American Revolution
26 December 1776
Americans: George Washington, 5,402 with 17 guns
Hessians: Johann Gottleib Rall, 1,356 with 6 guns
Weather: What they call a "Nor'easter" in this part of the United States. Cold, blasting wind from the northeast, blowing a mixture of snow and rain. Ice starting to form on the Delaware River and streams.
Dawn Twilight: 6:50 Sunrise: 7:21 Sunset: 16:40 End Twilight: 17:10: Moonrise: 17:31 nearly full
(calculated from U.S.Naval Observatory site)
Several years ago, while visiting friends in Princeton, we went to the site of Washington's famous crossing of the Delaware and his subsequent victories at Trenton and Princeton at the end of 1776. These two battles were dubbed by historians of the American Revolution a turning point. Up to this date, the year 1776 was near catastrophic for the American cause of independence, with an unending string of British victories and Washington's army virtually annihilated, driven south, clear out of New Jersey and into Pennsylvania. It was only the coming of winter that kept the British commander, Lord Howe, from ending the entire war then. While the Battle of Trenton may not be so obscure to students of American history (as opposed to the average American on a Jimmy Kimmel street interview who couldn't tell you what came first, the Civil War or WWII), not many may know that if it weren't for this tiny, half-hour battle, the American Revolution was on the verge of collapsing. The United States might never have existed. Yet Trenton was more of a raid than a full-on battle. It was like one of those Schrödinger moments in quantum theory where the universe split into two metaverses.
High-res map of action at Trenton from about 08:00 until 08:30 when Washington's army surprised the pants off the Hessian garrison.
Since the signing of the Declaration of Independence by Congress on (...anyone? anyone? Oh, come on!), the year 1776 had been one humiliating defeat after another for the American cause. After they evacuated Boston in March with their tails between their legs, British had sent some 30,000 troops, including 17,000 Hessian mercenaries, to their rebellious colonies in over 125 warships, the bulk of their fleet to New York. Washington had lost every battle since then, including both forts on the Hudson (Forts Lee and Washington). What remained of his army had been forced to retreat all the way from New York down to Trenton, New Jersey, 73 miles. To the Brothers Howe (General and Admiral), who had been tasked by Parliament and King George III to suppress the insolent bumpkins of any delusions of independence, it certainly looked, by the end of the year, that the rebellion was done. The King had issued a demand for unconditional surrender on 30 November. It even looked like the end to Washington, and to many members of Congress.
 | |
| General William Howe Commander of His Majesty's Land Forces in North America while his brother, Admiral Richard Howe, conveniently commanded the Royal Navy. | |
By December 7 Washington managed to ferry what was left of his ragtag army over the Delaware River into Pennsylvania. He also had his men collect all the boats on the New Jersey side for a distance of forty miles up and down the river and either burn them or take them across to the west bank, depriving them from the pursuing enemy. For their part the British, under Generals Cornwallis and Howe, had been dawdling up at New Brunswick during the week Washington had been getting his army over the river into Pennsylvania and only managed to reach the Delaware at Trenton a day after Washington had pulled his army across to safety. Neither British commander was particularly concerned. They decided that the rebels were finished and that they themselves should just settle down into comfy winter quarters now and finish the job come the spring, as any 18th century gentleman would. According to long custom, European armies of this period didn't fight during the winter, when forage was scarce. Besides, with all the boats gone and no bridges over the Delaware, they could use the winter months to build their own flotilla of boats. Also the river was starting to freeze over, effectively shutting down all the ferries, but not frozen enough to risk walking over with horses and artillery.
For weeks Washington had been vainly trying to persuade his subordinate commander, Gen. Charles Lee, to bring his 7,000 men down from Peekskill on the upper Hudson in New York and join him. Lee (not to be confused with the soon-to-be-famous "Light Horse" Harry Lee) was a veteran English officer of Seven Years War experience, was contemptuous of Washington, whom he considered an amateur. Though Washington had been assigned Commander-in-Chief by Congress the previous year, Lee had long felt he, with his obviously superior military experience , should've been the one. In fact, Lee had been corresponding with partisan members of Congress to lobby for his replacement over Washington, whom he described as "indecisive of mind". For weeks he had been prevaricating and refusing to budge his army, replying to Washington's polite entreaties to reinforce him (the C-in-C was too deferential to issue direct orders in the "I'm your boss, that's why" vein) that he felt it important to remain where he was, threatening the British rear. He did have a point. Both Cornwallis and Howe themselves had been worried about their northern flank and regarded Lee as the more competent soldier over Washington (British, you know, unlike the colonial yokel, Washington). And Lee had been sending out frequent raiding parties on their lines of communication. So he felt he was performing a more valuable strategic deterrent to Howe's drive south.
Finally, on December 12, Lee did order Maj.Gen. John Sullivan to march south (via Tinicum Ferry on the upper Delaware) with his division of 2,100 men to join Washington, promising to come later with the rest of his force, though that had been greatly diminished by the expiration of enlistments at the beginning of December. But luck favored the British (and ironically the American cause) when, the next day while enjoying breakfast in his bathrobe at an inn, Lee was captured by a British light cavalry patrol (under the later notorious villain, Banastre Tarleton--well, notorious to Americans who blamed him for a number of massacres of captured prisoners in South Carolina later in the war). This greatly relieved Cornwallis and Howe. As I mentioned, they considered Lee the most dangerous threat to their movements south, but that Washington was a negligible one.
Ha! They'll soon see!
After the capture of Lee, Howe was convinced that the war was all but won. All of his intelligence from Loyalist Americans (called, derisively, "Tories" by the Patriots) and his spies in Congress was that the rebels were done for. He was also aware that most of the American soldiers' enlistments were set to expire at the end of the month and that Congress did not yet have the authority raise money to pay for or even call up fresh recruits (this was then the sole responsibility of each state). In a panic Congress, in fact, had evacuated Philadelphia and fled to Baltimore, expecting the British to march into the American capital before Christmas. And their warships were already at the mouth of the Delaware. Once across the river from Trenton, it was only a two day march for the Redcoats to the capital. But Howe, supremely confident, ordered his army in New Jersey to stand down and settle into winter quarters. He and Cornwallis went back to New York, where Cornwallis was due to sail back to England. Howe would leisurely mop up the rest of the beaten rebels in the spring.
"Victory or Death"
 |
| Johann Gottleib Rall Commander of the Hessian Brigade at Trenton |
Major General James Grant, who had recently assumed command of the Crown's forces of this part of New Jersey, was stationed up in New Brunswick, 27 miles northeast of Trenton. He had been receiving alarming reports from his commanders about an increasing number of raids by insurgents on their posts. Grant thought there was nothing to worry about. He, like Howe, also regarded the insurrection as essentially over and these raids just irritating and sporadic last gasps of a failed insurgency. But he sent a politely-worded note to Col Johann Rall, in charge of the Hessian brigade at Trenton, that he might want to erect some earthworks around the town, just in case. Rall, who was contemptuous of the rebels as well (he had been at the twin victories over them at Long Island, White Plains and Fort Washington), referred to them as "country clowns" or a more scatological epithet in German. He thought earthworks were unnecessary, redundantly snorting, "Scheiszer bey Scheisz! ["shitty shits"] Let them come! We want no trenches; we'll have at them with bayonets!" But he was, at least, prudent enough to send out pickets to the outskirts of town. He also issued a standing order that one of his three battalions stand to arms each night in a rotating schedule, just in case.
Meanwhile, for his part, Col.von Donop, who was officially senior to Col Rall, had his own brigade of Hessians and two companies of Redcoats, (the 42nd Highland, "Black Watch"), down at Bordentown, six miles to the southwest of Trenton (see map below). Von Donop was more concerned that the rebels might try a crossing over the Delaware further south at Bristol to Burlington, so he moved his 1,500 men down that direction to Mt. Holly to intercept them, 18 miles from Trenton. Col. Rall also noticed increased enemy activity directly across the river from Trenton at Morrisville (Ewing's militia) and urged von Donop to come back up north again to support him. As there was no love lost between these two German officers, von Donop ignored Rall's request.
At the same time, on Christmas Day, Washington had moved two divisions (John Sullivan's and Nathaniel Greene's, 5,400 men) to McKonkey's Ferry on the Delaware, nine miles northwest of Trenton. Apparently a Loyalist spy on Washington's staff had been at a general planning meeting on Christmas Eve up at the American headquarters at Buckingham in which he heard plans of an attack across the Delaware at Colvin's Ferry, directly across from Trenton. That spy wasted no time in jumping on his horse and galloping south to alert the Hessians in Trenton. But Washington then convened a smaller staff meeting to plan the actual crossing, up at McKonkey's landing, beginning at sunset on the 25th. One wonders whether he and his closer cohorts knew about this spy and simply used him to hear the bogus plan and let him go report it. I'd like to think so.
Washington had already sent orders to Ewing down at Morrisville to cross the Delaware at Colvin's Ferry with his 700 men, and also for Cadwalader with his force of 2,400 to cross at Bristol over to Burlingham to draw von Donop down south, away from Trenton (the Americans, naturally, had their ubiquitous spies too). These demonstrations were clearly intended to distract the enemy about the actual object and line of attack. Or the actual day. Or the actual crossing point. This ploy reminds me of Alexander's strategies at the Granicus and the Jhelum two thousand years before, which also involved cross-river attacks and distractions (I encourage you to read my articles on those two battles), leading to me to wonder if Washington was familiar, in his classical education, with Plutarch and Arrian. Probably. There's a lot of wondering in this article, isn't there?
During this last planning session, too, a staff officer, Lt. Col. Joseph Reed, noticed that Washington had been scribbling notes again and again, wadding them up and throwing them on the floor. Afterward the Reed had picked up one of the discarded pieces of paper, and all it said was "Victory or Death." It wasn't ranting. It was the password for the crossing, an exhortation to the troops, and finally a reminder to Washington himself how much was riding on this Hail Mary Pass.
Movement and positions of the forces beginning at midnight on Christmas Day.
The Crossing
Washington had been preparing for his crossing up at McKonkey's Ferry for a couple of weeks. As I wrote above, once he crossed over into Pennsylvania on 7 December, he had commandeered every boat and ferry for forty miles up and down the Delaware on either side of Trenton, stripping the right bank (the eastern shore) of boats. If the British were going to cross, they'd have to build their own. But by mid-December the Delaware was starting to freeze over. By January it was anticipated that it would be completely frozen enough to take the weight of marching men, so that the British wouldn't need any boats (just skates, I guess). So, for this reason alone, if Washington was going to strike back, he had to do it while the river was still liquid. He had also chosen to make his assault on Christmas night because it was his understanding that the Germans traditionally partied hard on Weinachten and would probably be hung over the next morning. He wasn't wrong.
Washington had to act soon for another reason. Enlistments for most of his regiments were due to expire by 1 January, which meant men would be returning home in their hundreds. Congress, as I've mentioned, didn't yet have the authority to fund or raise new troops on a national level. This was the responsibility of individual states, who themselves were still in the process of organizing their own new governments for the war effort. If he was going to use what forces he had to save the new country, he had to do it in the next two remaining weeks of this year.
So he had the divisions of Sullivan and Greene muster at McKonkey's Ferry on Christmas Day. Specialized, steep-sided boats called Durham boats, originally designed to carry heavy cargoes of iron ore, were assembled from iron mills up and down the river. And McKonkey's flat-bottom ferry rafts were commandeered to transport the horses and the 17 cannon. Each man was given a double-load of ammunition (60 rounds) and three days of rations. Because any semblance of uniforms had long since disintegrated, the men stuck pieces of white paper in their hats to distinguish them from the enemy. Though, since the enemy would be wearing their own uniforms and fusilier and grenadier helmets, I'm not sure why this was necessary. But also, it might have been necessary because the Hessians had blue uniforms like the Continentals. Anyway; an interesting detail.
The plan was for the 5,400 man army to commence its crossing on the afternoon of the 25th, assemble on the opposite bank, and then march down two roads to Trenton (The River Road and the Pennington Road), arriving there by 06:00, or an hour-and-a-half before dawn, when the Hessian garrison was presumed to be still asleep, then launch the surprise attack.
Modern panorama (well, 2008 modern) from the Pennsylvania side of McKonkey's Ferry. That doesn't look so far, right? Well. Do it at night, in freezing cold and blinding sleet, and imagine the river filled with little ice bergs.
Below: The most familiar painting of Washington's Crossing by Emanuel Leutz in 1851, at the Met in New York. Please ignore the "Betsy Ross" flag. That didn't exist yet. And yes, too, Washington would probably have been sitting. And the ice that was forming didn't look like rock candy. Oh, and the light is coming from the wrong direction (would've been from the right since it was sunset). Otherwise, it's accurate.
 |
| The author and an old friend, Karen Smith, at the site of Washington's Crossing, 2008. |
Washington and his staff were in the first wave over the river, and then supervised the army as it followed them. The storm had put the whole operation far behind schedule and it wasn't until about 02:00 that all the infantry were safely over. But it took still another hour for the artillery to be transported and unloaded. Then the whole army, forming up in the freezing cold, didn't get moving off the landing area until 04:00, four hours behind schedule.
Once over and marching, Sullivan's division turned right to take the River Road down to Trenton. Greene moved inland about a mile and at a check point marked by an inn, Bear Tavern, took the Pennington Road on a parallel route. As Americans headed to the southeast, the freezing wind was more from their back left shoulders (and would be in the faces of any enemy pickets they'd run into). This made the remaining eight miles they had to march somewhat easier...they kept telling themselves.
Washington's troops marching south to Trenton. Painting by Don Troiani (posted with permission). You need to visit his site to see his remarkably good illustrations of American history.
Meanwhile, to the south, Ewing's and Cadwalader's attempts across the Delaware against the lower approaches to Trenton had been stopped by the storm. The ice was even heavier in the river below the town. If the Hessian pickets noticed these attempted crossings, Rall evidently didn't think they were a threat since they were aborted. And these failed attempts probably reassured the Hessian commander that Washington wasn't going to try anything that night.
The Hessian troops in Trenton, meanwhile, and contrary to popular legend, were not getting drunk celebrating Christmas. They were, for the most part, kept on edge by irritating raids being made by local militia. And the regiment on duty that night (von Knyphausen) was kept awake all night by these sporadic raids. Their brigade commander, Col. Rall, by contrast, was up most of the night. He was getting drunk and playing cards at the houses of Stacy Potts (one of the locals who had remained behind when the Hessian troops came to occupy their town) and later at Abraham Hunt's.
 |
| Abraham Hunt Tried but acquitted for collaboration with the enemy, he may have played a crucial role in distracting Col. Rall the night before the battle by getting him drunk and playing an all-night card game. Oh, and yes, you're right, he does look like an Addams Family character. |
As I mentioned above, through the night--as throughout many nights prior to this Christmas--outposts were reporting that there were small raids around the outskirts of the town. Occasionally the Hessian officers would hear short bursts of musketry. But in the snow storm it was hard to tell the direction they were coming from. In fact it was now snowing so hard that Rall thought it highly unlikely that Washington would attempt anything major now. On Christmas night? Really? This is the 18th century! Middle of the Enlightenment! Even the "country clowns" don't do things like that on Christmas! Pour another round, Mr. Hunt!
Washington himself was said to be irritated that some of these freelance raiding parties were active that night, fearful that they would alert the Hessians. And he was also disappointed when Ewing had sent word that his attempt to cross the river and seize the southern bridge into Trenton had failed. But, ironically, it was all this guerilla activity that itself reassured Rall that nothing big was going to happen. These pathetic little raids had been going on for days. The ones this night may have unintentionally served as misdirection...or perhaps intentionally. But we'll give it to Washington's brilliance...or his luck.
Imagine Rall's surprise, then, at about 08:00, a little after sunrise, when bands of his pickets started running back into town from the north and west, firing frantically into the snowstorm behind them. He leapt out of bed, pulled on his pants on, threw his uniform over his nightshirt, and went outside to mount his horse and muster his troops.
What's that noise?
 |
| Barracks where Hessian troops slept Christmas night, visions of sugar plums dancing in their heads. from Google Street View |
Both Greene's and Sullivan's divisions had converged on the town from two directions. At first Rall thought the assault was coming just from the north side, where Gen. Henry Knox had set up his battery of nine guns at the top of King and Queen Streets to fire down into the town, and where Gen. Greene was deploying his brigades. The alarm was sounded and Hessian troops started pouring out of their barracks and houses on the south side of town, throwing on their own coats and gear, to form up across King and Queen Streets near the St. Michael's Episcopal Church in the town center. They managed to bring four of their three-pounder battalion guns up with them.
By this time the shot and canister from Knox's guns had already started to take their toll, quickly putting two of the Hessian guns out of action. Greene's men began to pour down the flanks of the town and straight down the green between the main streets. These quickly overwhelmed the still-forming battalions of Lossburg and Rall, who fell back to the east of town toward the apple orchard (see map above). Rall's intention was to move up toward Princeton and the British support there. The colonel saw, though, that his retreat up that road was blocked by Stephen's and Fermoy's brigades. He rallied the two regiments and led a counterattack back toward town. By this time, though, the American troops had occupied the houses along Queen and King Streets and were firing at the Hessians from cover. The Hessians had trouble shooting back into the snowstorm, while the enemy fire seemed to be coming from everywhere. This was another example of what the British had experienced the year before during their abortive fiasco at Lexington and Concord. Americans just didn't fight fair! One Loyalist diarist (Janet Schaw) called them "ragamuffins". And it reminds me of that old stand-up bit that imagines the Revolution having been staged like a football game and the umpire announces at the coin toss, "Okay! The Rebels won the toss. They say they can wear any kind of clothes they want to and shoot from behind the rocks and trees. While the British have to wear red and march in a straight line."
During this counterattack, Col. Rall was shot once. He managed to stay on his horse but called off the counterattack and led what was left of his men back toward the orchard. As he did this, though, he was hit again by two more musket balls and fell from his horse.
 |
| Stacy Pott's House on King St. where Col. Rall partied the night before and died the next night. |
Meanwhile, at the south end of town, the Fusilier Regiment von Knyphausen (who had, you'll recall, been up all night on alert), managed to form up against Sullivan's onslaught from the River Road into the lower west side of town. But the Knyphauseners (if that's what they'd called themselves) were soon out-gunned and out-manned by all three of Sullivan's brigades that were swarming into town from the south and west. Slowly the Hessians retreated toward the bridge over the Assunpink Creek to attempt to escape that way, but found it blocked by St Clair's and Sargent's brigades and their artillery. They then moved over to another small apple orchard on the southeast side of town above the creek but found retreat up toward Princeton blocked by more American troops under Glover, who had recrossed the creek and hit them from the south. At that point, the Knyphausen commander, Maj. Frederich von Dechow, who was also mortally wounded, ordered his regiment to lay down their arms and surrender, hoping for mercy from the rebels.
All three battalions of Rall's brigade had surrendered, only minutes after the first shots had been fired. One of the shortest battles (if you can call it that) of the war.
Col. Rall is shot from his horse while leading the counterattack of his grenadiers across Queen Street. Painting courtesy of Don Troiani.
Several Hessian troops were in flight, though. There were those who didn't lay down their arms and tried to retreat southward over the Assunpink Creek. Some managed to slip further east in small groups and then north toward Princeton. A few handfuls managed to make it down to Bordenton on the Delaware. But the bulk of the Hessian brigade surrendered.
Col. Rall's formal surrender to Washington. He died of his wounds that night at Stacy Pott's house, the note warning him of Washington's approach still unopened in his pocket. Painting by John Trumbull, 1786, Yale University Gallery
Within half-an-hour, Washington had captured 896 elite Hessian troops (the victors of Long Island, Ft.Washington and White Plains) and their six guns. As I mentioned, some 400 had managed to escape up to Princeton or down to Bordenton, including some jagers and 20 British light dragoons. The Hessians lost 22 killed and 83 seriously wounded. Besides Col. Rall, all of the Hessian battalion commanders were killed. The Americans, though exhausted from their night march through the storm, suffered only four killed and four wounded (including future President James Monroe, who was 18 at the time!). An unrecorded number, though, died later from the long night of exposure and exhaustion. It was reported that many died of frostbite, having been marching barefoot through the snow, but I find this suspect. I know the Americans were ill-clad, and their shoes weren't in the best shape, but I find it hard to believe (other that sympathetic propaganda of heroism) that they were actually barefoot while marching in sub-freezing conditions. At the very least they would've wrapped their feet in rags.
Washington also managed to capture quite a sizable depot at Trenton, both in munitions and other supplies. Why Howe thought this was a safe place to establish such a dump is baffling, unless his contempt for the Americans was such that he dismissed the risks.
In short, Trenton was a stunningly lopsided victory.
It was also unexpected. No one on the British side had thought the Americans were capable of such a feat. Everyone there assumed the rebels were beaten and that it was only for the British to cross the Delaware, march the short distance to Philadelphia, and accept their surrender. Trenton was a shock, much as the surprise Tet Offensive had been a shock to the Americans and ARVN who had assumed the Viet Cong were beaten in South Vietnam in January 1968. Trenton demonstrated not just to the British, but to Congress that the American people were not only far from beaten; they were, in fact, at their most dangerous.
The
reaction of the British command, all the way back to Gen. Howe in New York,
was to strike back. Within hours of learning of the catastrophe on the
Delaware, Lord Cornwallis, Howe's favorite field commander, had
cancelled his voyage home to England and rode down to New
Brunswick to consult with Gen. Grant. Col.von Donop moved his
Hessians back up to Princeton to reinforce that
garrison on the 28th. Things were starting to move in the King's army to redress the insult of Trenton. By 2 January, Cornwallis had assembled some 9,500 around Princeton to counterattack.
The End of the Beginning
After a day of rest in Trenton itself, Washington decided it was too dangerous to remain on that side of the Delaware. Though he was urged by Nathaniel Greene and Henry Knox to continue the momentum and take Bordenton and then Princeton, he thought it was prudent to withdraw his army, while he still had it, back across the Delaware. So on the 28th they all marched back up (with their nine hundred Hessian prisoners and their captured guns) and recrossed at McKonkey's Ferry again with the boats still up there. Washington went west to Newtown, six miles southwest from the ferry, to establish his new headquarters while his army rested. He must have heard they have great cappuccinos there.
While Washington was withdrawing, Gen. Cadwalader, who had been unable to cross the river on the day of battle, now did, landing at Burlington and moving up toward Bordenton in pursuit of Col.von Donop. Washington had sent Gen. Thomas Mifflin from his staff to take command over Cadwalader with an additional 1,500 Pennsylvania militia. Though the new year was approaching and the enlistments of the Continental troops fast expiring, Mifflin made an appeal to them to stay with the army while the momentum of victory was with them. Many agreed to. At the same time, he sent a request to Washington to recross the Delaware and resume the aggressive campaign while the British were on their heels.
Washington did. On the 30th he recrossed the Delaware and set up temporary headquarters on Queen Street. From there he issued his own plea to the Continental troops whose enlistment was going to expire on 1 January to stay with him, offering a $10 bounty (or about six week's additional pay) if any should stay on. Though about a thousand passed on the offer and started marching home, Washington was able to keep about 3,300 of his original Continental troops with him. He had also sent out requests for militia companies to come join him. He now had, including Cadwalader's division, some 6,800 and 30 guns. But he also learned that the British under Gen. Cornwallis were bearing down on him from Princeton with 9.500 Redcoats.
The Americans dug in on the high ground behind the Assunpink below Trenton. There was only a single bridge over that creek and the ground up to the east of it was all swampy. On 2 January instead of trying to maneuver around it, Cornwallis, still contemptuous of Americans' fighting prowess, ordered a frontal attack across the bridge. Three times the Redcoats charged across the narrow bridge and three times they were thrown back with great loss. Cornwallis called off the attack and pulled back to Beake's Farm north of Trenton. Again he made the same judgmental error that Howe had made, that the Americans were beaten and he would be able to swarm over them and wipe them up in the morning.
Yeah. That didn't happen.
In the night, Washington, leaving 500 men and two guns to tend the fires at the Assunpink Creek bridge, fooling the Redcoats, snuck the rest of his army east and north to hit Cornwallis from behind at Princeton. Again, Washington was taking his lessons from Alexander the Great. And his withdrawal from the position at the creek was just a repetition of how he had withdrawn from Long Island under Cornwallis' nose, sucker-punching the arrogant general again, and managing to achieve yet another decisive victory at Princeton the next day.
And yes, that's the subject of my next post, which you can read now.
Armchair General Section
A lot of mistakes were made on both sides at Trenton, but, as with every battle, more on one side than the other.
Washington's Mistakes
For the most part, except for the weather and the overly optimistic time-table, Washington didn't make too many mistakes. He may have counted too much on the ability of Cadwalader and Ewing to make their own crossings at and below Trenton. He was afraid that they might have tipped his hand and alerted the British. Even the impromptu, freelance raids that some militia were making on Hessian pickets that night that made Washington mad ended up serving his purpose by creating a lot of noise, concealing the thunderclap to come the next morning. As it turned out, these failed attempts not only didn't tip his hand, they inadvertently drew enemy forces (von Donop's) away from the primary target, Trenton. They also lulled the Hessian Rall into thinking that Ewing's and Cadwalader's failed crossings and the few pathetic militia raids were all the pathetic rebels had.
Another mistake that may have led to disaster was Washington's decision to move back over the Delaware to the Pennsylvannia side. The river had really started to freeze over by the 30th, and it became more and more difficult to move what was left of his army (particularly his artillery) back over to Trenton. Luck was still with him, but a wargame scenario in which the weather was even more serious could've changed everything.
Other than these small mistakes, Washington's entire maneuver, and the intricacy of all the parts of his envelopment of the town were carried out like clockwork. The Hessians didn't have a chance. Except that the very intricacy of all the moving parts of Washington's plan seemed also to have been its largest vulnerability (scroll down to Wargaming Trenton section below). It may have been that grim determination of the American soldiers to exact revenge on the Hessian invaders overcame any flaws in the plan itself.
Hessian Mistakes
The bad calls on the part of Rall were many. He should have taken his intelligence more seriously. His contempt for American fighting abilities was to prove his undoing. In a way, the string of relatively easy Hessian victories over the Rebels in the months prior was an example of "success-induced failure". Rall and his officers just didn't think the Yankee ragamuffins (in Janet Schaw's words) would be capable of an intricate and devastating counterstroke. They all thought the enemy was done for and cowering, waiting for the end on the other side of the Delaware. Indeed, the entire British command, all the way up to the Howe brothers, assumed this.
Rall's and von Donop's childish contempt for each other prevented them from cooperating. Von Donop moved his command even farther from Trenton the day before the battle (down to Mt. Holly), ignoring Rall's pleas to come closer to support him. One wonders, though, whether this would have made a difference.
I have no idea if Rall actually failed to open the envelope from the Loyalist spy that Abraham Hunt handed him at the card table that night. Or if he read it, did he just dismiss it? It was reported that the note was found in his vest pocket after he died. How do we know he didn't read it? And, if he did, why didn't he act on it and call out the whole garrison that night?
One wonders too, if Rall had taken the precaution of erecting fortifications around Trenton, as he had been advised to do, would it have made any difference? He could have put them up on the high ground above King and Queen Streets to command the town with his artillery. He could have also ordered his troops to fortify certain stone houses to cover intersections and streets. It would certainly not have been as easy for the Americans to swarm into the town and command the high ground and the bridge over the Assunpink. One of their decisive advantages was surprise and the fact that the Hessians weren't anywhere near ready in defense.
But once the battle had started, things moved too fast to redress any of this lack of preparation. The Continentals were swarming in and around the town. It was all the German troops could do to throw on their coats, grab their muskets, and muster on the snow-covered lawns between the widely spaced houses.
In the end, though, the chief error on the part of the Crown's army was in overconfidence in their own strength and contempt for the competence, resolve, and resourcefulness of the Americans. This went all the way up to the top, to Howe in New York, and Prime Minister North in London. They all misread the Americans. And much criticism (or praise, if you're an American, like me) goes to the overall British command for spreading their forces too thinly across New Jersey that winter.
Wargaming Trenton
In wargaming Trenton, attention should be given to rules which take into account the following factors:
- Weather: Cold, icy wind and snow blowing from the northeast, which would tend to blind any shooting in that direction. With blowing snow, too, visibility would have been greatly limited in all directions.
- Fatigue: The American forces had been up all night, marching in the snow, soaking, and freezing. Make sure your assignment of combat efficiency to the American side takes this into account.
- Morale: If your wargame rules allow for surprise adjustments to morale, make sure the Hessian side is affected by surprise. At the same time, because the Americans were itching for payback and probably excited about surprising the hell out of the enemy, they should be given a morale boost.
- Hand-to-Hand Combat with Bayonets: At this early stage of the war, it has been generally accepted that British and Hessian troops, being professional soldiers, had bayonets attached to their muskets, while the American troops did not. This might have led to a vulnerability on the American side to a Hessian charge. One might want to give a close-combat bonus, then, to any Hessian attack that ended in hand-to-hand combat. Or, possibly, to have American troops automatically retreat a certain distance when Hessians charged them. See this interesting Reddit post on the subject:
Experimental Premises of Trenton could be played on two scales, strategic and tactical. Here are some scenarios and conditions one might experiment with.
- Timing:
Experiment with the premise that Sullivan's and Greene's divisions
didn't converge on Trenton at the same time; that one or the other could
have been one or two hours later in arriving. Would this have made a
difference in the Hessian's response and mustering? Roll dice at each
turn to see if either wing shows up on the board.
- Weather:
What if that winter storm did not arrive and the weather was calm?
Would this have affected the time table of the attack? Or the
visibility? Or would it have allowed Cadwalader and Ewing to cross the
Delaware in support of Washington after all?
- Hessian Support:
What if Rall and von Donop had been more cordial with each other, or at
least coordinated their operations? Would it have made a difference if
the Hessians had both commands at Trenton, or von Donop's within
supporting distance?
- Intelligence: What if the British side had used its intelligence assets more effectively, both cavalry patrols and Loyalist informants? Would it have made a difference if, in a game, the British player could reconnoiter crossing points of the Delaware?
Orders of Battle
The following OOB lists were compiled primarily from the David Bonk's Osprey book, Trenton and Princeton 1776-77. The units only include those actually participating in the battle and not the American troops who were not able to cross the Delaware per the original plan (hope they have a good excuse).Command, besides listing the name of each command, this cell is also color-coded for the primary uniform coat color of the regiment. For the American troops, this color coding is mostly speculative since so many had essentially civilian coats, or brown coats, and those extremely tattered by this stage of the war. Nearly all of the New England soldiers were wearing brown coats, so reflected here.
Facing is color-coded in the facings of the regiment (e.g. cuffs, lapels, etc.). As with the coat color, where I could not find a reference, I assigned the default red facing.
Flags displays miniatures of the flags carried into battle by the units. Again, where I could not find a specific reference, I would leave this blank or use the default Continental Flag of the New England regiments (pine tree on a red field). Do not use this as a scholarly source, though.
Strength The strength reported by each unit on its roster on 22 Dec, as listed in Bonk's OOB.
Ranks is the standard deployment depth for each type and army at the time of the battle. Though the Hessians were used to deploying in 3 ranks, under the orders of Gen Howe, they were instructed to deploy in 2 ranks as did the rest of the British army at this time.
References
Bonk, David, Trenton and Princeton 1776-77 2009, Osprey Publishing, ISBN 978-1-844603-350-6
Breen,T.H., American Insurgents / American Patriots, 2010, Hill & Wang, ISBN 978-0-8090-7588-1
Hibbert, Chistopher, Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes, 1990, .W. Norton ISBN 0-393-02895-X
McCullough, David, 1776, 2005, Simon & Schuster, ISBN 0-7432-2671-2
Stephenson, Michael, Patriot Battles: How the War of Independence Was Fought, 2007, Harper Collins, ISBN 978-0-06-073261-5
Online
Curran, Jonathan, "Crossing the Delaware", National Museum of the United States Army
"Washington Crossing the Delaware — the Legendary Move that Saved America", American History Central
Proclamation of demand for surrender from Admiral and General Howe, Nov.30, 1776
Thanks for 10? years of blogging, Jeff. And thanks for adding yet another entry to the collection. I loved the new(?) Armchair General Section. Looking fwd to the entry in Princeton!
ReplyDeleteThank you so much for your kind comment, Señor Geek. I can't believe I've been doing this for over a decade. Thirty-seven battles so far. I'm almost done with the research, graphics, and maps for the next article, Princeton. Now comes the writing.
Delete