70s. Since Berthier and everybody were so deferential to their all-knowing emperor, everyone at the front was confused by the contradictory-but-absolute orders coming at them from Napoleon. So Davout was left vulnerably exposed to the east. And Napoleon had no idea that Charles had invaded a week before he was supposed to. Apparently he didn't get the memo either.
On the Austrians side, Charles did intitially have a good plan to catch Davout, isolated to the northeast, around Ratisbon. He could have done it. But his subordinates were so slow moving and unsure how to operate their new Armeekorps as independent forces (like the French had been doing for years now). To be sure, there was the rain and condition of the roads, which certainly didn't help. But, as Rod Steiger's Napoleon says to Grouchy's excuse about not being able to catch the Prussians due to the condition of the roads in that 1970 movie, Waterloo, "The roads are the same for everybody, true?" Still, Charles, consequently got to within striking distance (Landshut) a week later than he should have, giving away the advantage of the surprise attack back to Napoleon, and allowing Davout just enough time to start his escape from Ratisbon. It was a game of hours, though.
But even having that secret message between Lefebvre and Davout about the latters' moving back to Abensburg on the 19th, Charles, realizing he had to act at once, was still hampered by the slowness of his Korps commanders.
Charles could'v done it, though. Davout didn't start evacuating Ratisbon until dawn of the 19th and his divisions were strung out from there to Saal along the Danube road for some 13 miles by midday. And while the Austrians weren't entirely sure exactly where the French and Bavarians were all this time, the French weren't entirely sure where the Austrians were either, or what their targets were. Everybody was operating in the dark. Charles was just aware that Davout would be somewhere near the Danube between Ratisbon and Abensburg.
Was this really an example of the first modern battle?
Though this was an encounter battle, with each side discovering each other and unsure of whom they were fighting, I think it was maybe not the first example of that (see my post on Malplaquet, 100 years earlier). And, of course, there were battles in North America during the 18th century that were like this. But, like modern battles of the 20th and 21st centuries, Teugn-Hausen was definitely spread out and fought in broken, close terrain with skirmish-style tactics. It was probably very similar in nature to combat in WWII, or Korea, or Vietnam, and even Ukraine today. It was not a battle where two armies lined up in ordered lines on a designated ground and waited for the whistle.
The French had, by this time, been the leaders in this type of open combat, at least in the European theater (Americans would undoubtedly differ, as we invented it...or borrowed it, from the Native Americans). But it was new to the Austrians, who had, before Charles' reforms, fought largely in close, linear formations, as they had for the previous century. The notable thing to me, though, is that, for the first time, their new training had stood the Austrian rank-and-file well. They definitely held their own in this type of combat. And gave as good as they got. Neither side broke. Both sides inflicted pretty much comparable casualties on the other. And both sides more-or-less just pulled back from the contended ground (the Hausenerberg) about the same time.
It was the leadership. It always is.
I will acknowledge, though, that the overall command structure on the French side was still superior in 1809 to the Austrian. Charles had had the right idea in his imitating (with his own innovations) the new organization of the French army. But the latter had had a few more years practice and perfecting it, especially their veteran staff work. And Charles was still hobbled with the antique elitism of his subordinate generals. Admittedly, so were the other allies, from the British to the Russians, and they managed to ultimately defeat Napoleon, but mostly because of attrition and numbers, not because of the superiority of aristocrats over leadership based on merit. But my belief is that had Charles' Korps commanders been of the same independent caliber as Napoleon's commanders, he could've won this campaign, and possibly this war, within the first week. It was a very close thing.
This was also not a complete strategic defeat for the Austrians.
While Charles didn't accomplish his objective of defeating Napoleon in detail. And he was ultimately, after a series of other battles over the following five days, able to retreat across the Danube to make it back to Vienna (on the north side). But unlike the almost complete destruction of the Austrian army in 1805 at Ulm, Charles was largely able to preserve his army to fight a successful battle at Aspern-Essling the next month, the first direct defeat of Napoleon himself in battle. So this stage of the war, called the Ratisbon Phase, was not a strategic defeat for Austria...or a victory for France.
Wargaming Teugn-Hausen
There are two scales to wargaming this battle. One, is the tactical, sandtable scale, between Teugn and Hausen, the other a more grand-tactical scale, spread between Ratisbon and Ingolstadt (EW) and from the Danube down to Landshut (NS). The former would use essentially just the OOB in this post, between, essentially Hohenzollern/Liechtenstein and Davout. The latter would be a more strategic game involving all the corps of both armies.
For the latter, strategic game to simulate the fog of war, I might apply a version of the twin, isolated maps version, rather like the old Avalon-Hill Midway,. This was also a method we used to play professional wargames when I was attending the Defense Intelligence School in Lowry AFB back in the '70s (though each team would be in two, separate rooms, with a third room occupied by the referees). Basically, it's the old Battleship game engine design. That way, you can try to find your opponents' forces in the same way the French and Austrians were trying to discover each other, or the Japanse and American players try to find each other's fleets in Midway.
For the tactical level game I would recommend some scenarios:
1. Hohenzollern has more guts. What would happen if, as soon as his advance guard discovered St. Hilaire's marching columns, he had ordered an all out attack up and over both ridges and into Teugn?
2. Charles doesn't suffer a seizure. Test if Charles himself had acted opportunistically and sent up J. Liechenstein's I Reservkorps to support and link up Hohenzollern and Roseburg (over in Dünzling), overwhelming both St.Hilaire and Friant on the march. You could, if you have those provisions in your rules, role to see if Charles either wakes up each turn.
3. Morand and Gudin march faster. It was surprising that, when Davout galloped over to Saal to give those two direct orders to march down and outflank Hohenzollern at Buch, the first of Morand's regiments didn't show up until seven hours later. It was only a couple of miles! Okay, I admit, I wasn't there. And I didn't know how easy or hard it would have been to march through the woods between Saal and Buch. But you can see if that would've made it a decisive victory for the French player if at least some of Morand's battalions got there earlier. A scenario could allow for each turn (after, say, 13:00) to roll to see if Morand and/or Gudin start showing up east of Hausen. (That's why I included Davout's entire corps' OOB in this post..)
4. Davout doesn't move as fast out of Ratisbon. Another scenario to test would be if Davout didn't get the urgent order to evacuate Ratisbon the night before and delayed his departure until later on the 19th. Meaning that the first troops to reach Teugn would've been Morand's.
5. Sunny day. It's the little things that can decide history. Like whether it rains or not on a certain day. Play a scenario in which it hadn't been raining, and didn't rain that evening, making the ground hard and the roads firm. This would affect both movement and artillery effect. (See game conditions below).
Special Game Conditions
I would take into accout the following special conditions for any game of Teugn-Hausen:
Austrian Combat Effect: However your game assigns combat effectiveness (CE) to each side, I would rate the French and the Austrian troops equally in terms of training, morale, formation efficiency, and rate of fire. At this stage of the war, the Austrian troops themselves had been retrained and motivated with new tactics for three years. They had renewed confidence in themselves. And their company and battalion level officers were mostly veterans. And they really hated the French.
French Combat Effect: By 1809, after over a decade of triumph, the French army had started to show its age. It had lost significant numbers of experienced combat rank-and-file as well as lower-level officers. Spain had also taken its toll. And in 1809 Napoleon, facing a manpower shortage, was, for the first time, compelled to call up the 1810 class of draftees a year early to fill the ranks. Virtually all of the privates of Demont's division of Davout's III Corps, for instance, were from that class, between 17-18 years old. This would start to get worse by the later years of the wars (1813-15) when they were calling up kids as young as 14 (the "Marie-Louises"). But for this year, I would rate the CE of French troops to be pretty equivlent to the Austrians. They proved to be brave kids, but they were pretty raw compared to the troops of previous campaigns.
Soft Ground: It had been raining the previous week. And it was pretty cool and humid still on the 19th. I would rate the ground as soft and the roads as muddy. This would reduce artillery effect (shot, canister, and shell) and would slow movement--whatever rules you use for those.
Visibility: It was pretty humid. So as troops and guns fired, smoke would linger and accumulate. I don't know if your wargame rules account for visibility from gunsmoke (mine do) but I would apply them to this game if you have them. Besides affecting artillery accuracy, increased smoke would also limit reconnaissance, so that you would not be able to see or identify new troops as they appeared on the edge of the table. Smoke would also accumulate more thickly in the woods, reducing the visibility in them to a few feet.
One could, simulating this effect, use decoy markers representing troops on the table, rolling to idenitfy them as each sides' figures came with in a certain distance.
Appearance of New Troops: Since during this entire campaign troops were moving around and showing up to surprise everyone, I would think about using randomizer rules (dice, phone randomizer app, scissors/paer/rock, whatever you use) to see if and when reinforcements or enemies appear and where on the edge of the board.
Bonus Section
Austrian Infantry Formations for 1809
Schematic of the new, closed column formation, the Battalion Masse, that Charles had introduced to the Austrian army prior to the Fifth Coalition War. Note that the flags would've been carried on the right corner instead of the center, as was traditional in other armies' formations. This was to make it easier to rally and also to deploy; soldiers wouldn't have to remember they were on the right or the left of the flag. The formation was also supposed to make it easier for the infantry to withstand cavalry charges from all angles than the traditional square, which was difficult for untrained troops to master, particularly in chaotic battle conditions.
The disadvantage, though, was that these battalion massen were more vulnerable to artillery fire than an old style hollow square, and could not deliver quite as much musketry from each face as a hollow square. © 2025 Jeffery P. Berry Trust, image protected by Digimarc watermark
Here is the deployment scheme of Kayser's battalion deployments on the Buchberg, according to Elliot. I've laid it out in actual scale to the troops. Elliot's description of the dimensions was in paces.
© Copyright 2025 Jeffery P. Berry Trust, image protected by Digimarc watermark
Orders of Battle
Column Key:
Command is the name of the command or regiment, colored in the primary uniform coat color for each regiment.
Facing” The command level and type, using standard military symbology (corps, division, brigade, regiment, etc.) This column is also color-coded in the “facing” color of the regiment, e.g the colors, cuffs, lapels, and tail linings.
Flag A miniature of the regimental flag, if known. If unknown or not carried, this cell is left blank.
Strength” With the French units, I used the archived parade state reports of 16 April from Bowden/Tarbox, three days before the battle . So these are within three days precise. For the Austrians, I used Jack Gill's OOB from the Krieg 1809 Archives, parade states as fo 1 April. So these are precise to within three weeks.
“Guns” The calibers and numbers of pieces assigned to each unit.
“Bns/Sdns” The reported number of subunits (Battalions for Infantry, and Squadrons for Cavalry).
References
As with my previous posts, I've linked, where they exist, books to online retailers. My preference has always been my favorite bookstore in America, Powell's, in Portland, who also have the largest stock of used and out-of-print books in the world. But where Powell's doesn't seem to have the book in stock, I've linked the title to Amazon (who, I'm told, also source their used stocks from Powell's)
Paper
Bowden, Scott & Tarbox, Charles, Armies on the Danube 1809, Empire Games Press, 1980, ISBN 978-0913037089
Castle, Ian, Eggmuhl 1809: Storm Over Bavaria, Campaign Series #56, Osprey Press, 1998 ISBN 1-85532-708-2
Chandler, David, The Campaigns of Napoleon, MacMillan, 1966, ISBN 0025236601
Elting,
John & Esposito, Vincent, A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, Greenhill Books, 1999, ISBN 1-85367-346-3
Haythornthwaite, Philip, Austrian Army of the Napoleonic Wars (1): Infantry, Osprey 176, 1986, ISBN 0-85045-689-4
Haythornthwaite, Philip, Austrian Army of the Napoleonic Wars (2): Cavalry, Osprey 181, 1986, ISBN 0-85045-726-2
Nosworthy,
Brent, With Musket, Cannon and Sword: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies, Sarpedon, 1996, ISBN 1-885119-27-5
Rothenburg, Gunther, Napoleon's Great Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1814, Indiana University Press, 1982, ISBN: 0-253-33969-3
Smith, Digby, Napoleonic Wars Data Book, Greenhill Bools, London, 1998, ISBN1-85367-276-9
Digital / Online References
Allan, Douglas James, Napoleon 1809--Campaign de Cinq Jours
Elliott, Grant, Battle of Teugen-Hausen, Partizan Press, 1996 https://stefanov.no-ip.org/MagWeb/ageofnap/19/an19th1.htm
Arre Caballo, Battle of Teugn-Hausen, 19 April 1809, 07-2023 post, https://arrecaballo.es/guerras-napoleonicas/guerras-napoleonicas-1809/batalla-de-teugn-hausen-19-abril-de-1809/
Rickard, J (19 October 2010), Battle of Teugn-Hausen, 19 April 1809. https://www.historyofwar.org/articles/battles_teugn-hausen.html
Gill, Jack, Thunder on the Danube Archives, Austrian Hauptarmee in Late March
© Copyright 2025, Jeffery P. Berry Trust, all rights reserved. No part of this post, except those illustrations which are already in the public domain, may be used for re-publication or re-posting without documented permission from the Jeffery P. Berry Trust, which may be obtained by e-mailing jeffery.p.berry@gmail.com. However, feel free to link to this site as a resource from related sites.
