Seven Years War
6 May 1757
Prussians: Frederick II, approx. 64,000 (45,000 infantry, 17,300 cavalry, 210 guns)
Austrians: Charles of Lorraine and Count von Browne approx 61,000, (48,000 infantry, 12,600 cavalry, 189 guns)
Weather: A beautiful day in the neighborhood.
Location: 50°05'05.7"N 14°30'30.8"E about 4.4 mi (7.1 km) east of the nearest Starbucks in Prague.
Dawn Twilight: 03:52 Sunrise: 4:29 Sunset: 19:28 Twilight Ends: 20:06 Moonrise: 22:21 nearly full
(calculated from U.S.Naval Observatory site)
I've decided to add to my collection of Seven Years War battles, since I haven't done one in, oh, eight years, longer than the war itself lasted. (the last one I wrote about was Zorndorf 1758). And this one, Prague, was fairly early in that war. It preceded Frederick's first tactical and strategic defeat at Kolin a little over a month later. Also this was itself a near-run battle, with both sides making tactical mistakes that could have easily flipped the victory. In fact, one could argue about whether either side won, considering the Prussians paid for their taking the field with far more casualties than the Austrians, and failed to capture Prague (Frederick's stated strategic objective). Also a little over a month later the Austrians pretty well spanked Fritz's ass good.
The other notable aspect of this obscure battle is that it was a massive one, rivaling nearly any other battle during the 18th century in numbers of combatants (including the early Napoleonic battles) and casualties. It was also significant in that it pitted a then-smaller European power (Prussia) against the dominant military power (Austria) of the Holy Roman Empire.
As to the casus belli of what came to be known as the Seven Years War, let's just say it was the same as pretty much every other war throughout history: Self-entitled autocrats wanting to sacrifice the lives of millions of their subjects for personal, political, or territorial gain. In that sense, Frederick, seizing Silesia (as he did in the previous War of the Austrian Succession), Saxony, and now Bohemia from Austria, was no different than Putin today trying to seize Ukraine for Russia. It was actually Britain that started the war in North America in 1754 by George Washington seizing some frontier forts from France. This escalated with nearly all the European powers joining either the French or the British in a global war, what Winston Churchill later described as the true First World War.
But it doesn't matter. I'm writing about these battles for themselves, not necessarily how they fit into the vast context of human folly. And I gather that most of my readers just want me to get to the carnage. As my hilarious grandfather used to say whenever we'd set down to watch a war movie on TV, "More fun! More people killed!"
Campaign map up to Battle of Prague on 6 May. Composed from the meticulous, day-to-day description and maps culled by Kronoskaf from the Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen, volume III by the German Grosser Generalstab. (map image protected by Digimarc copyright, © Jeffery P. Berry Trust, all rights reserved)
The Prelude
This was the second year of the Seven Years War, also known as the Third Silesian War (the first two were part of the War of the Austrian Succession, supposedly settled by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle). Frederick's goals had been somewhat checked by the campaign the previous year, though he did find himself in a better position in Saxony, which drove its Elector Augustus III into exile in Poland. His goal for this year was to add Bohemia (today's Czechia) to his growing empire, now including Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, and Saxony.
On the Holy Roman side, the goal of Empress Maria-Theresa and her French consort, Francis Stephen, (otherwise known as Emperor Francis I) was to retake the regions of Silesia and Saxony back from Frederick. But in the immediate term, it seemed more important to defend Bohemia from an aggressive Prussian invasion. At first, the Hof Kriegsrath (or General Staff) in Vienna strongly urged the Empress to appoint the popular and competent Irish-expat Marshal Maximilian von Browne to take overall command of the army. But under pressure from her French husband, the empress appointed his incompetent brother Charles of Lorraine (the loser of Chotusitz 1742 and Soor 1745, and later this year of Leuthen). Browne, an honorable and patriotic soldier, agreed to act as Charles's second-in-command, turning down the offer to serve as co-commander (he knew that wouldn't work--why do so many management boards think a joint CEOship ever works, even to this day?).
Charles, however, was feeling a bit under the weather and delayed moving up to Bohemia himself until later, having his personal effects moved to Prague ahead of him instead. Browne went out himself (though he was also feeling rather sick too) to supervise the defense of the region.
On 18 April 1757, Frederick formally began his invasion of Bohemia from four directions. Having overrun and subdued Saxony (who weren't interested in getting involved in this war, thank you), he moved his main force (39,600) from Pirna down the Elbe River to Aussig, joining up on 25 April with Prinz Moritz von Anhalt-Dessau (19,300) marching from the west. (See campaign map above.) Meanwhile, the corps of Bevern (20,300) and Schwerin (34,300) started coming down through the mountains from the north in Lusatia and east from Silesia. All had orders to converge on the capital of Bohemia, Prague, on the Moldau River. Their target date was the first week of May.
On the Austrian side, Marshal Browne was busy as a bee riding all over Bohemia, organizing and shoring up the defenses. In the east, around Königgratz, Serbelloni, with 27,000, was supposed to be checking Schwerin's advance in that region. In the center, Königsegg, with his 23,000, was supposed to be intercepting the Prussians under Bevern (20,300) coming down through the mountains from Zittau. To the northwest of Prague, along the Elbe, Browne himself established a defensive position with 39,000 at Budin on the Eger River to stop Frederick's force himself. And marching from the west, Duke Arenburg was coming with another 24,000 men, covering Prinz Moritz's force, keeping them from crossing the Eger and turning Browne's flank. In all over 113,000 men to defend Bohemia against a more-or-less equal number of Prussians. Moreover, Browne was counting on another 37,000 men marching up from Vienna under Marshal Daun. If he could hold off Frederick's advance for two weeks, he would have force superiority in a central position. Strategic victory looked pretty damn good.
Then came Charles.
Well..."pretty damn good" just turned into damned. In the first place, Serbelloni, who was supposed to be blocking Schwerin in the northeast, was doing a pretty shitty job. For some reason he pulled all his covering cavalry and grenzer (irregular) forces in to concentrate them in Königgratz in eastern Bohemia. Then, when he was ordered by Browne to pull back and join the main army at Prague, he took his own sweet time. Instead, he moved all his personal belongings south to Pardubitz, (see map above) to protect them from Schwerin's raiders. And he didn't move at all for over a week.Then, Königsegg, who was supposed to block Bevern up north, botches that assignment too. He splits his force, and is defeated by an inferior force (16,700 Austrians to 14,550 Prussians) at a minor action at Reichenberg on 21 April. He and his outlying wing under Macquire (10,200) then spend the next week retreating down to the Elbe to the crossing at Brandeis, which they were then supposed to block to hold off the combined corps of Schwerin and Bevern. But he diminishes his own remaining force by dispatching some 6,000 men under d'Ursel 16 miles (26 km) east to the town of Nimburg to defend a magazine there, as well as several detachments of hussars and grenzer up and down the Elbe to watch any other crossing points.
Schwerin and Bevern join forces at Münchengrätz on the 26th and continue on down the Iser River to Brandeis on the Elbe.
On the western approaches, Frederick and Prinz Moritz join up southwest of the previous year's battlefield of Lobositz on the 26th. They march on with their combined 59,000 to the Eger, where they do a head fake and cross that river at Koschlitz, about 7 miles (12 km) west of Browne's main blocking force (39,100) at Budin. Duke von Arenburg, who is supposed to be watching this outflanking possibility, is still way to the west on that day and just misses it. Apparently he had sent ahead some hussars on the crossing at Koschlitz, which watch passively while the Prussians take their own sweet time laying the pontoon bridges in broad daylight. Arenburg does nothing to interfere with this crossing but veers southeast to try to join up with Browne.
Browne, however, seeing he is outflanked, orders a retreat to the next fortified position at Welwarn, and then to Tursko the next day, and then to Tucheinirschitz just five miles from the walls of Prague by the 30th.
All this time, Serbelloni hasn't left Königgratz to join the main army at Prague. It's a schitzchau. (Sorry. I've been longing to use that bad pun.)
And then comes Charles.
On the 29th, Maria Theresa's brother-in-law (apparently feeling much better now, thank you) finally arrives at Prague to take command. As he approaches the city he notices signs of panic on the road, with thousands of civilians evacuating eastward with cartloads of their furniture. The city's streets themselves are clogged with the baggage trains of Browne's retreating army coming in from the north. Not a good omen.
On the 29th, Maria Theresa's brother-in-law (apparently feeling much better now, thank you) finally arrives at Prague to take command. As he approaches the city he notices signs of panic on the road, with thousands of civilians evacuating eastward with cartloads of their furniture. The city's streets themselves are clogged with the baggage trains of Browne's retreating army coming in from the north. Not a good omen.
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| Prince Charles of Lorraine Maria-Theresa's Brother-in-Law |
The next morning, the 30th, the Prince rides up to Tucheinirschitz where Browne is in the process of digging earthworks to defend the capital. Charles puts his loving hand on Browne's shoulder and formally takes command. He calls a council of war of all the present generals to decide what to do. This was the way the Hapsburgs did it. One has to admire their commitment to the democratic process. And, like so many corporations today, their leadership loved to have brainstorming meetings. I imagine they would've loved white boards to write down all the ideas.
In the meeting Browne argues for defending the city from the west, and going on the offensive to outflank Frederick. Charles is all for abandoning Prague entirely and retreating somewhere east--and safe. He is also worried that Browne is exhausted and not thinking clearly. The consensus of the generals is that Prague should be defended, but from the right bank (eastern side) of the Moldau, leaving the left bank to the Prussians. So Charles decides that's a good compromise. He also sends orders to Königsegg to move down from Brandeis to join the main army at Prague and to Serbelloni to hurry up and do the same thing. Königsegg obeys this order at once when he receives it, but Serbelloni somehow moves even slower.
On 1 May Charles leads the retreat through Prague (though he probably would describe it as a redeployment), reaching the eastern side of the Moldau that evening. He calls another council of war and again makes his case to leave a strong garrison in Prague and retreat eastward with the rest of the army. Again he is overruled by the other generals (including Browne). But they do agree to reinforce the garrison in the city to 17,000. The rest of the army camps on the heights of the Ziskaberg and Schanzenberg ridges overlooking the Moldau and the Rocketnitzer stream to the north. Königsegg arrives the next day with his remaining troops from Brandeis. So, by 2 May the Austrian army on the ground east of Prague numbers just 61,000. They all spend the next few days digging entrenchments.
On 2 May Frederick had followed the retreating Austrians to the western outskirts of Prague and sees that their whole army has retreated to the opposite side of the Moldau. He decides to throw pontoon bridges over the river north of the city and cross there, which he accomplishes on the 4th. On the 3rd he sends orders to Schwerin, who is some 20 miles northeast at Unter-Sliwno and cross the Elbe to meet him at Gbell, three miles northeast of where the Austrians are busy preparing their defenses. Meanwhile, he leaves Marshal Keith on the left bank of the Moldau with 32,000 men to cover the westward approaches to the city and prevent a breakout by the Austrians. After some delays and miscues, Schwerin does manage to cross the Elbe (now abandoned by Königsegg) and join up with Frederick near Gbell on the 5th (see battle map below). Their combined force in this area is now about 64,000 (having detached numerous units to guard their lines of communication).
While these maneuvers are going on, Frederick also has Prinz Moritz throw some more pontoon bridges over the Moldau to the south of Prague and cross there with 30 squadrons of cavalry and a few grenadier battalions to cut off any Austrian retreat south.
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| Count Serbelloni What're you lookin' at? |
Meanwhile, on the Austrian side, Charles wonders where the hell Serbelloni is. He sends another urgent galloper to that general asking "WTF? Over?" (in the 18th century German equivalent language). Serbelloni, not having left his comfy quarters back at Königgratz, responds by saying he is sending a small detachment of grenzers under Puebla to Podiebratz, still 30 miles (48 km) away. Thanks for nothing. I have wondered why Charles didn't have this worthless turdblossom relieved the week before. The count had done absolutely nothing to impede Schwerin's approach. He hadn't moved to join the main army when directly ordered to. And when ordered again, ignored that order. Finally, on the 5th, the day before the battle, Marshal Daun arrives from Vienna near Serbelloni with 37,000 more men and summarily relieves that do-nothing. But none of this happened in time to turn the battle. Obviously, Count Serbelloni must've had had deep church connections at court to protect him (his predecessors included many Princes of the Church).
At 0600 on 6 May, Frederick's and Scwherin's combined forces meet just south of Gbell, just two miles northeast of the Austrian entrenchments. Schwerin's men had made a night march and hadn't slept in 48 hours. Austrian hussars and grenzers posted north of the Roketnitzer stream had reported all this to headquarters. Charles moved from Nusle over to Maleschitz, directly behind the hinge of the two wings of his army. His army was deployed in three lines from the Ziskaberg over to the heights above the ponds at Kej, approximately 4.4 miles (7 km). It was then bent south (en potence as they used to say in 18th century military jargon) to cover a possible attack from the east.
Even though his scouts reported that the Prussians seemed to be moving east instead of attacking his positions along the ridge, Charles didn't feel that Frederick would attack that day His defenses were so strong, in fact, that he doubted Frederick would have the nerve to attack him at all, but was merely heading off east to avoid contact. Flawless reasoning.
But...he was wrong.
The deployment of the Austrian army at dawn on the 6th. Obviously, Charles expected an attack from Frederick from due north, where everyone could see he was assembling his forces. Browne, his second-in-command, was worried about the vulnerable right flank and set up batteries and emplacements to cover that sector. He also had the right flank cavalry face east, just in case.
Note that the regiments on this map, as with all my other maps in this blog, are rendered in proportion to their actual footprint size on the battlefield, and also in the uniform coat color, accented with the regimental facing color. Though the Austrian army did not yet number their regiments until later in the century, I have annotated them here with that eventual number to aid in keeping track of them and researching their uniform colors for all you wargamers. In the Prussian army , regimental numbers had already been in effect.
(map image protected by Digimarc copyright, © Jeffery P. Berry Trust, all rights reserved. Hi-res versions of these maps are available from the author at jeffery.berry@comcast.net.)
The Austrians stand down.
Well. Charles was wrong about Frederick wanting to avoid battle. Incredibly, in spite of the observed rendezvous of Frederick and Schwerin on the heights to the north near Prosek, and in spite of their mysterious movement to the east, Charles ordered his army to stand down. He gave the order for the men to cook breakfast and then take their tents down. Browne, who was in charge of the right wing, thought this was imprudent and countermanded the order to stand down on his command. Good thing (spoiler alert!).Also incredibly, for some reason, whoever was in command of the cavalry (Lucchesi or Esterhazy) had allowed 300 men from each regiment the night before to go into town to celebrate Spring Break or something, and collect fodder for the horses, and ammunition. Why this was done on the eve of a potential huge battle seems the height of recklessness. Charles himself was mystified by it and presumably ordered everybody back that morning. The narratives I read did not say whether these men (potentially almost half the cavalry) made it back in time for the battle.
View looking roughly north from the center of the Austrian position on the Schanzenberg ridge toward where they first saw the Prussians about a mile-and-a-half north near Prosek. Of course, none of those high-rises would've been there 267 years ago. Image from Google Street View. Praha Bike Rents & Tours
Frederick, though, was all for attacking that morning. Though Schwerin's men were exhausted, having marched all night, and though the king himself was suffering from some stomach bug and throwing up, he ordered Schwerin and Winterfeldt to reconnoiter the eastern approaches for the feasibility of attacking that way. The old field marshal and his staff rode over past Kej and assessed that the ground to the east of the Austrian position seemed to be mostly open meadows, perfect for attack. They also noticed that the Austrians all seemed to be facing north, not prepared for a flank attack. He came back and reported this to Frederick who ordered the whole army to start marching that way.
By 0600 the Prussians were heading due east in two columns. Frederick had left Penavaire's cavalry division , Manstein's grenadiers, and his little brother Prince Henry's brigade, along with some 12 pounder guns in front of Gbell to make a demonstration and fix Charles's attention north. The Austrians could see the Prussians marching east, and were soon masked by the rolling hills to the northeast. Charles still assumed they were marching to distance themselves from Prague, leaving a rear guard.
Browne, on the east edge of the Austrian position up on the ridge above Hlaupetin, could see the truth: The Prussians were going to turn their flank! He had some guns in emplacements on that ridge which began to take long range potshots at the Prussian columns. By 0700 these columns started turning to the south toward Unter-Poczernitz. Browne ordered Königsegg's infantry and Lucchesi's cavalry to file right and move south to counter the coming flank attack. Lucchesi moved his 42 squadrons south of the village of Stebohol and Königsegg reformed his two brigades facing east along the high ground known as the Taborberg, down to the ridge known as the Homoleberg. Austrian heavy artillery were in the process of filing out of Prague and as those batteries came up, Browne positioned them facing east in front of the infantry. He also sent an alert to Charles to the threat and called for support from the grenadier companies of the left wing to come over and extend the line (see 1000 map below).
With the troops he had, it was a long piece of ground that Browne had to cover. Prior to the battle he, Charles, and the war council had resolved that the Austrian infantry should, for this instance, break from its standard deployment in four ranks to three ranks in order to extend the front. This was somewhat controversial among some of the more conservative officers. Browne and the progressives thought the fourth rank was useless anyway since it couldn't fire from that depth. The Prussians had been deploying in three ranks for years (as had the British and Dutch since the War of the Spanish Succession fifty years earlier). The more old school officers thought that the fourth rank provided more moral support, making the formation more steady. But they were overruled by the need to cover more ground in this particular battle. By the end of this year, the three-rank deployment had become standard in the Austrian infantry, it was so useful, even though four ranks remained formally in the training manual for decades.
All of this redeployment took time. Fortunately, with interior lines, the Austrians were able to realign their right flank in time to receive the expected Prussian attack. The Prussians not only had far more distance to cover, but as they approached Unter-Poczernitz, they discovered that the ground that Schwerin had judged to be open meadows was, in reality a morass of drained fishponds, thick with boot-sucking mud. The battalion guns and heavy artillery were forced to funnel through the narrow streets of Unter-Poczernitz, causing a major traffic jam. The infantry had to march either across the narrow causeway dam between the village and the pond to the east or along the high, wooded ground to the northwest, across the boggy Roketnitzerbach. It took several hours for the first line of them to deploy on the western side, and then without their supporting guns.
Schwerin resolved to launch an attack at once. By about 1000 Frederick, still not feeling that great, had come down to join him and asked his trusted old friend if it wouldn't be wiser to wait until the supporting troops and the artillery had had time to join them. But Schwerin said he thought it was more advisable to strike early, while the Austrians were still redeploying. He used some homey German aphorism, "Frische Eier, gute Eier," ("Fresh eggs are good eggs", or "The early bird gets the worm." or "a stitch in time..." or some nonsense) to justify striking at once. There was also the belief in the Prussian army at the time that the mere sight of their troops marching resolutely with shouldered muskets would be enough to frighten any enemy into panic. Any enemy, apparently, but Austrians, as it turned out.
Causeway over the dam at Unter-Poczernitz which caused such a traffic jam for the Prussians. Image from panorama by Luke Hurryman on Google Maps.
Schwerin loses his head. Literally.
By
this time, Browne had managed to shore up his eastward-facing lines on
the heights of the Taborberg and the Homoleberg. And he had brought up
much of the Austrian reserve artillery to augment the three-pounder
battalion guns supporting his infantry. The gap between his right flank
and Lucchesi's cavalry down below Sterbohol had been filled by the 22
grenadier companies under Col. Guasco and two regiments from Arenberg's
second line (Los Rios and Harrach). And Charles had already dispatched
his second line under Wied and Clerici, as well as Maquire's reserve
infantry back at Direktorhof to shore up Browne's lines. These latter
two, however, Charles countermanded the order to redeploy and then,
after some more persuading, countermanded his countermand, so they got a
late start.
On the Prussian side, after having given the order to General Winterfeldt,to
attack at once with the first line of Prussians, without waiting for
supports or artillery, Schwerin galloped down to Prince Schönaich's cavalry who were just lining up south of Sterbohol. He gave Schönaich the
same order to attack the Austrian cavalry at once. The Prussian cavalry
commander pointed out that his supporting dragoons had not yet come up
(they were still negotiating the narrow causeway at up at
Unter-Poczernitz) and that across the field, if the good Field Marshal
would notice, the Austrian horse outnumbered him. The good Field Marshal
didn't want excuses. He ordered the attack without delay and galloped
back up toward the north to see how Winterfeldt's infantry assault was
doing.
Not great.
These regiments got underway one at a time, and not in a concerted motion. As
Winterfeldt led the line of Prussians up toward the Austrians, they met
an onslaught of cross cannon fire, both from the high ground in front
of the Austrian position and from their left as a battery of twelve
pounders hammered their line obliquely from the Homoleberg. It was
estimated that they had lost almost half their men before they even got
within musket range of the Austrian line. As I pointed out earlier, they
had almost none of their own artillery to answer the Austrians. When
they neared the main Austrian line, they were met with rolling musket
volleys and canister from the three-pounder battalion guns. Winterfeldt
himself was shot in the throat and taken from the field. At this point
one regiment after another started to hesitate and fall back. Seeing
this, the Austrian infantry cheered and spontaneously surged forward in a
counter-attack. This caused the whole Prussian line to break. It was
reported that many recent Catholic Silesian draftees among the Prussians,
not thrilled at being here in the first place to fight their countrymen
and coreligionists, actually stayed behind to hand their loaded muskets
over to the attacking Austrians. Oh, the shame!
It
was about this time that Schwerin galloped up to witness the collapse
of the Prussian line. He was there to see Winterfeldt shot, and ordered
him to be evacuated. Riding up to his own regiment (Schwerin #24)
he rallied some of them, seized the regimental flag and started to lead
them back to the attack. Just then a canister blast hit him directly in
the heart and stomach and ripped off half his head. Needless to say,
his horrified regiment resumed their flight. (Oh, and yes, he was dead,
if that wasn't obvious.)
When
the bad news was brought to Frederick about the death of his old friend
and mentor, he was reported to have said "There is nothing we can do
about that. Let's be determined as he was. March on!" But he must've
been devastated. After the battle a memoirist says he came across the
king sitting on a stump crying, and lamenting his dead friend.
Sanitized illustration of Marshall Schwerin getting his brains blown out rallying the #24 Schwerin Regiment. Artist: Richard Knötel , 1895.
Map of Situation about 1000. Browne and Charles finally notice that the Prussians are making an end-run and begin to redeploy to meet the new threat from the east. Kheul's troops and O'Donell's lone brigade of cavalry are left to guard the northern flank, in case this is just a feint. But all the other Austrian forces are frantically marching east, including the reserves. Most of the Austrian cavalry are moved to the southeast to keep the Prussians from enveloping that flank.
Meanwhile, back at the cavalry charge.
General Schönaich,
having his direct orders from Schwerin, and with only four of his
cuirassier regiments (about 3,500 troopers in 20 squadrons), proceeded
to launch his charge up the narrow ground between the swampy gully west
of Sterbohol and the pond to the left. Lucchesi, commanding the Austrian
cavalry, had about 4,340 men in 42 squadrons (assuming that the
absentees on R&R back in Prague from the night before had returned).
In addition he had just been reinforced by Charles who dispatched
another 4,890 hussars under Hadik from the reserve, and then another
1,860 cuirassiers under Hohenzollern from the left wing. In all,
Lucchesi had around 11,000 cavalry to face Schönaich's 3,500. He also dispatched some of Hadik's hussars to flank the oncoming Prussians from the south (see map above).
Though
hopelessly outnumbered, the Prussian cuirassiers resolutely charged
home against Lucchesi's first line, who waited to fire a salvo from
their carbines and then launched a short counter-charge. The Prussians
crashed into this line and drove it back. But then the supporting line
of Austrians drove into these now-disordered Prussians and drove them back.
They were also hit in the flank by the swarm of Hadik's hussars. So the
survivors all retreated back to their start point south of Sterbohol to
reform.
Schönaich's
dragoon regiments finally started to show up, having negotiated the
narrow causeway above Unter-Poczernitz, raising his force to almost
7,000 (less any casualties from the first charge). Of course, he was
still outnumbered by Lucchesi, but the latter took time to reform his
own squadrons. The Prussian ordered
another charge and yet another melee took place. But this time
Frederick (who had moved down himself to Sterbohol) dispatched two
hussar regiments (Puttkamer and Wartenberg)
around the pond below Unter Mecholup to outflank the outflanking
Austrian hussars. This melee rocked back and forth for the next couple
of hours.
Things begin to fall apart for the Austrians
Up
north, after the initial Austrian success in driving back the first
Prussian infantry assault, Browne was at some pains to rally his
victorious infantry, who had chased the fleeing enemy down the hill and
were masking the big batteries up on the plateau. The reinforcements
from Wied and Clerici had not yet come over into position to support
them. The old marshal was in the process of rallying his disordered
infantry when he was hit in the leg with a cannonball, shattering his
tibia. He wasn't killed but had to be taken back to Prague. Königsegg and
the other commanders of the right wing were also trying to get their
infantry back up onto the hill behind the batteries, but as this was
happening, 22 new battalions of Prussians led by General Hautchamoy and
supported by Bevern began to show up on the north side of the Austrian
line, near Hostawitz.
This
wasn't by plan, but by chance. What the lead battalions on this force
found in front of them was a gap left wide open on the left of the
Austrian line after those infantry had run down the hill to the
southeast, chasing the fleeing Prussians. Into the gap these battalions
attacked the disordered flank of the jubilant Austrians, who had, until
then, thought they had just won the battle. Ooops! And what began as a
victorious chase reversed itself.
Memoirs
from the battle record that the ground was dotted with scrub trees and
bushes so that no one could really tell what was going on. So the
envelopment by the northernmost Prussian battalions of the Austrian
position happened by chance, with each battalion or even company
discovering the Austrian units as they stumbled through the scrub. And
the Austrians on that side, not realizing there was a gap, also started
to discover they were being outflanked. One by one the Austrian infantry
battalions began to rally but fall back as the fresh Prussians came at
them from the north, and other fresh infantry began to show up below
them opposite the plateau.
The Prussian battalions under Bevern surprised and began to hit one Austrian regiment after another
as they moved south through the scrub, starting a ripple effect as each retreated west. It
wasn't a rout. The Austrian units fell back in relative order slowly,
but inexorably. The whole action reminds me of a very similar battle,
involving another unintended gap in the line and a slow, orderly
withdraw; Chickamauga in 1863, of which I wrote another blog post.
Landscape between Kej and Hostawitz, where Bevern's battalions found the gap to the north of the Austrian line: open fields broken up by scrub woods and brush. They probably wouldn't have marched in ordered lines. Image from Google Street View.
About
1100, to the south, where the cavalry battle had been swinging back and
forth, General Zeiten, with all his Prussian hussar regiments, looped
around the pond north of Unter-Mecholup (again, see map) and launched a
fresh attack on the Austrian cavalry, now more-or-less spent. This
caused all of these regiments to retreat to the southeast, past Zabelitz
and Unter Rostel (I drop these names so you can refer to them on the
map, not because I expect you to say, "Oh yeah! Zabelitz! I know it
well! Great pizza place there!").
The southern flank of the Austrian position was now completely exposed.
However, the Prussian cavalry itself was so exhausted and battered that
it could not exploit its victory.
Final Phase: The Austrians Retreat
By
noon, to the north of the cavalry action, Frederick's second line of
infantry finally managed to make it over the Roketnitzer through the
causeway at Unter-Poczernitz and deploy. These had their battalion
artillery with them. They also had all of Frederick's heavy guns, which
had, after three hours, managed to squeeze throught the narrow streets
of the village and unlimber enmasse to the southeast and center opposite
the Austrian positions. All of this artillery and fresh infanty,
combined with Hautcharmoy's and Bevern's assaults up at "the gap" tunred
out to be the tipping point. Without Browne's leadership the entire
right wing of the Austrian line started to fall back in sections.
Charles, about this time, too, who had moved his headquarters to
Maleschitz earlier that morning, suddenly had a pain in his throat and
lost consciousness. His staff evacuated him first to Nusle, where he
regained consciousness but didn't know where he was. Then they moved him
back into Prague. So the Austrian army was now, at the height of the
crisis, leaderless.
The
action of the narratives I read (Duffy, Kronoskaf, Asprey) and the
Prussian General Staff maps I used as reference all differed in detail
about which regiments were where during the next two hours of the
gradual Austrian withdrawal. My maps are more or less derived from the General Staff ones,
which aren't the easiest to decipher. It sounded pretty chaotic. But,
in general, without central leadership the Austrian army slowly folded
back toward Prague, eventually forming up outside of the city wall s in a
north-south double line from the Ziskaberg down to the farm at Stomka,
about 2,000 yards. The advance of the Prussians was itself not
particularly coherent and these suffered terrible casualties from the
stubborn Austrian intantry and almost suicidal banzai charges
from the remains of the Austrian cavalry under O'Donell, who slowed up
the Prussian offensive heroically. The retreat was so stubborn, in fact,
that it was at this stage that the Prussians suffered their greatest
casualties of the entire battle.
Manstein,
up north, frustrated at not being part of the action he could only see
and hear from the smoke and gunfire to the south, decided to take his
grenadier battalions and attack the grenzers holding the narrow, wooded
ridge between Hrdlorzez and Kej, where the Rocketnitzer looped. These
grenzer infantry fought back for awhile, long enough for their artillery
in the emplacements up there to escape. Both sides suffered large
casualties. But soon the Prussian grenadiers took the position. Prince
Henry (Frederick's little brother), also not wanting to be left out of
the action, led his brigade of one grenadier battalion (which he
detached to Manstein), the #3 Anhalt regiment, and the #13 Itzenplitz,
#17 Manteuffel, and Wangenheim Grenadiers down that ridge to. When they
got to the gorge formed by the Rocketnitzer at the village of
Hrdlorzez, Henry tried to personally lead the leading regiment in the
column, the Itzenplitz, over the stream. He plunged into the water first
to show them it was fordable and promptly sank in up to his chest. The
men pulled him out, muddy and soaking. Nevertheless, they did find a
shallower part and Henry led them across to continue the drive to roll
up the Austrian northern line. His older brother was very proud of him
when he later learned of this exploit.
Prince Heinrich leading the #13 Itzenplitz across the Roketnitzerbach. Nice try. Also by Richard Knötel
, 1895.
Henry
only manages to get two regiments across the Roketnitzer. But these (#3
Anhalt and#13 Itzenplitz) and some artillery manage to maul Clerici's
Austrians across the stream on the Taborberg. Clerici himself is killed.
All the Austrians fall back in this sector. But now Henry faces Kheul's
fresh regiments who had been facing north on the Schanzenberg and are
now swung right to block him. He's outnumbered. He sends an order to
General Penavaire, with the right wing Prussian cavalry up on the north
side of the stream to cross and charge Kheul in the flank. For some
reason only one regiment obeys this order (Schönaich Cuirassiers
C #6). They make a half-hearted charge and fall back. Maybe Penavaire
thought, "I only take orders from the king, not his little brother."
Henry
is eventually reinforced by Manstein and and comes to a halt about
1500, facing the remaining resolute Austrians on the Ziskaberg. The rest
of the Prussian army has also driven as far as Directorhof where it
pulls up short against the new, eastward-facing, and rallied Austrian
line. The battle peters out; both sides bloody and exhausted.
The
rest of the afternoon and evening Kheul expertly supervises the careful
withdrawal into the fortifications of Prague. Frederick lets them go.
That night Charles, who seems to have recovered from his fainting spell,
calls another war council. He lobbies for giving up Prague and escaping
with the army to the south and back to Vienna, essentially giving up
Bohemia. Browne, who is in a lot of pain from his smashed leg (I've had
my own tibia splintered in several pieces--not from a cannonball--it
hurts!), argues for keeping Prague. He is seconded by the other
generals. His reasoning is that Prague is the key to Bohemia and that
Frederick can't leave it untaken in his rear. He also argue sthat a
general siege will cost the Prussians a lot, weakening them while
Marshal Daun to the east assembles a fresh army around Kolin (which word
has it he is doing at that very moment).
"Well, fine," Charles throws up his hands.
Climax of the battle about noonish. Schwerin is decapitated just before this. Browne is hit by a cannon ball and taken off the field. Charles passes out and is taken back to Prague. Everything falls apart for the Austrian side, which had been holding its own all morning.
Was this a Prussian victory?
Prague itself had been well provisioned for a long siege before the battle. Its defenses were formidable. And though some 15,000 Austrians had escaped south from the battlefield to eventually join up with Daun at Kolin, Charles still had over 60,000 troops inside the city (including the original garrison). And much of the population had evacuated before the battle. While this would've been a terrible hardship for them, the reduction of mouths to feed during the siege made it easier for the Austrians to hold out.
For his part Frederick had not achieved his initial objective for the campaign; the capture of Prague. Instead he was faced with a costly siege, for which his army was not prepared. And Marshal Daun, arriving at Kolin 46 miles to the east (74 km) on the day of the battle with 37,000 fresh troops, with the addtion of Serbelloni's army and those fugitives from Prague, would soon have 85,000 men at his disposal.
A memorist, Kalkreuth, describes coming across Frederick sitting on a stump after the battle weeping to his brother, Prince Henry. "Our losses are frightful. Field Marshall Schwerin is dead!" According to Kalkreuth, he began to list the losses, both personal friends and horrific general casualties, and became so overcome he could no longer speak. I don't think, at the time, he thought he'd won a victory.
So, 18th century custom or not, I would say that Frederick did not win this battle. It was actually a strategic defeat. Within five weeks, he would be forced to break off the siege of Prague and head east to confront Daun, and his first battlefield defeat of his career at Kolin.
Armchair General Section
So what are we to make of this battle? Aside from about whether or not it was a Prussian victory, what were its features?
For one, the campaign up to the battle was masterfully played out by Frederick, Schwerin and the other Prussian commanders. They out-maneuvered the Austrians and sucker-punched them a number of times.
On the Austrian side, while Browne played his part well, he was not well served by his subcommanders, Serbelloni, Arenburg, and Königsegg. And when Charles finally showed up, all he wanted to do was give up. But overall, the Austrians managed their resources carefully and maintained the central position, not letting the Prussians get to Prague before them.
The opening phase of the battle itself was also managed well by Frederick. Employing another head-fake, he managed to execute an end run around the Austrian right flank, much like Alexander did at the Granicus and The Jhelum over two thousand years before, and perfected by Frederick at the end of this year at Leuthen and the next year at Zorndorf. That maneuver became his signature.
The Austrians were well-dug in, having had five days to do so. But they were expecting an attack from the north and failed to adequately prepare their vulnerable right. Fortunately, Browne was perceptive enough to see what Frederick was doing that morning and was able to shift his front to the right to meet the Prussian assault from Unter-Poczernitz. But Charles, not the brightest of C-in-C's, at first countered this move and delayed the reinforcement from the center to his right (something he would do catastrophically again at Leuthen later that same year). He was the master of bad calls.
Now the Prussians made a series of mistakes. When Frederick asked his good friend Schwerin to go check out the ground to the east, the 73-year-old apparently just gave it a cursory glance from a distance and said it looked good. What he didn't realize, had he rode up to it and tested it himself, or sent his staff, was that it was broken up and swampy; a series of drained fish ponds that wouldn't take cavalry, artillery, or even infantry formations. This sloppy reconnaissance cost Frederick several hours, bottling up his artillery and infantry in choke points.
The next error came when Schwerin, realizing his mistake, tried to make up for it by ordering an immediate attack by the first units to make it through Unter-Poczernitz, without waiting for artillery or supporting forces. This resulted in disaster as the first infantry and cavalry charges were repulsed. This is what happens when you substitute homey aphorisms (Fresh eggs make good eggs) for careful execution.
Schwerin's third mistake came in trying to personally rally his own regiment instead of keeping his head (literally) and managing his overall command. It would've been like Patton taking personal command of one of this tanks. While brave and worthy of statues in German parks, it was reckless. Frederick himself was sick and tried manfully to maintain control of the overall army, but he could've used some help as the whole operation became chaotic, devolving into many individual combats at the intitiative of individual battalions.
On the Austrian side, Browne, also got too involved with micro-management. Instead of delegating the rallying and calling back of his victorious infantry, he felt he had to personally do so, which involved, like Schwerin, his paying for it with an incapacitating wound. While his wound didn't kill him (for several weeks anyway), it was bad enough to remove him from the battlefield. He should have, instead of rushing to the heat of the battle, stayed on top of the Taborberg and managed the reinforcing regiments marching over. This would have avoided the opening of the fatal gap on the north side of the Austrian right wing.
In all, the character of the battle was one of mismanagement and bad, impulsive calls on both sides.
In terms of the scale of this battle, even though it was pretty obscure, it was, as I said at the beginning of this article, one of the biggest and most bloody of the 18th century. With 125,000 engaged, and over 27,000 casualties (22%) it rivaled Antietam or Blenheim for bloodiest day.
Wargaming Prague
Formations
Both sides' infantry formations used three ranks. Though four ranks were the regulation deployment for the Austrian infantry at this time, for this battle it was ordered that they should deploy on four. This would make the Austrian firepower the equivalent of the Prussian. If your rules provide greater morale for deeper formations, this would reduce the morale for the Austrian infantry accordingly. But it would also reduce the cannonball effect.
At this stage of the war, cavalry (both cuirassiers and dragoons) on both sides would have deployed in three ranks. Hussars were in two.
Ground
Ground to the eastern side of the battlefield would've been obstructed by many ponds and bogs. For the wargame, this would create several obstacles to both movement and artillery fire.
Austrians would be on higher ground at the beginning of the battle, giving them greater firepower and reducing the effect of any Prussian fire uphill (muskets or cannon).
Supporting Artillery
In the early stages of the battle most of the Prussian artillery (both battalion 3-pdrs and heavier field pieces) would have been stuck on the far side of the Roketnitzer stream at Unter-Poczernitz. The Austrians, however, would have all of their artillery available.
Leader Vulnerability
One of the features of this battle was how decisive the loss of a charismatic leader was. If your game rules provide for leader morale bonus, they should also provide for a morale loss if a leader is in the front and is killed.
Scenarios
- Frederick takes more time to deploy on the east. This would allow for the Prussian player to bring up his full strength. But it would also provide more time for the Austrian player to shore up his.
- Frederick attacks from the south. Prussian player makes an even wider circuit (as Frederick did at Zorndorf the following year) and attacks from the south, which was not as swampy.
- Charles is sick from the start and doesn't take part. This would give the Austrian player (as Browne) more flexibility in deployment.
- Austrian Cavalry is halved in strength. Assume that the half of the troopers that were given leave the night before don't make it back from the city to rejoin their regiments in time.
- Serbelloni and Daun both show to save the day. It would be fun to see what would happen if, even late in the day, Daun's 64,000 showed up from the east. You could devise a roll of the die after, say, noon to see if they showed up.
Orders of Battle
The following OOB lists were compiled primarily from the Kronoskaf article on the battle. The units only include those actually participating in the battle and not the Austrian garrison inside Prague itself, or Gen. Keith's Prussian forces besieging the city from the western bank of the Moldau.Command, besides listing the name of each command, this cell is also color-coded for the primary uniform coat color of the regiment. The numeric code before each name is the later numerical designation in the Prussian and Austrian armies. Prussia began numbering its regiments as early as 1737. Austria didn't start numbering its regiments until after 1769, but I have included the later number of those for aid in your own research since the inhaber (owner/commander) of each regiment changed over the course of its history. Kronoskaf or Duffy (see References below) are both excellent resources to look up the history of each regiment.
Facing is color-coded in the facings of the regiment (e.g. cuffs, lapels, etc.) For more precise uniform information I refer you to Kronoskaf or Duffy. Under this column, too, is the Military Symbol coding for the command (division , brigade, regiment, squadron, etc. as well as the code for the type of unit; infantry, cavalry, artillery).
Flags displays miniatures of the flags carried into battle by the units, both the colonel's color on the left (carried by the 1st company of the first battalion) and the regimental colors ( also known as ordnance flags), carried by all the rest in the regiment. Where units did not carry flags on campaign (like hussars or combined grenadier battalions), this cell is left blank.
Strength MAJOR CAVEAT: Kronoskaf and other sources I used gave approximate total strengths of the participants. To get to these estimates, I took an attrition rate based on those approximations and applied that to the official parade states of all the units evenly, rounding to the nearest ten--unless Kronoskaf reported a specific roster from a particular regiment for the day of the battle--that's clear, isn't it? So, it should go without saying: Do not use these precise numbers in any academic context without taking that caveat. Of course, each individual regiment probably varied considerably from what I have listed here. These are still approximations.
Guns
are the number of artillery tubes assigned to each command. For this OOB, since sections
were assigned to individual battalions for close support, I have
reflected that here. I also speculated on the caliber since I didn't have actual TOE data on each specific unit. Moreover, the Prussian Army was then in the process of replacing its older 3 pounders with newer 6 pounders as close support, with the priority given to first line regiments. Also during this period, the Austrian Army was,starting to add 7 pound howitzers to its battalion artillery. I have arbitrarily assigned those calibers to each unit to reflect this.
Ranks is the standard deployment depth for each type and army at the time of the battle for each army. Later in the war, both armies would reduce their tactical ranks, but as of 1757, both were still deploying according to older doctrine.
Subunits, list the building blocks for each type of command, for instance a Prussian musketeer regiment would have two battalions of five companies. For further details on subunits, I again refer to the Kronoskaf site.
Ranks is the standard deployment depth for each type and army at the time of the battle for each army. Later in the war, both armies would reduce their tactical ranks, but as of 1757, both were still deploying according to older doctrine.
Subunits, list the building blocks for each type of command, for instance a Prussian musketeer regiment would have two battalions of five companies. For further details on subunits, I again refer to the Kronoskaf site.
Notes
is used to mark artillery calibers, or relative position of larger commands in
each army. But I've also used this to show the color schemes of Prussian
grenadier and fusilier headgear, for quick reference. Again, for anyone
painting models, I refer to Kronoskaf.
References
I relied on the following references in composing this post, maps, and OOB, with most of the detail coming from Duffy and Kronoskaf, the latter probably the finest amalgam of information on this war and period.
Asprey, Robert, "Frederick the Great: A Magnificent Enigma", Ticknor & Fields, ISBN 0-89919-352-8
Duffy, Christopher, "The Army of Frederick the Great", Emperor Press, ISBN 1-883476-02-X
Duffy, Christopher, "Frederick the Great: A Military Life", Routledge, ISBN 0-415-00276-1
Duffy, Christopher, "The Army of Maria Theresa", Terence Wise, ISBN 0-7153-7387-0
Duffy, Christopher, "Instrument of War: The Austrian Army in the Seven Years War", Emperor's Press, ISBN 1-883476-19-4
Duffy, Christopher, "Military Experience in the Age of Reason," Atheneum, 1987, ISBN 0-689-11993-3
Duffy, Christopher, "By Force of Arms: Vol 2 of The Austrian Army in the Seven Years War", Emperor's Press, ISBN 1-883476-39-4
Frederick the Great, "The Art of War", Da Capo Press, 1999, ISBN 0-306-80908-7
Haythornethwaite, Philip, "Frederick the Great's Army 1 Cavalry", Osprey Publishing, ISBN 1-85532-134-3
Haythornethwaite, Philip, "Frederick the Great's Army 2 Infantry", Osprey Publishing, ISBN 1-85532-160-2
Haythornethwaite, Philip, "Frederick the Great's Army 3 Specialist Troops", Osprey Publishing, ISBN 1-85532-225-0
Haythornethwaite, Philip, "The Austrian Army 1740-80: 1 Cavalry", Osprey Publishing, ISBN 1-85532-415-6
Haythornethwaite, Philip, "The Austrian Army 1740-80: 2 Infantry", Osprey Publishing, ISBN 1-85532-418-0
Haythornethwaite, Philip, "The Austrian Army 1740-80: 3 Specialist Troops", Osprey Publishing, ISBN 1-85532-4180
Millar, Simon, "Kolin 1757: Frederick the Great's first defeat", Osprey Publishing, Campaign 91, 2001, ISBN 1-84176-297-0
Nosworthy, Brent, "The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-1763" Hippocrene, ISBN0-87052-785-1
Online References:
Kronoskaf: Seven Years War: Battle of Prague
Plan der Schlact bei Prag, Die Kriege Friederchs des Grossen II, 1890, Berlin, Prussia. Armee. Grosser Generalstab. Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung This source was invaluable for my creation of the battle maps and the position and composition of the contending forces.
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